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 Preface and Acknowledgements  
Many in the Department of Defense associate the phase “acquisition reform” with 
major policy and legislative initiatives of the past decade, for example, the shift away 
from reliance on military unique specifications and standards, the emphasis on teaming, 
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA), and the Clinger-Cohen Act.  While we 
should never discount the significance of these measures, the view that the 1990s were 
the genesis of acquisition reform diminishes perspective of the long history of reform 
efforts linked to names such as Goldwater, Nichols, Grace, Carlucci, Packard, and 
Hoover, to name but a few.  Indeed, these efforts extend back in our history to the 
Continental Congress’ attempts to reform the buying practices of General Washington’s 
Army.  Considering this history, “reform” may well be acquisition’s defining theme. 
Of course, acquisition can never be truly and completely “reformed.”  As a 
process, acquisition continually evolves as military and political priorities shift, as 
economic and business conditions change, and as technology advances.  Acquisition 
reform, then, must also be viewed as a process rather than as an end state.  The slogan 
of 16th century Protestants, Reformata et Semper Reformandum (“Reformed and 
Always Reforming”), must apply in acquisition.   
How may such a perspective take hold in acquisition?  Elected and appointed 
leaders can provide the political will to pursue reform, but reform cannot simply conform 
to shifting political landscapes.  Acquisition professionals have the expertise to 
implement reform measures, but as “owners” of acquisition processes they often have 
difficulty challenging the status quo.   
We assert that a process of continual reform must include acquisition 
researchers.  Only research can provide the type of critical and focused inquiry that 
informs acquisition’s policies and practices and thus promotes its reform.  It is in such a 
spirit of reform that the Acquisition Research Program at the Naval Postgraduate School 
seeks to engage research in the study of acquisition and its important issues.     
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 The potential benefits of acquisition research are myriad.  It can contribute to the 
effective practice of acquisition in DoD through development of an expanded knowledge 
base about the field.  It can contribute to sound, scientifically-based proposals and 
recommendations for acquisition decision makers.  Perhaps most significantly, it can 
provide a solid theoretical grounding for future training and educational programs that 
will enable the workforce to think more creatively and critically about the key issues and 
challenges of acquisition. 
In pursuit of such possibilities, we are pleased to publish these Proceedings of 
the Naval Postgraduate School’s inaugural Acquisition Research Symposium held on 
Thursday, May 13, 2004, in Monterey, CA.  Titled “Charting a Course for Change: 
Acquisition Theory and Practice for a Transforming Defense,” the symposium served 
successfully, in our view, as a forum for the exchange of ideas among a distinguished 
and diverse body of scholars and practitioners of public sector acquisition.  The 
contents feature presentations on recently completed and on-going research projects 
conducted under the Acquisition Research Program, as well as an excellent keynote 
address by The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler, former Undersecretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology & Logistics).    
We are appreciative of and wish to recognize the support provided for this 
symposium and its research by the Program’s sponsors: 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Program Executive Officer, Ships 
• Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition Management) 
We also gratefully acknowledge the generous contributions of the Naval 
Postgraduate School Foundation in support of the symposium. 
James B. Greene      Keith Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S Navy (ret)    Associate Professor 
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 Announcement and Call for Proposals 
The Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School 
announces the 2nd Annual Acquisition Research Symposium to be held May 18-19, 
2005 in Monterey, CA.   
This symposium serves as a forum for the presentation of acquisition research and the 
exchange of ideas among scholars and practitioners of public sector acquisition.  We 
seek a diverse audience of influential attendees from academe, government, and 
industry who are well placed to shape and promote future research in acquisition.   
The Symposium Program Committee solicits proposals for panels and/or papers from 
academicians, practitioners, students and others with interests in the study of 
acquisition.  The following list of topics is provided to indicate the range of potential 
research areas of interest for this symposium: acquisition and procurement policy, 
supply chain management, public budgeting and finance, cost management, 
project management, logistics management, engineering management, 
outsourcing, performance measurement.   
Proposals must be submitted by December 1, 2004.  The Program Committee will 
make notifications of accepted proposals by January 15, 2005.  Final papers must be 
submitted by April 15, 2005 in order to be included in the Symposium Proceedings. 
Proposals for papers should include an abstract along with identification, affiliation, and 
contact information for the author(s).  Proposals for panels (plan for 90 minute duration) 
should describe the panel subject and format, along with participants’ names, 
qualifications and the specific contributions each participant will make to the panel.   
Send proposals via e-mail to the Program Committee chair, Keith Snider, at 
ksnider@nps.edu.  
Further Symposium details (hotel, registration, etc.) will be posted at 
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 Keynote Address: Dr. Jacques S. Gansler  
 
Dr. Jacques S. Gansler – former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; 
presently interim Dean and Roger C. Lipitz Chair in Public Policy and Private Enterprise in the School of 
Public Affairs, University of Maryland. 
 
First of all, let me congratulate and thank Jim Greene and the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  I think this is really a very important and significant event.  Jim 
refers to it as the ‘First Annual Acquisition Symposium’ and I would hope that that is 
actually the case.  Getting this group together, I think, is very important.  
I should point out that it isn’t my first attempt at trying to do things of this sort.  
Almost a dozen, maybe ten years ago, at the time, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
asked a couple of us to go back and look at the schools.  I got assigned ICAF and what 
was then the Defense Systems Management College.  One of the things that came out 
very clearly and was actually put into the report that we did for Admiral Crowe was the 
fact that there really isn’t any acquisition research being done, or very little, and that’s 
such a shame.   
Then I became head of the advisory board for the Defense Acquisition University 
and really pressed them to try to put aside some money for external research; put it into 
the budget.  A little bit took place and then it kind of faded away.  Again, I tried pushing 
them when I got to be Under Secretary.  They actually did, in fact, introduce the 
acquisition senior course and wrote a hundred cases; and they tried  to do some 
research but not really the kind that I think needs to be done, and not sponsoring a lot 
externally.  It was almost all done internally.   
So it’s been sort of a career sponsorship on my part to try to push this whole 
area.  It seems to me that doing research on improving the effectiveness and efficiency 
with which we do our overall acquisition, both from a theory and a practice perspective 
is absolutely essential.  There is so much evidence of the potential for improvement that 
you can easily make the case, it seems to me.   
=
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 The problem is that while we do spend over $200 billion a year now, I guess the 
budget has gone up:  In my budget, I had $40 billion for R&D, $60 billion for 
procurement, and $80 billion for logistics, so, $180 billion.  It’s now over $200 billion for 
that same kind of pot.  Think about it in terms of every working day, over a half a billion 
a year is spent on these three areas and we never seem to have enough money left to 
even spend a very tiny percentage to try to improve it.  We use it all up and we are 
always short, by the way, in all three categories - - in terms of what we need. 
I thought about it in terms of putting some notes together for this meeting.  It 
struck me that now you can make the argument that there are so many changes 
happening in the process, which influence the acquisition process. It is almost a crime 
for us not to be figuring out ways to enhance that process, to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of it.  We should not be willing to settle; the government, the nation, the 
taxpayer really, shouldn't be willing to settle.  So what I thought of doing was trying to 
highlight what I think are the six major changes that are effecting the acquisition 
process today, and suggest that these may be at least six areas where we should be 
doing a significant amount of research that, frankly, is not being done today. 
The first of these is the changing nature of what the government itself 
does.  This is going from the government as a monopoly “doer” of things to the 
competitive sourcing of this work; as we have begun to do.  Regardless of whether the 
public and private sector win these competitions, we're introducing market forces to 
improve the performance and lower the cost.  This is done through A76, and other 
processes like that, including outsourcing sometimes, privatization sometimes, 
public/private partnerships, etc.  You will hear about some of these examples later 
today.   
The interesting part of this is that the Defense Department has taken the lead in 
doing these things without much research on how it's done or how to do it more 
effectively.  How to apply best practices? How to actually put together the results? How 
to do enough cases so that people would understand it better?  Yet, overwhelmingly the 
data that are available tend to show that we significantly improve performance (in some 
=
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 cases by orders of magnitude) and at the same time, on average, lower the cost by over 
30%.  Now why wouldn't one want to do things like that?  If you can dramatically 
improve performance and dramatically lower cost, why aren't we doing it?   
Research into overcoming barriers, developing best practices, worrying about the 
government workforce in terms of soft landings; this overall area needs to just simply 
get more visibility.  With data - - hopefully facts do have some influence sometimes in 
this area - - it can actually make a big difference.  That's number one.  It's the changing 
nature of the government's role.  Clearly, right now, you hear this in terms of civilianizing 
some of the military slots, for example.  In terms of work that's not inherently 
governmental that people in uniform are doing instead of carrying guns, when we have 
real shortages of people in the military.  All of that area, I think, is the first one I would 
highlight. 
The second one I'd highlight is the impact of e-government or the 
transformation to information-based management and control systems; but much more 
than from a management perspective, almost from a leadership perspective.  Sort of 
end-to-end; from procurement, finance, logistics, and so forth.  Here again, huge 
benefits in terms of higher performance and dramatically lower costs, if you're willing to 
change the process.  It's not the people that are the problem; it’s the process that’s the 
problem - throughout the whole acquisition domain, in my opinion. 
The classic example is logistics.  You will also hear more about that as we go 
through the day.  We spend over $80 billion a year on logistics.  We do not do a world-
class job by any measure that you can come up with.  We pile up enough metal and put 
enough people on it so that we can do it.  But if you want to compare our performance 
to any world-class operation, whether it be Caterpillar, FedEx, pick anyone, they deliver 
24 hours domestically, 48 hours internationally with 99.99% probability.  We, from the 
first Gulf War, had an average of 36 days.  We've reduced that (this is when things were 
on the shelf) to an average of 22 days, with an uncertainty of one to two years.  So, we 
order three times as much, in order to make sure that we get it.  Thus, we have a $60 
billion inventory floating around, of which about half of it is obsolete.  We simply do not 
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 do a world-class job - - in terms of responsiveness, dependability, or cost.  This really 
matters to war fighters.  This is really where the business side meets the war-fighting 
side.  Modern logistics systems, information technology systems, are obviously the way 
to go here.  You can have the desired effect when you link in finance and procurement.  
So it's an end-to-end system.  Very clearly, this is an area in which the DoD is lagging 
what has been demonstrated commercially on a worldwide basis.  And the biggest 
challenge here is overcoming institutional hurdles.  Research into how it's been done, 
and into what results have been achieved, can make a huge difference in overcoming 
the institutional inertia to the needed changes. 
Now, if you put together those two, the changing nature of what the government 
does and the impact of e-government, what you see is a clouding of the separation of 
lines between the private and public sectors.  In the past it’s been relatively 
differentiated.  Now you’re seeing a fuzzing of those lines.  And that's good.  Take 
advantage of what is best in each one and figure out a way to use market forces or 
competition to maximize performance, while minimizing cost.  Everybody knows we 
need that extra money.  If we could even achieve 10% savings on logistics (at $80 
billion a year) here’s $8 billion annually that could be put into modernization, which we 
so badly need. 
The third area comes from the revolution in military affair.  The changing 
nature of warfare and the changing nature of the technology used for it.  Bill Perry called 
it “reconnaissance/strike” warfare.  You can call it “a transformation in military 
operations”.  Whatever you want to name it, the reality is we have multiple, distributed 
sensors and distributed shooters, all “joint” (multi-service) and all interconnected by 
communication, command and control systems, fused data, etc.   
Now, what does this mean for the acquisition community?  The first thing that it 
means is that we must learn how to manage “systems-of-systems”.  We have always 
set up our procurements, our program offices, and so forth, around systems platforms; 
basically ships, planes, tanks, even radios.  Now what we have is the challenge of 
managing a system-of-systems, an integrated program.  We aren’t organized to do that.  
=
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 We don't have management practices to do that.  And we have got to learn how to do 
that if we’re going to learn how to manage these very complex systems-of-systems, 
which is what the revolution in military affairs is all about - - all on a joint basis and (as 
I’ll explain in a minute), on a multinational basis.   
In addition, because the system-of-systems, and the revolution military affairs, 
and the technology are all so heavily dependent on information technology, we now 
introduce the whole question of cyber security; as well as privacy in many of these 
areas (in terms of protection of cost data, and things like that).   Security of the 
information systems, and the vulnerability of those information systems, now becomes 
an area for very important research that has to get done.  In a certain sense, you also 
introduce the added unreliability associated with complexity, when you get into systems 
of this sort.   
There is a lot of very critical analysis simply associated with the technology of 
these systems.  The systems have to be, for example, open architecture.  This idea of 
“plug-and-play” has to be realized; as contrasted to just being in the speeches.  And it 
has to be nonproprietary.  How do we structure this from a procurement perspective?  It 
all needs to be linked with “middleware”, rather than each program’s individual, unique 
systems.  Additionally, we have to be able to handle the rapid changes taking place in 
this technology.  Therefore, we need to be able to, literally, “plug-and-play” with frequent 
updates of new systems.  These are big management challenges to the acquisition 
community, it seems to me, brought on by the way we're going to be structuring our 
systems, in order to be fighting our wars of the future. 
The fourth area I would raise is the changing nature of the acquisition 
process itself.   We are moving to, and should have moved to a lot earlier, the use of 
spiral development - writing requirements that are capability-based, writing test and 
evaluation plans that are capability based.  These all result in dramatic changes in each 
of the processes associated with the acquisition process.   
Just think of the budget process.  Historically we’ve had a budget process that’s 
R&D, then procurement, and then logistics.  Now, with spiral development, we have a 
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 5- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 block one, a block two, a block three, and a block four, all with R&D.  R&D never stops 
in a spiral development process.  Test and evaluation never stops in a spiral 
development process.  The requirements have to be written such that the system is 
capability-based and continues to evolve as the technology evolves - - as a new 
capability is proven out.  This changes the whole acquisition process, and we haven't 
really implemented that.  Additionally, these all have to be requirements that are cost-
based, because otherwise we’re not going to be able to afford enough of each system.  
We’re going to have to get off that historic curve where we constantly get improved 
performance at higher cost.  We now have to figure out how the next-generation 
systems will have improved performance at lower-costs.  So cost is a military 
requirement, not an accounting problem. 
Because the technology is changing so fast, we also have to be scheduled 
driven.  And we haven't traditionally done that.  In this Navy audience maybe I can pick 
on the F-22.  Some cynics say it's named that because it's taken 22 years to develop it.  
Now think about the technology in that.  When I was there a few years ago, we spent 
$350 million upgrading the electronics systems, because they were obsolete, and it 
hadn't even been put into production yet.  There’s something wrong about that cycle 
time when the critical information technology is evolving every 18 months and our 
system developments are taking 18 years.  They’re just incompatible.  So, we have got 
to be schedule driven.  The ACTDs and similar things are part of the acquisition change 
that can help us in this area.  Also, using commercial systems, commercial practices, 
and commercial suppliers can have a big impact here.  But all of these changes impact 
the way in which we have traditionally done our acquisition business.  So, these are 
areas for very significant acquisition research.   
The last area I would point out (in the changing nature of the acquisition process) 
is how do we keep continuous competition - - or at least the potential for it?  If you 
genuinely believe, as I do and as all the empirical data certainly shows that the way to 
keep motivating innovation and lower-cost is through continuous competition, then it 
must be part of the process.  By continuous I mean, for example, you can make the 
Joint Strike Fighter keep the two engines annually  competing, (for a share of the buys) 
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 as we did in the “great engine war” for the F-16's & F-15's - - so there is an incentive for 
better and better performance/reliability at lower and lower costs.  Even in the case of 
the Joint Strike Fighter avionics, having a second avionics potential supplier so that 
every five years, as avionics technology continues to evolve, you can get two or three, 
or even four for five, generations of new avionics procured in a competitive 
environment.   
So if the current supplier doesn’t continue to improve their performance and/or 
lower their costs then you have an alternative.  The fact is, if you have an alternative 
they will continue to improve performance and lower-costs - - as contrasted to our 
history, which is, once they've won and become a sole-source supplier, costs continue 
to grow and performance isn’t motivated to get significantly better.  It's the presence of a 
credible alternative, in a competitive environment, that can make such a dramatic 
difference.   
Now, as you know, we've had trouble trying to convince Congress and many in 
the military about why it’s worth keeping a second source around.  I think the empirical 
data are very clear, but people say ‘you mean you can’t manage it (in a sole source 
environment) so that you drive up performance and lower-costs?  Why do you have to 
pay a second source in order to do that?  The answer is, we've tried for the last 40 
years, and it hasn’t worked.  Why not try the one that does work; which is as in the 
commercial world, using continuous forms of competition, or at least the credible threat 
of competition.   
By the way, I don't think it should be a law to always run the competition because 
if somebody continues to improve their performance and lower their costs they shouldn't 
be forced to compete it.  That’s the reward for doing what you should have done in the 
first place.  So that's the fourth area: The changes in the acquisition process. 
The fifth one, and one of the more challenging ones from an acquisition 
perspective, is that I can’t imagine that we are ever going to go into any military 
operation in the future without some form of a coalition of our allies.  Of course, 
the impact of this is far broader than just a particular military operation; it's the whole 
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 area globalization and its impact on the acquisition process.  Here, you do get into 
concerns about technology transfer; and you get into issues associated with how you 
achieve interoperability.  When we go to war and our allies can't securely talk to us 
(which was the case in Kosovo - - with two allied airplanes flying along next to each 
other, but who couldn't talk in a secure mode) then we are vulnerable, and that’s 
obviously not good.  It’s clearly a case of the acquisition process having failed to 
achieve its objectives.   
And so if we’re going to go to war as a coalition, and I believe we are, then we 
have to have ways of achieving allied systems’ full interoperability.  That gets into 
issues of sharing technologies with our allies, and having assurances that they are 
controlling it.   It actually gets into a lot of the internationalization of the defense industry, 
and the increasing globalization of the commercial technology that is leading-edge, and 
that our adversaries have access to.  Surely, our allies should be able to get it directly 
from us.   Concerns of this sort are very serious acquisition research issues that I think 
that we have to address.  My impression is that there's very little serious research being 
done in the area of issues such as technology transfer. 
The sixth and the last area that I will highlight is the changing nature of the 
defense industry.  Because of the fact that the DoD is a monopsony buyer it is our 
responsibility to ensure that we have an efficient, responsive, innovative defense 
industry out there when we need it.  In this regard, I would not define the defense 
industry as just defense firms.  I would define it as the people who supply goods and 
services - - directly or indirectly - -  to the Department of Defense.  The more of those 
we can have commercially, probably the better.   
I would certainly think that, given flexible manufacturing and other technologies 
that are available, we could have many integrated (civil and military) production lines.  
The Japanese are heading in the direction of efficient production in quantities of one; for 
automotive.  What you have is multiple different cars coming down the line, and the 
robots and computers are smart enough, and have been programmed, so that it's just 
insertion of different parts into the process.  You can have some military stuff and some 
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 commercial stuff, as long as the production process is the same.  The end-item 
equipment doesn't have to be the same.   
Why can't we have integrated lines?  The reason we can't is because of all of our 
historic practices, and all of our unique rules.  Not because the technology doesn’t allow 
it.  The commercial firms don’t want to use our cost accounting standards, for example.  
That's fine; we have permission to waive it.  Then why don’t we take advantage of it?  
Because we've never done it before.  And that's why we don't do it.    
As to the industry structure itself, it is essential that we make sure we have at 
least two qualified firms in each critical sector. Because we had seven or eight aircraft 
companies and knew we couldn't afford all of them, we encouraged integration and 
consolidation of these firms - - always with the statement that what we were doing was 
allowing consolidation as long as we maintained competition, and as long as the 
government gained the benefit of cost savings.  Those were the two considerations that 
we had.   
We’ve had to stop some.  You recall the proposed Northrop/Lockheed merger we 
stopped because that would not have maintained two people in some of the critical sub-
sectors.   I would emphasize that two in every critical sector is not necessarily just the 
platforms (ships, planes, and tanks).  It’s the critical subsystems, where technological 
innovation is so essential as we move along.   
It’s the government's job, as the monopsony buyer from an oligopoly set of 
suppliers,  to worry about the structure of the industry, because the structure of that 
industry will determine the conduct and performance of that industry.  If we don't worry 
about it, two or three wins in a row by one supplier and the other one’s gone.  That may 
mean we have to stimulate, even subsidize, some R&D in order to keep a second 
supplier in a critical area doing the next-generation systems.  Then, when the 
competition comes along, there’s still somebody there.   
That leads me into thinking about what's happening today.  In some of these 
consolidations, vertical integration is taking place.  A major acquisition issue for the 
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 future is how do you assure that the prime contractor, who is basically becoming a 
systems integration house (not first and foremost a platform supplier), is holding an 
objective, independent assessment of his own supplier (at both the platform level and 
the lower tier) versus someone else’s?  How do you guarantee that objectivity, from the 
government's perspective, and yet not have the government assume full responsibility 
for that decision; because you want your integration contractor to have that 
accountability?  That's a really big challenge from an acquisition research perspective.  I 
think there are ways to do it, but I don't see much research being done; and yet I see 
the industry continuing its consolidation through vertical integration.  We’re going to 
suffer from it unless we start to really figure out how to address that from a public-policy 
perspective.  This should be an area of considerable research.   
The problem is that we’ve taken the position that ‘the market will take care of it’, 
yet the natural forces of the market tend to yield a monopoly, if allowed to continue 
uncontrolled.  That is why we have antitrust laws and things like that.  Now we’re down 
to the situation where if you're the only buyer of weapons systems and you have one or 
two suppliers, three at best, in any critical area, the Government has a responsibility to 
make sure that this industry becomes competitive - - and also that it makes money 
doing so, in order for it to reinvest in innovation. 
Those are the six sets of changes:  1) The changing nature of what the 
government does; 2) the impact of e-government; 3) the changing nature of warfare and 
its associated technology; 4) new acquisition practices; 5) globalization’s impact 
(including inter-national coalition operations); and, finally, 6) the changing nature of the 
defense industry.   And we must address these all together, because they’re all 
happening at once.  These are not independent.  They are all interrelated.  
It's a very complex analytic issue, and one in which serious research needs to be 
done - on best practices, on results achieved, on new ideas, and so forth.  And that’s 
where I think we don't now have that research being done.  It needs to be done - - given 
its importance, and the potential associated with these changes to our military 
capability.  I think it’s a surprise that there is so little research being done, and so little 
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 education being done.  Particularly, I would argue, in universities around the country 
where you must develop the people who will do this in the future.  You want to graduate 
students capable of addressing these issues.  You want people who will come into the 
government with some training and background on these issues, and/or people who are 
in the government being trained instead of doing it the way we have always done it - -  
because ‘that's the way they've always done it for 20 years, so let's keep doing it that 
way’.  The old way is not applicable in this environment of these dramatic changes.  
Right now, if you look at the level of funding in this area - - of the $200 billion a year we 
spend here - - it's really a sin.  I'd argue that a lack of funding and a lack of leadership 
priority is why we’re not giving it proper attention. 
We can set the requirement easily.  It's a state-of-the-art, flexible, low cost, 
responsive Defense acquisition system.  One that uses new models and new practices, 
and worries about both the theory and implementation.  I think that can be done, on a 
relative scale, with very little money.  The result will be not only enhanced acquisition 
results, but attracting new people and retaining top people in the acquisition community 
- - practitioners and researchers. 
To summarize, I think this conference is a very important first step in the right 
direction.  Obviously, much more is required in this area to be able to capitalize on what 
the military clearly need in the coming decades.  I think this is very important; very much 
worth the effort that people are putting in here today.  But even more important is what 
we can do in terms of the future; and I hope all of you will join me in trying to achieve 
our objective over the coming years.   
Thank you very much. 
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 Centralized Control of Defense Acquisition Programs: 
A comparative Review of the Framework from 1987-2003 
John T. Dillard —  Senior Lecturer in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He has been a project manager for several large Department 
of Defense missile and communications systems. 
 
Abstract: In the last three years, there has been a great deal of turbulence in US 
defense acquisition policy. This has led to confusion within the acquisition workforce in 
terminology, major policy thrusts, and unobvious implications of the changes.  The new 
framework has added complexity, with more phases and delineations of activity, and 
both the number and level of decision reviews have been increased.  Decision reviews 
are used as top management level control gates, and are also a feature of centralized 
control within a bureaucracy.  Although the current stated policy is to foster an 
environment supporting flexibility and innovation, Program Managers will now have 
fewer resources to manage their programs as they spend much of their time, and 
budgets, managing the bureaucracy.  The result could become an endless cycle of 
decision reviews.  Moreover, the implicit aspects of the still new model have not been 
fully realized, and may result in policy that actually lengthens program and delivers 
yesterday’s technology tomorrow -- counter to goals of rapid transformation.  The 
framework, and its associated requirements for senior level reviews, are opposed to the 
rapid and evolutionary policy espoused, and are counter to appropriate management 
strategies for a transformational era.  
Keywords: Management of Technology; Defense Program Management Policy; 
Strategic decision making; Project control models. 
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 Introduction 
The issuance of Department of Defense Directive 5000.11 and Instruction 5000.22 
on May 12, 2003, is the third significant revision of acquisition policy in as many years.  
Looking further back, these three revisions of regulatory guidance had evolved from two 
previous versions in 19913 and 19964.  Each had its major thrusts and tenets, and 
perhaps of most importance to Program Managers, modifications to the “Defense 
Systems Acquisition Management Process”5 or “Defense Acquisition Framework”6 which 
is the broad paradigm of phases and milestone reviews in the life of an acquisition 
program.  The purpose of the author’s research was to examine the evolution of this 
framework and draw attention to the explicit and implicit aspects of recent changes to 
the various models to better understand its current form.  Provided here is a synopsis of 
the most important findings.  The full report of this research, examining both private 
industry and defense acquisition decision models is available at: 
http://www.nps.navy.mil/gsbpp/ACQN/publications/FY03/AM-03-003.pdf 
The very latest DoD 5000 policy changes have come during a time of DoD 
Transformation, which, while larger in scope than solely equipment and technology, is 
chiefly focused on changes to force structure and weapons employment capabilities.  
This latest version of the 5000 series was actually drafted in the documents rescinding 
its predecessor.  According to his memorandum signed on October 30, 2002, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said the series required revision “to create an 
acquisition policy environment that fosters efficiency, flexibility, creativity and 
                                            
1 USD(AT&L) Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003. 
2 USD(AT&L) Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 
May 12, 2003. 
3 USD(A) Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, February 23, 1991. 
4 USD(A&T) Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, Defense Acquisition, March 15, 1996. 
5 Defense Systems Acquisition Management Process, Defense Systems Management College, January 
1997. 
6 Defense Acquisition Framework, Defense Systems Management College, 2001. 
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 innovation.”7  Interim guidance was issued, along with the rescission, as a temporary 
replacement, outlining principles and policies to govern the operation of the new 
Defense acquisition system.  Among them: 
3.1  Responsibility for acquisition of systems shall be decentralized to the 
maximum extent practicable . 3.18  The PM shall be the single point of 
accountability. for accomplishment of program objectives for total life cycle 
systems management, including sustainment. 3.27  It shall be DoD policy 
to minimize reporting requirements.8
Though the 5000 series provides guidance for all levels, or Acquisition 
Categories (ACAT), of programs, its language is particularly applicable to the largest, 
ACAT I, Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP).  In such cases, the MDA is the 
Defense Acquisition Executive, who also chairs the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) as 
a decision making body for program milestone reviews.  There are in fact both a 
Component Acquisition Executive and Program Executive Officer in the hierarchy 
between them, and direct communication between MDA and PM is infrequent.  Other 
top management stakeholders are OSD staff principals who sit in membership on the 
Defense Acquisition Board, where milestone decision reviews are conducted.  
Communication between PM and OSD staff principals is more frequent, especially via 
the Overarching Integrated Product Team process.9
The Challenges of Defense Program Management  
Defense systems in particular, known for their size and technological pursuits, 
are seen as among the most challenging of projects.  Gadeken, building upon previous 
studies at the Defense Systems Management College, et al., concluded that the Project 
                                            
7 Wolfowitz, Paul, Memorandum for Director, Washington Headquarters Services, Cancellation of DoD 
5000 Defense Acquisition Policy Documents, October 30, 2002. 
8 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Defense Acquisition, Attachment 1, The Defense Acquisition 
System, October 30, 2002, (Interim Guidance 5000.1, p. 6). 
9 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) Washington, DC 20301-3000 
DoD Integrated Product and Process Development Handbook, August 1998. 
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 Manager competencies of systematic and innovative thinking were among the most 
needed and critical in order to accommodate growing complexities.10
Inherent difficulty in the management of any program is exacerbated for the DoD 
by several additional factors, which have become even more apparent in the last twenty 
years.  Large defense systems are very complex systems, consisting of hardware and 
software, multiple suppliers, etc. and requiring design approaches that can alleviate 
complexity via decomposition into simpler subsets, etc.  Rapid technology changes, 
yielding obsolescence, have become particularly problematic for very large systems 
with acquisition life cycles spanning a long period of time.  Thus, it may not even be 
feasible to fully define the operational capabilities and functional characteristics of the 
entire system before commencing advanced development.11
The DoD 5000 series acknowledges these many complexities and difficulties 
facing MDAs and PMs in their management and oversight of large weapon system 
developments.  An approach to mitigate these technological challenges, especially in 
the post-2000 series, is evolutionary acquisition, referred to by some outside of DoD as 
progressive acquisition.  Also advocated by the General Accounting Office, it has 
evolved worldwide as a concept over the past two decades.  It is an incremental 
development approach, using iterative development cycles versus a single grand 
design.  Described succinctly by the Western European Armaments Group, the 
progressive acquisition approach is: 
a strategy to acquire a large and complex system, which is expected to 
change over its lifecycle. The final system is obtained by upgrades of 
system capability through a series of operational increments. (It) aims to 
minimize many of the risks associated with the length and size of the 
                                            
10 Gadeken, Owen C., “Project Managers as Leaders – Competencies of Top Performers,” RD&A, 
January – February 1997. 
11 Pitette, Giles, “Progressive Acquisition and the RUP: Comparing and Combining Iterative Process for 
Acquisition and Software Development,” The Rational Edge, November 2001. 
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 development, as well as requirements volatility and evolution of 
technology.12
Very similar in description, DoD’s adaptation of this approach as “evolutionary 
acquisition” is a major policy thrust in the series, and is the stated “preferred approach” 
toward all new system developments.  This particular policy thrust is important to this 
study as it pertains to the framework of phases and decision reviews of a program 
moving toward completion.  It is meant to change the way programs are structured and 
products delivered. – actually separating projects into smaller, less complex increments.  
It is, additionally, one of several aspects of the new policy that affect the framework and 
its use as a management control mechanism. 
Organizational Control Theory and Defense Acquisition 
Wideman also advocated progressive (evolutionary) acquisition, and recognized 
senior management responsibility for financial accountability in private and public 
projects and their preference for central control.  He noted problems with senior 
management control over complex developments such as software enterprises like 
Defense Information Systems, even when projects were not very large or lengthy.13  His 
observations in large, complex programs align with classic contingency theory, which 
holds that organizational structures must change in response to contingencies of size, 
technology, and as external environments become more complex and dynamic.  
Indeed, it has long been accepted that when faced with uncertainty (a situation with less 
information than is needed) the management response must either be to redesign the 
organization for the task at hand, or improve communication flows and processing.14   
Gareth Morgan traced organizational theory through the past century and depicts 
organizations as a variety of images, or metaphors in his treatise, Images of 
                                            
12 Western European Armaments Group WEAG TA-13 Acquisition Programme, Guidance on the Use of 
Progressive Acquisition, Version 2, November 2000. 
13 Wideman, R. Max, Progressive Acquisition and the RUP Part I: Defining the Problem and Common 
Terminology, The Rational Edge, 2002. 
14 Galbraith, J. R., 1973, Designing Complex Organization, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley. 
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 Organization.  He warns that large hierarchical, mechanistic organizational forms have 
difficulty adapting to change and are not designed for innovation.15  Further research by 
Burrell and Morgan indicate that any incongruence among management processes and 
the organization’s environment tend to reduce organizational effectiveness.16
In their book, The Intelligent Organization, Gifford & Elizabeth Pinchot make an 
even stronger case for decentralized management in large complex organizations faced 
with transformational change.  They suggest that as organizations today face increasing 
complexity, rapidity of change, distributed information, and new forms of competition, 
organizations must grow more intelligent to confront and defeat the diverse and 
simultaneous challenges.  They posit that for an organization to be fully intelligent, it 
must use the intelligence of its members all the way down the hierarchy.  They note that 
with distributed information there is distributed intelligence, and failure to render 
authority to those closest to the problem will yield lethargy, mediocre performance, or 
worse – paralysis.  Control will be maintained, and anarchy will not occur -- but neither 
will success.17
What the cumulative research appears to support is that, for large complex 
hierarchies such as the Department of Defense, decentralized control and 
empowerment should be an organizational strength, given today’s environment of 
program complexity, evolving requirements, and rapidly changing technology. 
An Examination of Project Management Life Cycle Models 
Models have long been used to illustrate the integration of functional efforts 
across the timeline of a project or program.  It is the successful integration of these 
diverse elements that is the very essence of project management.  Models also help us 
to visualize the total scope of a project and “see” its division into phases and decision 
                                            
15 Morgan, Gareth, 1997, Images of Organization, Sage Publications. 
16 Morgan, Gareth, 1997, Images of Organization, Sage Publications. 
17 Pinchot, Gifford and Elizabeth, The End of Bureaucracy and the Rise of the Intelligent Organization. 
Berrett-Koehler Publishers, San Francisco, 1993. 
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 points.  The interaction and overlapping of many and varied activities such as planning, 
engineering, test and evaluation, logistics, manufacturing, etc. must be adroitly 
managed for optimum attainment of project cost, schedule and technical performance 
outcomes. The Project Management Institute’s Project Management Body of 
Knowledge (PMBOK®) provides generally accepted knowledge and practices in the 
broad field of project management.18 Striving for commonality across diverse business 
areas and product commodities, it provides a generic framework as a structure for 
understanding the management of a project or program.  In the figure below (Fig. 1.), a 
project life cycle is depicted as costs and staffing relative to time. 
 
Fig. 1.  Sample Generic Project Life Cycle, Adapted from PMBOK® 2000 
Project Management difficulty climbs along the scale of system complexity and 
technological uncertainty, and is simplified by division of the effort into phases, with 
points between for management review and decision.  The institute acknowledges a 
variety of approaches to modeling project life cycles, with some so detailed that they 
actually become management methodologies.  Illustration of generic project 
management processes or activities across time are depicted thus (Fig. 2.): 
                                            
18 Project Management Institute, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® 
Guide), 2000 Edition, Pennsylvania, 2000. 
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Fig. 2.  Project Management Processes, Adapted from PMBOK® 200019
The Evolving Defense Acquisition Framework 
The 1996 Model 
Models of program structure are important to the Department of Defense in 
conveying the overall acquisition strategy of a large acquisition project.  The 1996 
revision of the 5000 series was published after a rigorous effort to reform the defense 


































DoD 5000.2-R of March 1996
 
Fig. 3.  Defense Systems Acquisition Management Process20
                                            
19 Ibid. 
20 Department of Defense 5000.2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense, Acquisition Programs and 
Major Automated Information Systems, 1996. 
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 The model (Fig. 3.) is streamlined and simplified to depict only four phases and 
four decision reviews.  Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) could occur before Milestone 
III and frequently did occur in this phase as a service Secretary decision.  Another key 
change was the very deliberate change in the declaration of Program Initiation moving 
from Milestone 0 to Milestone I.  Program Initiation also served as a benchmark of OSD 
interest in annually reporting to Congress, per 10 USC § 2220(b), the average time 
period between program initiation and Initial Operational Capability (across all ACAT I 
programs of any commodity). In 1994, the average was 115 months.21










































Fig. 4.  Defense Acquisition Management Framework22
Toward Centralized Control of Acquisition Programs 
The current 2003 model (Fig. 4.) has five phases and six potential decision 
reviews.  Eight total distinct activity periods exist in the model, including pre-acquisition 
activity.  The most apparent, and perhaps least significant, change between eras was 
from numerical to alphabetical designation of major milestone reviews.  A more subtle 
and important change was the appearance of divided phases and within-phase decision 
and progress reviews.  With the latest release of the regulatory series, these additional 
                                            
21 Ibid. 
22 USD(AT&L) Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 
May 12, 2003. 
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 sub-phases or “work efforts,” along with “pre-acquisition activities” have brought the 
total number of distinct activity intervals to eight, with as many as five phases and six 
decision reviews – more than at any time past.  Each of these efforts has its own 
entrance and exit criteria, making them more in practice like a distinct phase of 
acquisition. 
Reviews are described in the current policy to be decision points where decision 
makers can either stop, extend or grant permission to proceed into the next phase.  
Program reviews of any kind at the OSD level have a significant impact on program 
offices.  Much documentation must be prepared and many preparatory meetings are 
conducted enroute to the ultimate review.  And while non-milestone reviews are 
generally considered to be lesser in scope of effort to prepare for, a considerable 
amount of effort managing the decision process is still expended.  A six-month timeline 
for these activities in preparation of an OSD-level review has been unchanged for many 
years.  It outlines the requirements for meetings and preparatory briefings to staff 
members and committees.  Some representatives from program management offices 
keep an accounting of travel and labor costs associated with a milestone reviews for an 
MDAP system.  While only anecdotal data was available for this research, it is apparent 
that a substantial amount of program office funding is expended on support contractor 
assistance with supporting analyses and documentation, as well as frequent travel to 
the Pentagon, and other associated expenses in preparation for high-level reviews.23  As 
of this writing, there are a total of 25 MDAP programs in the Department of Defense. 
With Evolutionary Acquisition as the preferred strategy, notional systems are now 
shown as shorter developments (in SDD) with iterative Milestone B-to-C cycles.  The 
new DoDI 5000.2 prescribes that, “In an evolutionary acquisition program, the 
development of each increment shall begin with a Milestone B, and production resulting 
                                            
23 Author’s unpublished interview with an anonymous representative from a major program office going 
through a milestone review, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, February 19, 2003. 
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 from that increment shall begin with a Milestone C.”24  Thus, program managers can 
expect to undergo the reviews determined appropriate for the initial increment of 
development in their program, as well as reviews specified for the follow-on increments.  
The most recent published guidance shows one example of a system with no less than 
fourteen reviews in its first eleven years from Concept Decision.   
In the past, technology development during the advanced development (EMD) 
phase was blamed for undue costs and lengthening of this phase.  But a very real 
concern may now be that -- unless SDD is greatly shortened -- attaining technological 
maturity at Milestone B instead of C guarantees the fielding of “yesterday’s technology 
tomorrow.”  In other words, there is a very real but somewhat understated distinction 
between what was Milestone III under the 1996 model and what is now Milestone C 
under the Post-2000 era models, beyond that of LRIP and Full Rate Production.  
Evolutionary acquisition under the new model prescribes the initiation of low-rate 
production of an 80% solution at Milestone C as the preferred approach.  In order to 
achieve the 100% capability solution desired in the same time frame as would be 
planned under the single-step acquisition strategy, the model is perhaps more 
accurately depicted as below (Fig. 5). The diamond icons represent decision reviews. 
                                            
24 USD(AT&L) Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. 
May 12, 2003. 
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Fig. 5.  Actual Comparison of 1996 and 2003 Acquisition Framework Models 
Again, what is most apparent here is the increased number of decision reviews, 
as well as the concurrent activities involved in managing the follow-on development 
increment and its requisite reviews as well.  Assuming advanced development (SDD) is 
indeed shortened, and further assuming that concept and early prototyping phases are 
no longer than before, the time and effort on control activities appears almost certainly 
excessive within the same system delivery timeline. 
Conclusions 
On the whole, the 2003 acquisition model prescribes a very new paradigm, and 
only time can inform us whether Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s goals of program 
management flexibility and innovation have been achieved.  No program has yet gone 
through the entire model, and none will for many years to come. 
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 Nevertheless, time spent “managing the bureaucracy” has remained an 
encumbrance to PMs.  Back in 1988-89, military research fellows studying commercial 
practices at the Defense Systems Management College wrote about an imbalance of 
authority between PMs and the OSD staff.25  Of eleven improvements they 
recommended to the acquisition process, number three on their list was, “Reduce the 
number and level of program decision milestones.”  Showing the 1987 model, they 
recommended that only one of the then five reviews be conducted at OSD level:  the 
review for advanced development.  They quoted the 1986 Packard Commission’s 
conclusions, which said, “He (the PM) should be fully committed to abide by the 
program’s specified baseline and, so long as he does so, the Defense and Service 
Acquisition Executives should support his program and permit him to manage it.  This 
arrangement would provide much needed program stability.”26
Mentioned earlier was that contingency theory encourages senior leaders to find 
the best fit for their organization’s structure to its environment, understanding that some 
situations might call for rigid bureaucratic structure while others might require a more 
flexible, organic one.  The concept of control is also a cornerstone of cybernetics:  the 
study of organizations, communications and control in complex systems.  It focuses on 
looped feedback mechanisms, where the controller communicates to the controlled 
what is the desired future state, and the controlled communicates to the controller 
information with which to form perceptions for use in comparing states.  The controller 
then communicates (directs) purposeful behavior.27
The fundamental need for communications constrains the options for control, 
making the communications architecture a critically important feature of the control 
system.  It is often heard that with communications in today’s information age warfare, 
we seek to “act within the enemy’s decision cycle.”  For acquisition decision makers, the 
                                            
25 Defense Systems Management College, Using Commercial Practices in DoD Acquisition, December 
1989. 
26 Packard Commission, A Quest for Excellence, Final Report to the President, 1986. 
27 Ashby, W. R., An Introduction to Cybernetics, London: Chapman & Hall, 1960. 
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 25- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 information architecture is the command and control hierarchy within our bureaucracy.  
And the decision cycle in the course of a program still, after many years, reflects 180 
days of typical preparation lead-time for a decision review. 
Similarly, when Rand authors wrote about DoD decision making pertaining to 
training, equipping, manning, and operating the force, they suggested that decisions 
should be based upon senior leadership’s desired outcomes.  They acknowledge that 
with a decentralized management style comes dilution of responsibility and 
accountability, unless vigilance of execution is maintained.  But they agree with other 
theorists that centralized decision making was consistent with the Cold War, and a style 
well-suited to the 1960s, but can be stifling and can restrict innovation.28
Pinchot’s Intelligent Organization does not call for decentralization to undermine 
bureaucracy, but to improve it.  They advocate decentralization with horizontal 
interconnection (a network organization) between business units, to lessen the reliance 
upon going up the chain of command and down again for communication flow and 
decision.  Rather than total autonomy for PMs, he supports self-management, from 
trust, with responsibility and accountability.29  This thinking seems particularly 
appropriate to a professionalized bureaucracy such as the DoD acquisition workforce, 
with disciplined standards of training, education, and experience steadily progressing 
since implementation of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) 
in the early 1990s. 
It is evident that the debate about centralized control and number of OSD-level 
reviews has been taking place for a long time.  The current model increases the number 
and levels of reviews, and their placement with regard to program events indicate that 
we are moving toward an even more centralized approach to control of acquisition 
programs.  But what is perhaps even more significant than this observation is that 
                                            
28 Johnson, Stuart, Libicki, Martin C. and Treverton, Gregory F., New Challenges New Tools for Defense 
Decisionmaking, Rand 2003. 
29 Pinchot, Gifford and Elizabeth, The End of Bureaucracy and the Rise of the Intelligent Organization, 
Berrett-Koehler Publishers, San Francisco, 1993. 
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 26- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 moving toward greater centralization of control at the higher levels may be a cause for 
serious concern, given predominant management theory cited herein.  The mainstream 
of thought indicates that more efficiency and effectiveness might be gained from a 
different approach to an external environment of instability and uncertainty, whether 
from unclear threats and uncertain scenarios, or from complexities of technology and 
systems acquisition. 
Centralization of control is a management issue to be dealt with – the challenge 
to avoid anarchy, with no guidelines or parameters, as well as excessive control.  Might 
programs actually be lengthened by more cumbersome reviews?  Whether fourteen 
reviews in eleven years are too many is a matter of conjecture and more debate.  
However, it is obvious that there are today more reviews than ever before, and these do 
have a requisite cost associated with their execution.  We will likely continue the 
struggle to find the appropriate balance between centralized functions at OSD and 
autonomy for the management of programs in both explicit or implicit management 
policies and frameworks.  A study of how the DoD might exploit its current capacity via 
increased horizontal communication might provide insight toward attaining the 
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 Using the Systems Engineering Process to Balance the 
Interdependence of Mission Capability, Operations and 
Support Costs, and System Utility Rates – What’s T&E’s 
Role?  
LTC Thom Crouch — Lecturer, Graduate School of Business & Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate 
School 
 
ABSTRACT:  This research project defines the interdependent relationship 
between a weapon system’s mission capabilities, O&S costs, operational utility rate, 
and their impacts on overall mission effectiveness of an operational combat unit.  By 
analyzing the sub-elements of both operational effectiveness and operational suitability 
it can be shown how operational effectiveness is a dependent element of operation 
suitability.  Additionally, it will be demonstrated how support costs influence operational 
suitability parameters of a weapon system, which then impacts a combat unit’s overall 
mission effectiveness.  Since support costs have such a critical relationship with 
operational suitability factors, the project also defines the current relationships between 
Service Cost and T&E communities to question whether or not there is the requisite 
level of integration of effort between the two organizations to accurately assess weapon 
system costs and capability prior to production. 
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 Total Ownership Cost: An Exercise in Discipline 
Michael W. Boudreau — Senior Lecturer, Graduate School of Business & Public Policy, Naval 
Postgraduate School 
Brad R. Naegle — Lecturer, Graduate School of Business & Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Presenter: Michael W. Boudreau 
As a first step, we felt it was important to gather research and data relating to 
total ownership cost initiative, without bias and complicating the process. This, in itself, 
is quite a task, as there had been quite a bit of work done in the area over the last two 
years in all services and numerous DoD programs. 
This presentation is designed to provide some insight and perspective into what 
we’ve drawn upon from the work done. 
Presenter: Brad Naegle 
 
 
Figure 1.  Photo Courtesy of DAU 
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 33- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
  
Here you have an F-16. When people think about an F-16 this is what they see.  They 
say ‘there’s the bird, I can fly that’ or that’s an F-16 you can fly today.   
If you want to fly one tomorrow, it looks more like this. 
Figure 2.  Photo Courtesy of DAU 
Of course this is tests, measurement, diagnostic equipment, all the support equipment, 
all folks at earned Dalton embedded within that are the software processes and go 
along with it, all the training and education that as go out with the crew supporters of the 
system.  And that is truly an F-16 you can fly for longer than a day.  So when we think 
about things logistically total ownership cost wise.  That's the system, and that's of 
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These cost elements here make up the logistics footprint.  This is by no means 
an exhaustive list.  But there are a lot of elements around that that you can see that 










If you divide that out and that green line you see come down into the picture was 
put there on purpose, those items that show up on the right side in green are typically 
those that you can influence after deployment of the system in the field or the fleet.  You 
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 can choose to do some of those things or not do some of those things or just how you 
do those things.   
That big chunk on the left that’s in the dark red, are those things that are actually 
1) determined during the acquisition process, 2) during the design and acquisition 
process of the system and 3) without a really significant reengineering, are hard to 
change.  Of course, that’s about the percentage of the cost that’s involved in that and 
where that cost comes from. 
The green are the things that can be influenced in the field and the fleet and the 
rest of that.  If we’re asking people in the field or the fleet to reduce their costs by 10%, 
their taking 10% of that green block off of there and may not even be noticeable to the 
actual cost of the system.  Where we need to attack this is clearly on the left hand side 
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So, how do we spend money on the system?  If you look at the purple line at the 
bottom, that is how we expend the dollars when we procure and support a system over 
it’s lifecycle from Milestone A, or before Milestone A, through disposal.  That’s 
important.  Everyone pays a lot of attention to that purple line and how we expend those 
dollars.  The green line on top represents the percent of the lifecycle costs that are 
locked in at various stages.  You can see, by the time you get past Milestone B you 
have effectively locked in the lifecycle and the cost of that system.  It’s going to be very 
difficult to change without significant engineering beyond that point.  We haven’t spent a 
great deal of the money for the total ownership of the cost of the system at that time but 
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 Presenter: Michael W. Boudreau 
 
 
 When we talk about total ownership costs we’re talking about a lot of different 
aspects.  We’re talking about the personnel, the institutional costs, the system itself, the 
operating and support; that includes maintenance man hours, uniformed military 
members and civilian maintenance man hours, the repair parts, all the test equipment.  
It’s easier to get an understanding of TOC in the charts just shown to you in the last few 
minutes.  You could see in a pictorial way what was included.  At least some of these 
items are well beyond the ability of program managers to deal with by themselves.  The 
guidance that came out in 1998 in respect to system TOC suggested the program 
managers should go and get all the help they could muster within DoD because TOC 
reduction was a very big job and certainly had to be done by lots and lots of different 
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Those are the definitions that go with total ownership cost: One from an 
institution perspective, and the other from perspective of a war-fighting system itself.  
You can see those costs are pretty inclusive.  If we were to put them on an acquisition 
timeline, it would cover all the RDT&E, the Research, Development, Test, and 
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 Figure 3.  CAIV / R-TOC Relationship30
The two buzz-words that I think have predominated in discussion related to TOC 
really show up nicely on this milestone and phase chart: The first being cost as an 
independent variable (CAIV).  That is, in my humble description, figuring out how much 
money that you’ve got to devote to a war-fighting system and using that as one of the 
hard and fast “rocks” that constrain how you develop, and what you are able to develop.  
Finally, when the system is fielded, figuring out ways, throughout the life of the system 
to reduce ownership costs in areas that maybe you didn’t understand completely as you 
would in ideal circumstances during the development itself.  Even with beautifully 
developed systems, there are always opportunities for taking corrective action afterward 
-- this notion of continuous process improvement that reflects in RTOC, Reduction in 
Total Ownership Cost.  Finding those ways by looking at cost drivers, particularly as the 
system is put into service, either in the field or in the fleet. 
 
Figure 4. Nominal Life-Cycle Cost of Typical DoD Acquisition Program with a Thirty-Year Service Life 31
                                            
30 Kaye, Michael A., Mark S. Sobota, David R. Graham, and Allen L. Gotwald. “Cost As An Independent 
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 Another way of looking at TOC is on a percentage basis by when it happens.  It 
is generally considered about a third, 28% if you want to be more precise looking across 
a number of programs, 28% of the TOC is in the acquisition phase, RDT&E and 
procurement.  On the average, over numerous systems 72% is spent in operating and 
support costs.  Which part is it that the PM is most attentive to?  It is obvious, those 
things that the PM can touch closest-in.  That routinely is RDT&E and procurement.  
When we say that the PM has to be a total life cycle cost system manager then we’re 
really saying ‘Mr. PM, we think that you need to focus a huge amount of your attention 
also on those operating and support costs and we are holding you responsible to do 
that.’  That sounds, from my perspective, very logical, but in the doing is pretty tough.  
The reason being, that there’s nothing that really connects in an easily definable, clear 
way, the amount of monies that are going to be spent on those systems that the 
program manager is responsible for.  There is no way to connect him to those O&S 
costs.  So you have to come up with artificial mechanisms: actually putting down 
operating and support costs in the PM’s acquisition strategy and his acquisition 
baseline.  But then how do you measure it?  It’s pretty hard to measure because, of 
course, those costs may not be incurred until 5 to 15 years in the future.  How do you 
know whether a PM is doing a good job in that respect, or not?  There may be ways of 
getting at TOC metrics, but it’s not as clear as going out and measuring what’s left in the 
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 Figure 5.  Design Decisions vs. Expenditure of Funds32
 
This chart is very similar to the one Brad just showed you.  The thing that I’d like 
to note from the chart is that this is ascribed to the Defense Acquisition University.  The 
interesting thing about this chart is that I pulled it out of a GAO report.  What should you 
get from all that?  To me, we should get that we’ve understood for a long time this 
mantra about ‘up front and early’: Needing to pay close attention to those things that are 
most important and dear to us at the very beginning of a developmental process.  If we 
wait too long we will be unable to affect, to the extent we’d like to, those attributes; be 
they cost or performance attributes, either one.  Just to reiterate, because our 
milestones and phases don’t show up on this chart.  We think that we get perilously 
close to the 90% locked-in position by the time we get to Milestone B.  For those of you 
who don’t work in acquisition every day, what does that mean?  Milestone B is where 
the program manager gets assigned.  Up until that time it’s probably been a study group 
made up of many stakeholders under the direction of the user.  At Milestone B when 
                                            
32 U.S. General Accounting Office. “Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce 
Weapon Systems’ Total Ownership Costs.” Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management 
Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate. GAO-03-57. February 2003. 
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 there’s a formal decision to go ahead with this program, then a program manager is 
assigned probably just before that but not long before that.  So when we talk about 
upfront and early from the perspective of influencing TOC we’re talking while the 
concept is still in the hands of the user and is not actually being developed by the 
acquisition community.   
Presenter: Brad Naegle 
Figure 6. Photo courtesy of DAU 
 
 We tried to find some examples of this.  This happens to be the program that I 
managed: The Extended Service Program.  It was a service life extension program of 
the 2.5-ton fleet of trucks.  This shows the truck and some of the neat things we did to it 
when we remanufactured it.  The remanufacturing process tore the truck down to 
components and built it up like a new system.  The idea was to start with an old 2.5-ton 
truck and end with a 2.5-ton truck.  What we were trying to attack was the total 
ownership cost, the operations and support costs of this truck.  But we did add some 
enhancements as we went through the thing.  Some of my students who see this chart 
are kind of amazed.  We said we put in a new heating and defrosting system that did 
two really unique things for that truck series: Heated and defrosted.  That doesn’t sound 
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 like a great thing until you drove the old truck, then you realized it was a really great 
thing.  We did enhance it as we went through this. 
The whole idea was to reduce the total ownership cost.  This is kind of what it 
looked like over a short period of time.   
 
 
First of all, the entire weapons system cost of the truck was about $57,000.  That 
included everything up until that point.  The contract price was much less, around 
$44,000 a truck, but the fully burdened cost was $57,000 per truck.  The blue line on the 
bottom is the total ownership cost of the new 2.5-ton extended service program.  This 
data was extracted from 100,000 miles of testing.  It was not projected but a projection 
of something we had empirical data for.  The red line at the top was the cost of 
supporting an existing 2.5 ton truck in the system and reflects that they were very old 
and very costly.  They went about 1,000 miles between hardware mission failures.  
They were very costly to support.   
We were bringing on a new series of truck, that Mike Boudreau was in charge of 
at the time, the family of medium tactical vehicles, but we couldn’t bring them on fast 
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 enough because of the costs that are involved.  So, we needed to do something to the 
fleet to keep the total ownership costs down. 
As I was trying to sell this program as the program manager, I looked at the 
difference between the red line and the blue line equaled the total cost of getting a new 
ESP truck.  That happened at just between seven and eight years.  The truck was 
basically paid for in less than eight years of service as far as the differential in cost 
between the old and the new truck.  The truck was re-baselined to 0 miles and it had a 
twenty year life span beyond that.  So, if you go all the way out to the 20-year mark, the 
savings, per truck, ended up being $109,258.  Which was a magic number because it 
was about the cost of a brand new FMTV replacement 2.5-ton truck.  Not only did I pay 
for my own efforts within eight years but if you kept one it’s entire life, you saved enough 
money to buy it’s replacement.  Great story but it didn’t go over particularly well.  People 
didn’t like the idea of remanufactured trucks.  Nonetheless, that was the concept behind 
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 Presenter: Mike Boudreau 
One thing worth mentioning; there is a wonderful database out in our acquisition 
community related to TOC.  What we’ve done here is put down some of the sites where 
you can get some good information that shows you how robust the effort has been over 
the last few years.  If you’re not familiar with some of these acronyms; AKSS is the 
Acquisition Knowledge Sharing System which is a DoD/OSD website that replaces what 
was on CD ROM.  It was formerly called the Defense Acquisition Desk Book.  In fact 
you can get the web version of that on websites today even though it has become 
obsolete.  DAU is the Defense Acquisition University.  They have quite a body of 
material that has put together on TOC.  IDA, the Institute for Defense Analysis, has an 
R-TOC website that includes 30 systems that cover all the services.  
 
 
There it is.  By way of apology one of the things that’s happened in the 
intervening time since we did this research was that Comanche has fallen off this list.  
Not because they did anything really wrong in the way that they wanted to proceed with 
TOC but maybe the program was simply too costly when combined with other warfighter 
needs.  Also there’s a Fire Support Command and Control Army System that shows up 
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 under the fielded system that is a follow-on to AFATIDS for those of you who are 
followers of army command and control systems.  That’s also fallen off the list recently. 
At any rate, as you can see here is that in each of the services there were 10 
TOC pilot systems, pilot programs that were used to put together and test R-TOC ideas.  
There are a lot of them here that I’m sure you are familiar with besides the ones that I’ve 
mentioned. 
AAAV is the Marine Corps Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle.  It’s now 
called EFV the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.  The name has changed but the system 
is the same.  MTVR has been discussed earlier today that is the Marine Corp medium 
tactical vehicle replacement.  H60 is a helicopter program.  EA-6B is the Prowler an 
electronic aircraft.  CVN68 is the aircraft carrier that has been used as a test bed for 
some of these R-TOC ideas.  AWACS you’re familiar with and JSTARS.  I suspect 
many of you are familiar with.  F-117 is the stealth fighter.  F-16 is ubiquitous, 
everybody knows about it.  So, you can see there are quite a selection of different 
programs that have provided test beds, some of which have already begun to show 
dividends in terms of R-TOC.  In some of these systems, it will be years before we see 
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 There are lots of different TOC initiatives.  KPPs are Key Performance 
Parameters.  Those are parameters that are identified by users as elements that are 
most important to a system that’s being considered for acquisition.  KPPs doctrinally 
now show up in what used to be called the ORD, Operational Requirement Document 
but is now called the CDD, the Capability Development Document and its follow on user 
document that supports production.  At any rate KPPs are those areas that are so 
important to the user that if they cannot be achieved that throws into question whether 
or not we should go on with this development and acquisition of the system. 
 
You would think if cost is really important to the DoD that at least on some 
programs you would see a TOC metric as one of those KPPs.  I submit to you that you 
have to look a long way to find that because that is not what is most attractive to military 
users.  Being in the military once upon a time, I can relate.  We are more interested in 
the “pointy end of the stick.”  But, what good is it to have the world’s greatest warfighting 
system if we can’t afford to acquire it, or later on, to maintain it or sustain it?  We think 
the KPPs are an area where we ought to start defining the number of dollars we are 
going to spend on a program and make cost so important that if we can’t stay within 
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Reliability Centered Maintenance is important.  RCM has been around for a very 
long time.  That’s another thing that the GAO has played back to us of things that we’ve 
known for years and years, decades for heavens sake.  Lots of those TOC pilot 
programs are working on going back to review the basics of reliability centered 
maintenance, which is a very worthwhile endeavor. 
You will hear a lot more about PBL, Performance Based Logistics throughout the 
day.  That is very closely related to the control of TOC.  PBL has to be a constituent 
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Cost drivers, looking at those things that are most expensive in fielded systems, 
is one of the very fruitful ways of getting at R-TOC for legacy systems.  Through 
modification of systems, maybe we can reduce the cost of ownership. 
Value engineering is another program that has been around forever.  Value 
engineering kicks in after production starts.  Often we spend many more dollars than is 
necessary in early production because of things that we didn’t understand completely, 
but that we begin to understand more fully as time goes on.  The way that we can get at 
needed changes and address the associated production and sustainment costs is 
through value engineering change proposals. 
Those are just a few of the TOC initiatives.  Frankly, we haven’t, in our study 
come up with any of those ideas.  They’ve all been out there being used by one 
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By way of conclusion, we think that the earlier you begin considerations of Total 
Ownership Cost in a program acquisition, the more effective you are likely to be.  We 
also think as I’ve mentioned before, that focusing on ownership cost as a Key 
Performance Parameter (KPP) makes it so important that it cannot be traded away.  We 
also think there are a lot of things counterbalancing TOC.  Some of them are pretty 
simple.  We tell people to do one thing but we incentivize them to do another.  What 
happens to operating and support savings?  Can the community that makes the 
savings, use the savings to plow back in and get other beneficial results?  Oftentimes 
not! Those savings are taken away and used elsewhere, probably for very useful things, 
but it’s a disincentive for program managers and users.  We think that combat 
developers, the user community, is not as focused on how much war-fighting system 
costs, as maybe they should be.  They are interested in warfighting capability, not how 
that capability is going to be sustained.  We think that program managers and material 
developers typically will follow the lead of the user community.  If the user community 
identifies the importance of ownership cost and makes sure that TOC translates into the 
acquisition program baseline, the program managers and their communities will follow 
that lead and manage it to the best of their ability.  We also think R-TOC should be a 
continued focus in legacy systems and in the post-deployment phase because there are 
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 always ways of taking cost out of systems even though it may take a little bit of up-front 
money in order to get yourself to that point. 
One of the things that we think is an important pathology that in fact the TOC 
databases have not really matured yet.   
In all the services there are problems with databases.  When you think about 
that, if you don’t have a good cost and performance database that describes your 
legacy systems, then do you have all the tools that you need in order to progress with 
the follow-on systems?  We think the answer is that we’ve not come up with databases 
that are as complete and flexible as we need.  It’s been a problem in all the services 
and all the services have devoted R-TOC focus in trying to develop better databases.  
Oftentimes, those databases exist but they exist in a lot of different places in ways that 
are somewhere between difficult and impossible to patch together so as to get 
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 By way of recommendations from the research we’ve done: 
• It’s clear that we think the TOC ought to be described in Key Performance 
Parameters (KPP).  That will cause program managers and their staffs to continue to 
pay attention to the total life cycle cost of the system. 
• More work needs to be done to continue to enhance our databases such that they 
will be good tools for us to do more focused work in reducing TOC.   
• We think that we have contractual mechanisms, but we need to refocus those 
toward keeping the contractor involved in R-TOC.  Once again, there have been 
some initiatives that have been done in the pilot programs that look to have great 
promise in that respect.   
• Leadership support is necessary in order to make TOC a focus within each of the 
services. Certainly without that leadership support, will those key questions be asked 
at our different meetings, such as milestone decision meetings?  Without the hard 
TOC questions being asked at the leadership level, the workforce won’t focus on the 
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 The Impact of Software Support on System Total 
Ownership Cost 
Brad R. Naegle — Lecturer, Graduate School of Business & Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School 
 
As a spin-off of the Total Ownership Cost (TOC) research that Mike Boudreau 
and I conducted, there was some interest in examining the TOC implications of software 
intensive systems and what the software component is adding to the TOC burden.  I 
thought it would be interesting to get into this, it felt a lot like opening ‘Pandora’s Box.’ 
The Growing Problem 
 
We are obviously significantly dependent on these software systems.  Virtually 
everything we have is moving into a software intensive system.  We’ve gone from the 
M-16 rifle to our new objective individual combat weapon, which has lines and lines of 
software code.  We want to put these together in the system of systems that Dr. Gansler 
talked about in the keynote presentation at the Symposium. 
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 These systems of systems are going to be an important concept as we talk about 
TOC and the software drivers linked into the difficult interfaces that are associated with 
making a system of systems work effectively.  Software maintenance is becoming an 
ever-increasing part of the TOC of our systems. 
Magnitude of the Problem 
 
How big is the problem?  With the lack of databases that we discovered in the 
first research effort, we do not have a really good accounting of how much money is 
being spent on the software component of software intensive systems.  
Some estimates indicate we spend about $30 Billion a year on embedded 
weapons system software.  This is not the management information systems piece; this 
is literally the tactical systems portion.  Of that, about $21.6 Billion is attributed to 
software maintenance and it’s continuing to grow.  Given what Dr. Gansler said, we 
spend about $80 Billion a year overall, a quarter of it being software maintenance at this 
time and growing. 
The cost data is hard to come by, with few data sources.  I asked a number of 
program managers what it costs to support software.  They are less than forthcoming 
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 with numbers, which might be attributed back to the program, as it is typically a large 
number.   
One of the pathologies I encounter is that we don’t want to talk about the TOC of 
systems. The rational is that decision makers, Congressmen and others who can kill a 
program, are not seeing numbers presented in a way to illuminate TOC.  No one wants 
to be the first to say that an M-1 tank doesn’t cost $2 Million a copy; it actually costs $12 
Million a copy if you look at it from the TOC perspective.  Someone unfamiliar with the 
concept of evaluation would look at those numbers and eventually cancel the program. 
I was able to locate information on the B1-B Bomber program; this is the old 
Reagan era Bomber.  I happened to work with the software maintenance manager of 
that system who said her budget was $980 million a year to support the software only 
on the B1-B Bomber.  That gives some perspective on the number of dollars being put 
into software maintainability. 
Software Supportability’s Nature 
 
=
What is software maintenance?  We often talk about it as if it’s a supportability 
thing like hardware maintenance. Software maintenance is really software 
reengineering.  Those responsible for software maintenance are software engineers or 
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 software professionals.  To hire that group of people, the cost is much higher than for a 
typical hardware maintainer.  Automatically, the cost-basis for hiring people to support 
our software are higher. It is also important to note, software systems are changed at a 
much higher rate than hardware systems.   
As a point of reference, software is actually deployed with the knowledge that 
there are thousands of latent errors throughout and those errors will be identified in use.    
For example, when Microsoft released Windows XP, the very day of the release, 2.8 GB 
of patches needed to go on it.  You have to expect the errors in these things.  In fact, if 
Microsoft met their own goal for errors per 1000 lines of code; XP would have 8 million 
errors.  That’s what is expected in a software build, due to the complexity of it.  Software 
is a different animal than what we have grown accustomed to in hardware deployment. 
Interfaces between software systems and hardware within these systems of 
systems are critical to make the systems of systems run efficiently.  When one change 
is made to one system within the system of systems, it requires interface changes to 
ripple across the rest of the systems that are involved.  Sometimes the interfaces are 
seamless and go well and no interoperability problem occurs. More often than not, a 
single change in software function requires changes throughout the system of systems.  
This is a driving factor that continues to increase the maintainability rates for the 
software. 
Along the same line, software must be upgraded continuously to maintain 
required levels of performance within the system.  For example, the M-1 Abrams office 
tells me their goal is to reduce software drops or additions to the system to twice a year.  
Hardware systems do not change that frequently, it becomes much more difficult to 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 57- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 Contributing Factors 
 
There are some contributing factors to how the software is physically architected 
which have a huge impact on costs related to resolving issues, scalability, maintaining 
or other required alterations. Among these are: 
Software engineering. With over 50 years of history, Software Engineering is 
still immature. We do not have a standardized language to build software. We still lack 
the skills and the skill sets that are required to build upon a standard body of knowledge 
like more mature engineering disciplines have overtime.  Unfortunately, when a new 
software system is built specifically for the DOD, it can rarely be reused.  The system is 
built from scratch. It’s like implementing and maintaining a new technology every time 
we build a new software system. 
Software is significantly unbounded.  Software doesn’t have the physical 
world as a concern.  It is literally the logic processes that are involved with the coders 
and the people who are involved with the design of the software. 
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 Engineering discipline is often linked to the frequency and impact of latent 
errors – the importance will be made clear later in this presentation. 
Requirements Creep has dramatic negative effect on software architecture. The 
negative effect is more dramatic than it is in hardware due to the complexities and the 
interoperability pieces that go with the software.  As we saw in John Dillard’s 
presentation, we set up acquisition processes against the milestones. Those milestones 
are fixed in concrete because of the funding system that goes along with them.   
It is well documented that software development is an event-driven process.  
Trying to put an event-driven process function within a milestone model creates 
significant issues, especially when imposed milestones are driven by oversight rather 
than clear software evaluation points. The first thing that typically happens is the 
engineering discipline is lost.  The focus becomes milestone driven, rather than quality, 
losing engineering discipline and the ability to maintain the system. 
The first casualty is documentation, which is critical for the supportability of the 
software. Processes are shortened, then “undisciplined coding to get functionality and 
move on,” becomes the continual loop. 
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 How do we go about doing the request for proposal and the source selection on 
our software intensive systems?  The process is not significantly different than for 
hardware centric systems.  With recent reforms toward performance-based 
specification, a lot of detail is left out.  This is purposeful to garner innovation.  
Requirements analysis is weakened as the contractor is required to make sense of 
open-ended requirements and maintain cohesion within the system of systems.    
Without clear requirement expectations, realistic estimates of time, effort, dollars 
and delivery schedule are nearly impossible. It also becomes much more difficult to 
compare contractors based on quantifiable selection factors like price and schedule. 
While the intent is quality innovation at a good price, the results are foggy requirements 
with unrealistic deliverables and schedule. Quality software innovation takes back seat 
to the selection process where evaluation boards only have the RFP type data to 
evaluate the software development realism.  The net effect; we still do not have an 
objective way of determining whether or not what is proposed and ultimately awarded 












do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 60- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 Here are some of the pathologies that go along with the software development 
piece.  First, requirements are not broken into the level of detail required. Currently in 
the RFP process, level three is required of the work breakdown structure. This is one 
level below the major end item in the software architecture. This is not enough detail for 
the contractor to build as they would in a mature engineering environment such as with 
hardware. 
Software requires a much more detailed approach to system requirements. If one 
leaves software system architecture to the interpretation of the software developer 
without clear requirements, poor design becomes standard. As noted previously, this 
introduces critical functional errors to the software system of systems as new software 
is built with top-line functionality only.  
It is more costly to fix errors the later they are discovered in the software 
production cycle. Strong requirements, refined over time, develop stronger processes. 
Requirements creep is part of managing the software lifecycle; without a clear structure 
in place, late requirements clarification/changes will severely impact the software 
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 Somehow, we have to get our hands around how the support costs of weapons 
systems are contributing to TOC, especially the software component. It is important that 
we capture where the money is being spent and attack issues as they relate to 
sustainability.  
It is important that we improve the requirements analysis.  Expecting to hand off 
a level-three work breakdown structure to a software intensive system and hoping to get 
a quality product is not realistic.  At the very minimum, we need to tell contractors what 
is the current, planned and projected capability upgrades.  Even though software is ever 
changing, it is important that we make a cut at requirements and upgrade expectations 
to enable contractors to build efficiently in the front end and construct the software 
architecture for flexibility to accommodate those changes and upgrades. This should 
also be applied for software interfaces. 
 
We require higher safety and security requirements on intensive software 
systems, beyond what is readily available in most of the commercial markets.  
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 Exception or fault handling: There are current software systems in the tactical 
world that lock up when a fault occurs. In a combat situation, this is deadly. A system 
needs to have a ‘reject faults’ capability, to move on and continue to function. 
Recovery technique:  For example, I spoke to a Navy commander who was 
involved with the STENNIS.  A software glitch in the system caused the ship not to 
know where it was in the world.  They didn’t want to get too close to land masses or any 
other ships so they steamed around for about six hours rebooting the software. 
Reliability:  Our requirements for reliability in our weapon systems are 
thousands of times higher than what we expect from the software sitting on our desks 
and in our offices. 
Redundant Capability: What do we need to make sure it does not go down 
under any circumstances?  
Conclusion 
The software component of our increasingly high-technology weapons systems 
provides the capabilities and lethality desired for our forces, but is potentially 
devastating to our ability to cost-effectively maintain their advantages.   
The complexity of individual software-intensive systems is significantly 
compounded when they are combined in a “system of systems” architecture.  The initial 
software architecture, driven by how requirements are translated into performance 
specifications, is critical in determining how much maintenance will be required and how 
much effort will be required in the necessary maintenance actions.   
To gain more effective software design, significantly more effort is required in 
requirements analyses. Performance specifications must be much more developed than 
is typical in the current development model.  Handing off performance specifications 
developed through just three levels of the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) for 
software intensive systems is insufficient in a complex, system of systems environment 
dependent on seamless interfaces in an ever-changing architecture.   
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 Significant development, incorporating all critical performance features, interface 
requirements, and known, planned and projected upgrades, changes and 
enhancements must be effectively transmitted to the developer for consideration in the 
software design and architecture.   
Without these efforts, software supportability costs will continue to skyrocket as 
existing software will require expensive and time consuming re-engineering to 
accommodate interface and capability changes that were known or could have been 
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 Panel III: Performance Based Logistics: Contractor 
Performance Measurements 
Chair: Lorna Estep – Deputy Director, Directorate of Logistics Readiness, Headquarters, 
Department of the Air Force.  
Discussant: Steven J. Kelman  – former Administrator of the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy at the U.S. Office of Management and Budget; presently the Albert J. 
Weatherhead III and Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Public Management, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government. 
Characteristics of Good Metrics for Performance Based Logistics (PBL) 
Presenter: Kenneth Doerr, Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate School 
Co-authors: RADM Donald Eaton, USN (ret.), Senior Lecturer, Arthur Chair and 
Ira A. Lewis, Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate School 
Using Metrics to Measure Contractor Performance 
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 Characteristics of Good Metrics for Performance 
Based Logistics (PBL) 
Kenneth Doerr — Associate Professor, Operations Management, Graduate School of Business & Public 
Policy, Naval Postgraduate School 
Donald R. Eaton, RADM, USN (ret.) —  Senior Lecturer, Arthur Chair, Graduate School of Business & 
Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School 
Ira A. Lewis — Associate Professor Graduate School of Business & Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate 
School 
 
Performance Based Service Acquisition is a Department of Defense (DoD) 
acquisition reform that has had noted success in reducing cost and streamlining the 
management of non-core government service capabilities (Office of the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense – Defense Acquisition Reform [OSD-DAR], 2000).  The guiding 
principle in Performance Based Service Acquisition is that when an outside vendor 
exists who can perform a service more effectively than a government user could 
organically, that user should specify measurable outcomes to a service vendor, and 
allow the vendor to best determine the appropriate processes (how) of delivering the 
service.  Performance Based Logistics (PBL) is an extension of Performance Based 
Service Acquisition aimed at the logistic services for major weapon systems.   PBL is 
intended to reduce lifecycle cost, increase readiness, improve reliability and reduce the 
logistical footprint of weapon systems.  A number of case studies of successful PBL 
initiatives are available (e.g., Candreva, et al., 2001). 
This paper takes for granted the success of PBL initiatives, and takes as its 
starting point the question of how best to measure the degree of that success.  In 
support of our prescriptions for measurement, we will draw not only on successful best 
practice, but also on the underlying logic and justification of outsourcing, as laid out in 
the economics and management literature.  While PBL prescriptions from OSD are 
always careful to explain that a PBL initiative may result in the selection of an ‘organic 
contractor’ (i.e., another DoD command), actual instances of ‘organic contractors’ are 
fairly rare, and in any event, some of the same measurement issues arise regardless of 
the blend of private sector and organic resources. 
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 While measuring the performance of ongoing PBL initiatives is our starting point, 
we also intend this paper to inform valuation questions.  From the initial question of 
whether to bring forward a weapon system or a major component of a weapon system 
as a candidate for PBL, to later design questions of ‘what form’ of PBL is best applied to 
that candidate, measurement issues are endemic.  After all, the logistic services to be 
outsourced will be priced contractually, and for some services, there is no clear market 
to determine that price.  When discussing CONUS transportation, prices are perhaps 
not difficult to determine by reference to a market.  However, when discussing 
something like intermediate-level maintenance of a deployed weapon system on which 
the DoD has a monopsony and the number of qualified bidders is quite limited (and may 
indeed be only one or two), the market paradigm clearly breaks down, and is perhaps 
best understood in the context of game theory (Shubik & Levitan, 1980).  Unlike the 
simple solutions of monopolistic games, however, the monopsonistic game of buying 
weapon systems logistics is hampered by the difficulty of measuring the value of the 
services to be obtained. 
In discussing whether a case could be made for the privatization of a particular 
governmental service, Bendick (1984) said it was important to compare private to 
‘nonmarket’ (i.e., organic) alternatives, and that the private sector should only be 
employed if it could reasonably be expected to be more efficient. He listed  
 “four aspects of market efficiency [that] are important to examine: 
• In producing the services … do the private sector’s production processes 
and input costs allow it to generate output at a lower total cost than could 
the public sector? 
• Are the administrative costs incurred by government to mobilize and 
control the private sector les than the cost savings from more efficient 
production? 
• Is the supply side of the market sufficiently responsive that private firms 
enter markets rapidly and smoothly? 
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 • Are purchasers sufficiently rational and careful, and the quality of the 
service sufficiently definable and measurable, that effective, informed 
consumer sovereignty can be exercised?  (Bendick, 1984, pp. 153-154).” 
Each of these considerations is potentially problematic when examining PBL 
initiatives.  When considering the first of his factors, the existence of PBL contracts in 
which the private sector vendor has hired back organic resources as subcontractors to 
do the touch labor puts in question exactly what services are being outsourced – 
logistics or management?  When considering the third of his factors, the consolidation of 
the defense industry and the decline of the number of independent companies that 
might act as potential bidders raise concern.  However, this paper will primarily concern 
itself with the second, and especially the fourth of his factors.  We will discuss how an 
excess of measurement can make administration of comprehensive PBL contracts more 
costly, while the difficulty with defining and measuring some logistic services make 
consumer sovereignty difficult to establish. 
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows. First, we will lay out a 
structural framework upon which measurement issues will be developed.  Upon that 
framework, we will then develop questions about how measurement informs which sorts 
of candidates are best suited for PBL.  Finally, we will discuss how measurement issues 
should be considered when deciding on the form of PBL to be adopted for a particular 
candidate, and the management of ongoing PBL contracts.  We are not attempting to 
clearly delineate between good and bad measures, or good or bad candidates for PBL.  
Rather, we are attempting to surface imbedded measurement-related issues that may 
make the difference between a problematic implementation and an easy one.  Thus, 
this paper is not intended as a guidebook for implementation, but rather as a guidebook 
for further investigation. 
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 A Hierarchical Bridge Framework of Measurement 
for PBL 
When describing logistics service acquisition for a weapon system as an 
economic game, it is important at the outset to note the dissimilarity between the two 
players.  The vendor has a clear objective of maximizing the wealth of their owners, and 
a clear profit incentive (again, we assume throughout the paper that we are dealing with 
a private-sector vendor).  The objective of the user acquiring the service is not so easy 
to state, and far more difficult to assess.  Maximizing national security would be one 
way to state the objective, and the incentive (at least at the organizational level) might 
be understood in the same terms – to gain more security for the nation.   At the outset 
then, the game has a measurement and a translation problem – measuring the services 
in terms of their contribution to the objectives and incentives of the DoD, and translating 
that measure into the dollar measurement used by the private sector. 
Of course, it might be claimed that business does not really have such clear 
objectives and incentives either.  There is a venerable literature pointing out the 
maximization of shareholder wealth should not be (and is not in practice) the sole aim of 
a public corporation.  Stakeholder analysis has its roots in this observation (Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995).  But even stakeholder analysis (in narrow form at least) does not 
deny the centrality of profit as a corporate incentive, rather the discussion centers on 
rights of resource holders, and equitable distribution of profits.   
The management fashion of Balanced Scorecards has demonstrated the 
willingness of corporate executives to look beyond profit in analyzing performance 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1992).  But it would be a mistake to take the current proliferation of 
Balanced Scorecards as evidence that corporations suffer under the same sorts of 
fundamental measurement problems with their objectives and incentives as the DoD.  
The Balanced Scorecard is clearly meant to be a diagnostic tool to inform management 
decisions beyond retrospective financial figures about the long term viability of the firm 
(i.e., it is meant in part to help predict and control future financial performance).  Kaplan 
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 and Norton (1992) discuss the shortcomings of financial performance measures in 
terms of their ability to guide (1) the innovation necessary to obtain future profitability, 
(2) the diagnosis of internal process problems that limit current and future profitability 
and (3) the relationship with the customer necessary to sustain future profitability.  Their 
main criticisms of current financial measures (which are a part of the Balanced 
Scorecard) are that they are historical and external to operations.  They tell a firm how 
well it has performed, not why, or what to do next to maintain or improve future 
performance. 
But measurement-related differences between the DoD and the corporate world 
exist not only in the incentives and objectives of each, but also in the process 
capabilities that are important in developing logistics tactics to meet those objectives.  In 
reviewing essential dimensions to be considered in logistic performance analysis in the 
commercial sector, Mentzer & Konrad (1991) developed a matrix in which five core 
logistics functions (transportation, warehousing, inventory, order processing and 
administration) could be measured along six dimensions (cost, labor, facilities, 
equipment, time & energy).  Distinguish between those dimensions and the four 
“overarching goals of PBL … to compress the supply chain, eliminate non-value added 
steps, reduce Total Ownership Cost and improve readiness for weapons 
systems…(Department of Defense – Defense Contract Management Agency [DoD-
DCMA], undated)” to which one should add “increased reliability and reduced logistics 
footprint (Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], 2003)”.  Aside from cost, these sets 
of six factors seem to have little in common.  But all of the commercial sector factors 
can be translated into cost, and can be understood as the essential dimensions that 
must be managed efficiently and effectively, in order to facilitate logistics support of the 
firm’s profitability objective.  The DoD factors, on the other hand, do not all translate so 
readily into cost, and fall into three categories of dimensions that logistics improves 
warfighting capability:  improved readiness (facilitated both directly by a focus on 
readiness and indirectly by a focus on reliability), increased agility (reducing logistical 
footprint, eliminating non-value-added steps, supply chain compression, and improved 
reliability) and reducing cost (by freeing capital for other warfighting priorities).   
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 This is a significant difference in how logistics is viewed.  The concept of 
readiness shows up as ‘equipment’ to commercial firms, who view the maintenance and 
functioning (and depreciation) of their operating capital primarily as a financial question 
– when will it become so expensive to maintain that I will have to replace it? Since DoD 
weapon systems are often quite old, very expensive and difficult to re-capitalize (lacking 
a depreciation mechanism, recapitalization is often driven by technological 
obsolescence), readiness is a much more central issue. Improvements in readiness, of 
course, improve warfighting capability; but marginal improvements are quite difficult to 
value in dollar terms. The idea of ‘agility’ is increasingly important to commercial firms, 
but agility in a commercial operation means, for example, the flexibility to quickly 
change production volumes, or quickly changing production technology.  It shows up in 
the list above as ‘time’, which is also translatable to dollars.  DoD operations on the 
other hand are mobile, and mobility directly impacts their effectiveness.  Agility is not a 
newly discovered competitive dimension – it has always been an operational necessity.  
Once again, however, the operational effectiveness derived from a marginal 
improvement in logistics agility is very difficult to translate into dollars.   
These differences in organizational objectives and the consequent logistics 
objectives further devolve into differences in process measurement.  Caplice & Sheffi 
(1994), in a classification and review of corporate logistic process metrics develop three 
categories: utilization, productivity, and effectiveness (see Table 1).  Utilization 
measures simply address the question of how much of a resource is used, compared to 
what has been made available.  While these sorts of measures may be useful in 
assessing the efficiency of a narrow segment of a process (e.g., space utilization may 
be useful in assessing the efficiency of a facilities layout manager), they have virtually 
no contribution to the understanding of logistics contribution to organizational objectives, 
primarily because they do not measure outputs at all.  It might be claimed that they 
measure waste, but even this is not true – all they measure is activity, not whether that 
activity is directed toward some valued outcome.  What Caplice and Sheffi (1994) have 
called effectiveness measures, on the other hand, ‘beg the question’ in an essential way 
– those measures are only as good as the norms one establishes for outputs.  They 
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 may be useful for historical comparison of a single process, but their value in comparing 
across processes or in guiding resource allocation decisions is quite limited.  
Productivity measures, on the other hand, incorporate both outputs and inputs.  For the 
corporation, assessing the contribution of an activity to its objectives is a matter of 
relating those inputs outputs to profits.  While of course this is not necessarily easy 
(e.g., single factor productivity measures do not capture a comprehensive cost picture), 
at least the examples given by Caplice & Sheffi (1994) can be measured or translated to 
dollars (e.g., dollars paid for orders processed, or shipments made), and this is broadly 
true of metrics proposed in other reviews of corporate logistic performance 
measurement systems as well (e.g., Chow, Heaver & Henriksson, 1994; Lambert & 
Burduroglu, 2000; Mentzer & Konrad, 1991), with the important exception of customer 
satisfaction metrics.  The importance of the ‘customer view’ has already been 
mentioned in relation to Balanced Scorecards, is often mentioned my authors on logistic 
performance measurement.  However, it is worth noting that Lambert & Burduroglu 
(2000) list “reliance on management outside of logistics to identify the impact [of 
customer satisfaction] on revenues, which typically does not happen” as a primary 
disadvantage of customer satisfaction measurement.  Hence, beyond simple utilization 
measures, corporate logistic performance measures can, or are desired to be, 
understood in terms of their impact on profitability. 
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 Table 1.  Corporate Logistics Metrics (from Caplice and Sheffi, 1994) 
Dimension Form of Metric Logistics Examples 
Utilization Actual Input /  
Normed Input 
Labor hour used / labor hours budgeted 
Area of warehouse occupied / total area 
Hours machine used / machine capacity 
Productivity Actual Output / 
Actual Input 
Ton-miles delivered / costs incurred 
Orders processed / hours of labor 
Pallets unloaded / hour of dock time 
Effectiveness Actual Output /  
Norm Output 
Items filled / items requested 
Shipments on time / shipments sent 
Transactions w/o error / total transactions 
Compare those corporate logistic measures to what might be proposed as a 
productivity ratio for weapons systems logistics –  
Operational Availability (Ao) of deployed systems / Total deployed hours. 
At first glance, this looks like a utilization measure, not a productivity measure – 
but Ao is often used as a surrogate for readiness, which is typically given as a primary 
outcome objective of military logistics (it would be a utilization measure if, e.g., flight 
hours were in the numerator).  The denominator translates to dollars in a budget 
(whether or not they could be translated to an actual cost is another issue).  But the 
numerator is not and should not be translatable to dollars, because profit is not the 
objective.  While measurable, it is difficult to value in terms of the dollars that might be 
spent to increase it, or relinquished in order to pursue other priorities.  Another problem 
is that Ao is only a surrogate for readiness because it is a ‘single factor’ measure. It is 
also not fine grained enough for many resource allocation decision we wish to make 
(hence the distinction between ‘mission capable’ and ‘fully mission capable’ systems). 
And finally readiness itself, after all, is only a surrogate for the organizational objectives 
of the DoD (i.e., ready for what?).  Note that if Ao were really the objective, it could be 
maximized by parking equipment.  Hence, logistic performance of weapon systems are 
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 more difficult to measure than commercial logistics (at least in terms of productivity), 
and perhaps more attenuated from DoD objectives than are commercial logistic 
measurement systems.  









How do these measurement issues inform the decision to bring forward a 
weapon system or component as a PBL Candidate?  First, again considering only 
outsourced PBL solutions, we must consider the economic logic behind outsourcing.  
One basic economic justification of outsourcing is the tradeoff of economies of scale 
with reduction in transaction costs.  If the outsourced service can be performed by an 
organization that offers similar services to a number of other customers, that 
organization gains economies of scale, and should be able to offer the service more 
cheaply than if it were done by the outsourcing organization in house.  The price that is 
usually paid for such outsourced services is usually in terms of increased transaction 
costs to negotiate price and services, and monitor performance (Aubert, Rivard & Patry, 
1996). When economies of scale are difficult to obtain, as with a unique weapon system 
requirement, some of the underlying justification for outsourcing disappears.  On the 
other hand, high internal transaction costs, due to e.g., high reporting requirements, or 
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 inefficient internal controls make outsourcing relatively more attractive.  If high internal 
transaction costs are part of the justification for outsourcing a PBL contract, then it is 
important that the system or component being outsourced avoid some of those 
transaction costs.  When measurement of logistic outcomes (readiness, agility and cost) 
is more difficult, it will mean higher transaction costs, because performance monitoring 
systems will have to be more elaborate, and fair prices will be more difficult to determine 
and negotiate. 
One way to make pricing and performance monitoring easier is by reference to a 
market for similar services.  Hence, in prescribing a methodology for the analysis of 
performance based contracts for contract managers, market research is indicated as a 
required step (OSD-DAR, 2000).  For comprehensive weapon system logistical support, 
or for weapon system-unique components, there will likely be no ready market for 
maintenance, or many other logistical support functions.  In those cases, the 
implementation of an outsourced PBL solution will require more cost and effort to 
develop appropriate metrics, and negotiate appropriate prices.   
In summary, measurement issues are endemic to the relationship between 
commercial sector vendors and the DoD.  From the point of view of measurement, the 
best PBL candidates are those with external markets for services, and clear outcomes 
that are easy to relate to mission objectives.  This is not to place a definite boundary on 
the systems where PBL ought to be applied, but only to point out that measurement 
issues may make some PBL implementations far more difficult and expensive, and may 
affect the form of the PBL solution. 
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 Measurement, the PBL support spectrum and the 
management of ongoing contracts 
One of the characteristics of PBL is that general characterizations are hard to 
make.  The top level guidance for the initiative always has caveats such as  
“there is no one-size-fits-all approach to PBL. Several programs have started the 
move to PBL under initiatives designed to meet the programs’ specific 
requirements. Each program has tailored the PBL application to its unique 
circumstances taking into account cost, schedule, or product integrity to meet 
warfighter capability. (DoD, 2001, p. 2-2)” 
In reviewing implementations, a wide variety of approaches can be found, in 
terms of measurement and incentives, and in terms of the level at which the PBL 
contract is written:  from a complete weapon system as with the DDG-51, to component 
level stock support, as with the AEGIS.  The spectrum of choices is usually described in 
terms of the degree of commercial support involved, and a frequently encountered 
graphic (which we have been unable to track to its original source) is shown in Figure 2. 






While examples of systems are often given in association with this chart, and 
definitions of the various anchor points (e.g., Mini-Stock Point) are offered, very little 
guidance can be found for the program manager as to what characteristics of a weapon 
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 system should inform the choice of the degree of commercial involvement, and whether 
the contract should be offered at the system, or component level.  It is our position that 
measurement issues should inform this choice. 
A primary aspect of measurement informing the choice of commercial 
involvement, which we have not discussed yet, is risk.  As should be clear by reference 
to Figure 1, vendors will be primarily interested in reductions of financial risk, while the 
DoD is entirely concerned with operational risk.  The tradeoff of these two kinds of risk 
is central to the logic of PBL outsourcing.  Contracts are almost always offered across 
multiple years (lowering financial risk for the vendor), with the expectation that the 
vendor will assume some degree of operational risk.  Figure 3 shows the expected 
tradeoff of operational risk.   
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 Although risk is clearly indicated as a factor to consider when developing a PBL 
strategy (ASN-RDA, 2003; Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense – 
Logistics & Material Readiness [OSD-LMR], Undated), this factor is rarely mentioned as 
a candidate for measures of ongoing performance in PBL contracts.  Indeed, it has 
been said that  
“minimal contract management involvement is anticipated as long as the 
contractor meets contractually specified performance metrics. However our 
involvement may increase if the contractor systems and processes are not 
functioning correctly and end users are not appropriately supported (DoD-DCMA, 
undated, pp 28-29. )” 
This is a curious form of risk transfer.  Operational risk, as we understand it, 
involves the variance associated with outcomes.  The assumption of operational risk by 
a contractor then would entail accountability for control of that variance, and assurance 
(with appropriate remedy in the case of failure) of the mitigation of its impact.  Here, 
rather, it seems that vendors are being asked to assume some aspects of risk (not 
clearly defined), but that the DoD will ‘increase involvement if the contractor’ fails to 
meet requirements.  We do not claim that this is risk transfer in name only, but that the 
form of risk being assumed by vendors is not what is commonly understood as 
operational risk, and the degree of risk they are assuming is apparently quite limited. 
It is our view that the degree of operational risk a contractor can assume is 
limited in many cases by the nature of our operations.  It is unrealistic, for example, to 
assume that contractors will be able to perform operational level maintenance on a 
ground combat weapon system; difficult issues relating to the physical risk, insurance, 
and liability of non-DoD personnel in or near combat need to be addressed.  These 
sorts of operational risk are difficult to measure, and even more difficult to value.  We 
think it likely therefore, that commercial sector vendors will be reluctant to undertake it.  
Depot level maintenance, and operation of CONUS inventory control points involve less 
operational risk, and risk in a form that is easier to measure, and less costly for a vendor 
to assume, and hence we think it likely that the more operational risk involved in the 
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 logistical support of a particular system, the more organic resources will need to be 
involved. 
Proposition 1.  When operational risk is high or difficult to measure, PBL 
strategies should seek less commercial sector involvement.  
Within the context of a price negotiation, it is also key to understand the benefit 
we provide by eliminating financial risk, as this is part of what we are paying to potential 
vendors.  Especially if interest rates and rise and the difference between the cost of 
capital and risk-free rates increase, what the DoD offers in terms of financial risk 
mitigation is highly valuable.  This valuable benefit is not free for the government to 
offer, and should be incorporated into pricing and contract negotiations.  If less 
operational risk is assumed by the vendor (or if that risk is difficult to assess), less 
financial risk should be mitigated – meaning contract terms should be reduced. 
Proposition 2.  When commercial sector vendors assume less (measurable) 
operational risk under a PBL contract, the term of that contract should be less. 
On the other hand, the outcomes of PBL strategies involving only certain 
components, or only depot-level support, are more difficult to tie to weapon system 
outcomes.  Consider Figure 4, which shows a highly stylized and simplified version of a 
weapon system and its major components, along with the failure rates (mean time to 
failure) of each of the components.  Assuming failure of any of the components cause 
the weapon system to become non-mission capable, the failure rate of the overall 
weapon system is then an order statistic, formed of the distributions of the time to failure 
of all of the components.  Now consider the problem faced by a program manager who 
has decided that his best PBL strategy involves outsourcing only component A (the one 
with the highest failure rate).  To properly value the impact of, for example a proposed 
incentive to improve the reliability of component A by 10%, the program manager would 
need not only distributional information about the time to fail of all the other 
components, but also a working model which imbeds that system in mission 
requirements.  After all, the final value of an improvement in reliability of a component 
(to readiness – of course there are other benefits in terms of reduced life-cycle cost of 
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 spares, and improved agility through reduced footprint)  rests in the increased likelihood 
of mission success in the deployed weapon system.  The sort of integrated simulation 
model needed to properly assess the impact of improved component reliability would be 
expensive, and more importantly, time consuming to build.  Given the time pressures 
put upon Program Managers, it is easy to see that the situation is problematic.   
Proposition 3.  PBL strategies involving less than comprehensive logistical 
support of a weapon system (e.g., for a component) should nonetheless have 
integrated weapons system models in support of their business case analysis.   
In summary, measurement issues exist across the PBL spectrum, but present 
different sorts of challenges at either end.  Ultimately there are at least two core 
measurement issues that should be referred to when deciding on an appropriate level of 
support within the PBL spectrum.  The first is the valuation of outcome-related 
performance, and the second is valuation of operational and financial risk. While 
outcomes are easier to measure at the right end of the spectrum, one is less likely to 
find a relevant market to support price and value decisions.  On the left hand of the 
spectrum, markets may well exist that essentially duplicate, for example, the services of 
a mini-stock point.  However, the valuation of those isolated services in terms of 
weapon systems performance is even more difficult. 
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 Aside from risk, the main distinction we will develop when discussing 
management of ongoing PBL contracts is the difference between process and outcome 
measures.  It is our position that, while PBL is clearly intended to buy outcomes, and 
relieve management of the necessity of monitoring the details of ‘how’ performance is 
obtained, a great deal of effort is still being devoted to process measurement.  It has 
recently been said that ‘too many metrics’ is a major problem with PBL implementation 
(Office of the Secretary of Defense, Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology & 
Logistics [OSD-ATL], 2004).  If the DoD is buying outcomes, not process, then it may be 
that much of the process measurement is unnecessary. 
An example of ‘too many metrics’ is shown in Figure 5.  This is a slide shown in a 
brief to a base commander to provide an overview of the PBL contracts at his base.  
This is a small base, with only a handful of PBL contracts.    Clearly, the commander 
understands that there are too many metrics, and is tracking them quarterly in order to 
push for their reduction.  Here, the number of metrics itself has become a metric, with 
visibility to the top operating officer at a command.  
Figure 5.  A measure of PBL measures used at one DoD command. 
Total Metrics Metrics Added 
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 Exactly how the superabundance of metrics arises is an open question.  PBL is a 
process meant to streamline managements concern with the details of a logistical 
process.  In part, it may arise from a broader context within DoD, of understanding the 
systemic relationships of which logistics is only a part.  Under various titles, including 
Integrated Logistics Support, the last several years has seen an increasing awareness 
of the embedded nature of logistical support, and the inter-relationships involved 
between e.g., manpower, maintenance, and supply.  Figure 6 is taken from a 
presentation to a PBL ‘tiger team’ concerned with establishing metrics.  Figure 6a lists 
the ‘balanced scorecard’ of top level factors for weapon system support.   
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 Figure 6b, translates the scorecard into logistics measures, by mapping between 
the high level scorecard factors, and the primary factors (process elements) of another 
management fashion called Integrated Logistical Support (ILS).  The details of ILS 
process elements are not germane here, only to note that they are indeed detailed and 
process oriented.  If one starts with a multidimensional balanced scorecard, and works 
through these process elements, it is easy to see how the number of metrics that must 
be tracked could be numbered in the hundreds – in fact, it would be hard to avoid.  One 
must ask why however, if we are engaged in an initiative to buy performance, we are 
starting with a detailed map of the internals of the process.  Wouldn’t it make more 
sense to measure only key outcomes, and measure them well? 
When we first presented this idea at a conference, we were met with the 
objection that an abundance of measures do not necessarily distract a decision maker 
from key tasks.  The analogy was drawn to a pilot in a jet, where the cockpit has a 
superabundance of meters and instruments, almost all of which can be ignored, except 
in the case of an emergency.  The analogy is a telling one, in that most of the people 
making decisions about metrics for PBL have themselves been pilots, or ship captains, 
or in charge of some complex process in the past.  However, PBL is not supposed to 
present the DoD with a complex process to manage – it is supposed to take one off the 
hands of the DoD.  We aren’t supposed to be flying the plane – we are supposed to be 
passengers.  When you are paying someone else to get you to your destination, you 
care about the price of the ticket, and arriving on time.   
Of course this is a simplification.  When discussing a PBL contract with one 
deployed squadron, we were met with a complaint about the difficulty of obtaining 
requisition status for parts that were backordered.  The maintenance officer for that 
squadron was not impressed that the average lead time to get the parts had been 
reduced, because his primary decision when confronted with a backorder was whether 
or not to devote the manpower to strip a spare part from another downed aircraft.  It was 
a decision that was difficult to make, without knowing how long it would be before the 
spare part arrived.  Clearly, in this case, some visibility into the process was needed, 
but only because a key operational decision rested on the measurement of that 
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 process.  Given that at least part of the justification for PBL is meant to be a reduction in 
transaction costs, we think this should probably be a general rule. 
Proposition 4.  In the management of ongoing PBL contracts, metrics should 
primarily concern themselves with valued outcomes, and should be related to 
weapon system cost, readiness, and agility.  Process measures should only be 
applied when key operating decisions depend on the status of the process itself. 
Figure 6b.  Metric Areas informed by Balanced Scorecard, and ILS Process Elements.  










Finally, we turn to the measurement of risk in ongoing PBL contracts. Operational 
risk is always difficult to assess.  In the context of support for a weapon system, it can 
be understood as variance in the logistics-related readiness of that system.  A common 
measure of readiness is Ao.  To see how variability, or risk, affects Ao, consider Table 
2.  The table shows the availability of two squadrons of 10 aircraft over a 20 day period.  
Over that period, both squadrons would report operational availability of 95%.  But 
consider that a mission requiring 10 aircraft would be degraded (more likely to fail) only 
5% of the time in the first case, but 50% of the time in the second case.  The difference 
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 is the variance in Ao.  To our knowledge, in spite of the exhortations of the centrality of 
risk assumption and readiness to PBL, there are no programs currently tracking this 
measure. 
Table 2.  Distributional differences in a 95% Ao. 
Day FMC aircraft 
In  Squadron A 
(10 aircraft total) 
FMC aircraft 
In Squadron B 
(10 aircraft total) 
1 10 10 
2 10 09 
3 10 10 
4 10 09 
5 10 10 
6 10 09 
7 10 10 
8 10 09 
9 10 10 
10 10 09 
11 10 10 
12 10 09 
13 10 10 
14 10 09 
15 10 10 
16 10 09 
17 10 10 
18 10 09 
19 10 10 
20 0 09 
 
=
In a very thoughtful document, the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN-RDA, 2003) listed factors to consider 
when deciding whether to use a PBL strategy: life-cycle stage, acquisition program 
strategy (including programmatic risks), organic impact (e.g., maintaining engineering 
expertise), commercial base (including additional risk required of industry partners), 
design considerations (including risk associated with incentives and performance 
thresholds), and technology considerations (including supportability risks).  Although 
risk is mentioned in four of the six factors, there is no mention of the sort of operational 
risk discussed above, and shown in Figure 3.  Indeed, there is little mention of risk for 
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 ongoing contracts in this, or any other guidance documents for PBL.  We find this 
curious.  If part of what we are buying is operational risk mitigation (in key performance 
dimensions), it seems to us that it ought to be measured. 
Propositions 5.  Operational risk (variability) in key performance measures should 
be tracked for ongoing PBL contracts.  Where essential to mission support, a 
reduction in variability should be supported with appropriate incentives. 
In summary, this paper has presented a framework, and propositions about the 
impact of measurement on PBL.  None of the propositions have the status of fully 
supported hypotheses, or fully developed theorems. All need further investigation.  
Some of the propositions are empirical, and need to be investigated in the field.  Others 
are prescriptive, and need to be supported by modeling and analysis.  Our hope is that 
we have furthered the discussion of metrics for PBL, and added to the momentum for 
improved implementations of PBL. 
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 Using Metrics to Measure Contractor Performance 
R. Marshall Engelbeck — Lecturer, Graduate School of Business & Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate 
School 
Introduction 
This Project examines the use of metrics as a means to measure contractor 
performance.  It is also designed to supplement the research being done on the 
“Characteristics of Good Metrics for Performance Based Logistics (PBL)” by Professors 
Ken Doerr and Ira Lewis along with Admiral Eaton. 
I can remember as a second lieutenant in the Air Force, the only metric I needed 
to know was how many aircraft are in commission and how many you could launch.  
This was a lesson I learned very earlier in my career when the Wing Commander, a 
very ambitious officer, kept reporting to higher headquarters all the aircraft were in 
commission.  After about two or three weeks we had a team visit the base.  We went to 
the stand-up in the morning the team leader asked the Wing Commander, “how many 
aircraft were in commission?” When he answered 100% the team leader told him to 
launch them.  Only about 70% got off the ground.  Now that I have more experience and 
realize the world is much more complex, it is clear that measuring performance, 
especially when it comes to multiple variables is important. This is critically important as 
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 Research Questions 
 
 
Since my research question concerns the use of metrics to measure contractor 
performance in an organization as large as the Department of Defense the first research 
question addresses what is the regulatory foundation for the use of metrics to measure 
performance?  
The second question: Is there a difference between metrics applicable to 
contracts for supplies and contracts for equipment.  This question was selected 
because I perceive we continue to view the procurement practices as if we were buying 
only supplies and equipment.  Today, the statistics tell us that 60% of our dollars are 
going to purchase services.   
This brings us to the third question: Are there differences between the metrics 
used to measure contractor performance when we are buying supplies and equipment 
from the ones from whom services are purchased? 
These three questions are addressed in phase one of my research project and 
represent a majority of the information that will be provided this afternoon. 
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 Although it is part of phase II, I will touch on a fourth question in order to illustrate 
that various functions have their own interests. They have different concerns, which are 
often portrayed in the metrics they view as most valuable. This is very significant 
because it sends mixed signals as to what we value as being important. 
Regulatory and Philosophical Underpinnings of Performance 
Measurement 
 
First we have the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. Much of 
the literature on this subject concentrates on the requirement that each of the 
departments in the Executive Branch report to Congress on program results every two 
years.  Frankly I didn’t realize the extent the management philosophy behind this piece 
of legislation has affected the way managers view their management responsibilities at 
the grass roots level.   As many of you know the Act says: no longer is having a 
program the primary objective, nor is it the compliance with process that is most 
important. What is paramount is the results achieved and the fact you also need to 
measure the outcome in order to evaluate effectiveness.  I’m hearing this philosophy 
expressed more frequently in day-to-day discussions with the students we have in class 
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 here in Monterey as well as from students from the buying offices throughout the 
country that participate in our distance learning programs. 
The next major event that has affected the application of metrics to the 
acquisition process has been the National Performance Review, which as you 
remember, also occurred in 1993. The Core Vision of that review was that government 
works for the people and should be free from red tape and useless rules no doubt 
facilitated acquisition streamlining.   
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 has been heralded as changing 
the way we buy goods and services. It prompted major changes to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FAR), which hit the field in 1995.  As a practitioner I was most 
appreciative of the “guiding principles” and “performance standards” stated in the 
preamble to the FAR.33 They were very significant because for the first time in my 
memory, and I go back to the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR), a 
procurement regulation made it clear the primary goal was to support the ultimate user. 
This revision to FAR also included four results oriented performance standards by which 
the process can be measured.  We all owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Steve 
Kelman, a member of this panel, who was head of OFPP at the time, for putting 
acquisition in the right perspective. 
Next on the philosophical side, we have the “balanced scorecard” concept. 
Because the federal government does not operate in a “profit” environment some 
advocate use a modified “balanced scorecard” approach when applied to government 
operations.34 “Balanced scorecard” is a concept introduced by Robert S. Kaplan and 
David P Norton of Harvard in 1996. It evolved from their study of how four corporations 
measured their performance and set corporate strategy.35  This concept represents a 
                                            
33  FAR Part 1.102 
34 James B. Whittaker, President’s Management Agenda: A Balanced Scorecard Approach, Management 
Concepts, Vienna, VA.  2003. 
35 Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, “Putting the balanced Scorecard to Work,” Harvard Business 
Review, September-October 1993. 
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 good guide for establishing a strategic measurement system. However, we need to be 
cautious.  We shouldn’t just adopt what business is doing.  It is important that we take 
good ideas from industry and adapt them to our needs.  
You Get What You Measure! 
 
 
As Dr. Marshall Meyer points out “You get what you measure.” 36  This means 
when measuring performance it is vital to consider what to measure and the unintended 
consequences on what is not measured.  This can lead to mixed signals as to what is 
important. 
We must state our objectives in terms of measurable results.  All agree with the 
comment made earlier that experience tells us, when we say to contractors this is what 
we want and what we will measure, we do not always say it in a way they can 
understand it.   Some of the results we desire are not quantifiable.  Case in point: How 
                                            
36 Marshall Meyer, Rethinking Performance Measurement, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2004. 
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 clean is clean?  How do you measure clean?  We want a facility maintained in the 
cleanest manner.  How do you define that? 
Consider the quote ‘people are better motivated with measurable objectives than 
without them’, made back in 1961.  The lesson from this for our students sitting in the 
back, don’t throw away your old textbooks.  This quote came from the textbook titled 
“Management by Results” that was popular in 1961.37  I kept mine all these years.  I 
knew it would come in handy sometime. 
Last, but not least, is a statement that moves metrics from a measurement to a 
management tool.  This is a statement made by Luke Campbell.  It was made at a 
software metrics conference in the mid-1990’s where he said, “If you’re not measuring, 
you’re not managing. You’re just along for the ride!” 38  That management philosophy 
says a lot. 
Performance Measurement 
 
                                            
37 Edward C. Schleh, Management by Results, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1961.  
38  Luke Campbell and Brian Koster, “Software Metrics: Adding Engineering Rigor to a  Currently 
Ephemeral Process,” 1995. 
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 So what are we talking about?  Here’s performance measurement, I’ll let you read the 
definitions as they came out of the President’s management agenda and the scorecard 
approach published just last year. 39
Acquisition Program Baseline 
 
Next, what overarching metrics do we have?  What are our objectives as stated 
by from OSD?  They are cited in the DoD 5000 series regulations.  These are the 
performance factors the program manager must report on when reviewing program 
milestones.  They are mandatory for high-value or high-priority programs.  They include 
performance requirements, schedule requirements, interoperability, supportability, cost-
of-ownership, applicable environmental requirements, and estimate of total program 
cost.40
                                            
39  James B. Whittaker, President’s Management Agenda: A Balanced Scorecard Approach, Management 
Concepts, Vienna, VA.  2003. 
40  Paragraph C 1.4 of DoD 5000.2-R dated April 5, 2002. 
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Moving into the contracting side, this came out of the Acquisition Streamlining Act FAR 
1.102.  Doctor Kelman, thank you for putting this in there, because we in the contracting 
community were working so hard to follow the regulations, which we sometime forget 
about keeping our eye on the ball. 
Comment by Dr. Kelman:  Will you also please thank Dave Drabkin who played a 
very important role as a civil servant and worked with Colleen Preston in OSD.   
Note, that performance standards flow upward, illustrating that in order to 
achieve results, the acquisition process must successfully meet the standards 
established in four areas of performance. I would venture to say each of these areas are 
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 Categories of Deliverables 
 
As you recall two of the first three research questions dealt with the three different 
categories of deliverables.  First is the delivery of supplies and equipment.   This 
category includes the High-Value and High-Priority systems that are covered by the 
DoD 5000 series regulations we discussed earlier. This is the area that in the past has 
received most of our attention when it came to regulations and our policies. However, 
dollar wise we’re not buying as much in this area as we did prior to the end of the cold 
war.  Currently approximately 60% of procurement dollars go to purchase services.  
This includes installation support, food service and installation maintenance.  Then we 
have weapons system support and other mission capabilities, component repair, 
sustaining engineering, advisory services, research and development, 
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 Categories of Contractor Deliverables Spectrum of Tangibility 
 
The next research question was: Is there is a difference between contracting for 
Supplies/equipment and buying services?  A study from the Journal of Supply Chain 
Management reported a survey of about 1400 contracting personnel in the commercial 
world and concluded: (1) supplies and equipment are more tangible than services. (This 
slide illustrates a range of tangibility as it applies to the categories of deliverables 
purchased by DoD.); (2) there is a difference in the degree of difficulty between writing 
requirements for tangible vs. intangible items; and (3) it’s much harder to write 
requirements documents for the intangible items. 41  There have been other studies that 
reached the same conclusion.  Just yesterday I was talking to Laura Baldwin of the 
RAND Corporation and she commented that she continues to be surprised at the 
problems the acquisition community is having in stating performance-based 
requirements. We’ve gone to defining “what” we want rather than describing “how” we 
wanted it done.  She also said there are more contracting issues that span the 
                                            
41  Larry R. Smeltzer and Jeffery A. Ogden, “Purchasing Professional’s Perceive Differences Between 
Purchasing Materials and Purchasing Services.” Journal of Supply Chain Management, Feb., 02.  
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 differences between the two methods than she had ever imagined.  I agree with what 
Ken Doerr said previously, we still want to measure the how. 
Top Ten Categories 
 
To get an idea what industry measures, this slide shows the top ten supplier 
performance categories evaluated by over 2,000 randomly selected members of the 
Institute for Supply Management (ISM) and reported in the Journal of Supply 
Management.42  Note that way and above the rest is quality and the importance placed 
on continuous improvement. Also note at the bottom is price, which was evaluated by 
less than 4% of the respondents.  In the middle section are facility environment (9.2%), 
customer relationship (8.2%), delivery (8.1%), inventory and warehousing (7%), 
ordering (5.8%), and financial condition (5.5%).  Notice there are no statistical 
differences between these categories.  This tells us what industry thinks are the most 
                                            
42  Penny M. Simposn,  Judy A. Siguaw and Susan C. White, “Measuring the Performance of Suppliers: 
An Analysis of Evaluation Processes, Journal of Supply Chain Management, February 2002. 
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 important supplier performance indicators.  It also says buyers, as a supplier or as a 
producer of a product, want to have a good supply base to deliver quality product.  
How Commercial Firms Measure Services 
 
 
Let’s look at services.  In a study published by RAND, Laura Baldwin studied 14 
corporations that purchase services to determine what they measure.  Customer-
provider relationship, like a call center response, is an important metric.  The question 
asked was, “were you satisfied with the response you got on the call?”  This question 
could be applied to a maintenance technician after being dispatched to repair an aircraft 
on the line or it can also apply to a repair of a water heater in a facility at a Navy 
installation.  
Customer satisfaction metrics, overall customer satisfaction: That’s hard to 
quantify.  The only way is through some type of a survey.  We all get them all the time; 
when we stay in hotels, things like that. 
=
Next is Operations: This I found very interesting.  Many companies measure the 
cost of ownership of a facility.  They track the cost of repairs by building or they evaluate 
its ownership cost by the number of occupants. 
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 Last, but not least, are special interests: The number of contracts with small 
business or socioeconomic programs.  The message here is the metrics are different for 
services than for hardware. 
Conclusions 
 
In conclusion; The Government Performance results Act (GPRA) of 1993 
establishes the need for government managers to define desired program results and to 
establish performance metrics so that results achieved can be measured.  Customer 
satisfaction should be the number one standard metric.  
There is a difference between metrics used to evaluate contractor performance 
for supplies/equipment and services.   
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 There should be relatively few key performance metrics. However, achieving this 
with the number of competing interests will be difficult. Currently a company working out 
of New York is walking the halls of the Pentagon saying that it has an IT program that 
will measure contractor performance. It contains between 100 and 1,000 factors that 
can be measured and report contractor performance.  They advertise that their program 
can be tailored to individual contracts.  Their theme is, if we’re not measuring and 
managing all the contract requirements then the taxpayer is getting short changed.  I 
would ask, if we had to measure 1,000 factors that could be measured in a contract and 
managers feel there are only 10 or so of these they feel are important, then are we 
paying for something we really don’t need that much. 
 
Metrics selected should be able to project subsequent outcomes.  They should 
give you the ability, by looking at trend analysis, where you will be in the future.  Answer 
the question; will this contractor be able to support the organization’s mission?   
• Metrics selected should facilitate continuous Improvement.  
• Metrics selected should also cross-functional boundaries.  Our processes cross-
organizational boundaries horizontally. They are no longer confined to functional 
stovepipes as we learned with the introduction of the computer.   
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 • The performance measurement system should provide the capability to compare 
contractors and should be use to award/penalize contractors. 
Final Thoughts 
Research results concludes,  performance measurement can be used to manage 
contractor performance after award. Private industry uses performance measurement 
primarily to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of its purchasing department and 
to guide contractor selection,  However,  the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA) of 1996 makes measurement of contractor performance a very appropriate way 
to manage contracts in the public sector.  
GPRA requires managers in the executive branch to develop strategic plans as 
use performance indicators to record output and evaluate the outcome of each program.  
The study recommends that the Kaplan and Norton's Balanced Scorecard method can 
be adapting to the contract in a manner that would enable performance indicators to 
flow down to major contractors.  The goal would be to add joint accountability for results 
to the buyer-seller relationship.    
Past performance is also is an integral part of the contract management process.  
It is primarily seen as a way to mitigate the risk of selecting a contractor with a poor 
performance track record by reporting on contractor performance annually. Examples of 
information that must be reported to a centralized data base by the contracting officer 
includes, (a) A contractor’s record of conforming to contract requirements and standards 
of good workmanship, (b) A contractor’s record of forecasting and controlling cost, (c) A 
contractor’s adherence to contract schedules, including the administrative aspects of 
performance contractor’s history of reasonable and cooperative behavior and 
commitment to customer satisfaction and, (d) A contractor’s business-like concern for 
the interests of the customer. The study concludes that both parties would jointly benefit 
managing these indicators concurrent throughout the life of the contract rather than 
reporting after the fact.  
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Downsizing the Navy: 
Privatization of the Naval Air Warfare Center 
Aircraft Division, Indianapolis  
A CASE STUDY 
 
William Lucyshyn — Visiting Senior Research Scholar, Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise, 
University of Maryland 
Jeffrey R. Cuskey — Lecturer, Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Jonathan Roberts — Graduate Research Assistant, Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise, 




• Strategic:  When faced with a BRAC decision (1) identify and analyze the 
stakeholders; (2) develop top level guidance with an overarching process 
framework; and, (3) develop and evaluate alternative courses of action, 
completing “customer satisfaction,” business case, and risk analyses. 
• Tactical:  Once an alternative is selected, develop a detailed implementation plan 
to address (1) transition issues; (2) economic development and agreement terms 
and conditions from City and business perspectives; and, (3) contract terms and 
conditions from the business and Navy perspectives. 
• Lesson Learned/Reflections:  Identify potential risks and mitigations, barriers to 
implementation, success factors, and best practices; and make 
recommendations for future privatizations. 
 
                                            
43 This case was a joint effort of the University of Maryland’s Center for Public Policy and Private 
Enterprise (at the School of Public Policy) and the Naval Post Graduate School’s Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy.  William Lucyshyn is Visiting Senior Research Scholar at the Center for 
Public Policy and Private Enterprise, Jeffrey R. Cuskey is a Lecturer at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy (Naval Post Graduate School), and Jonathan Roberts is Graduate Research Assistant 
at the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise.  The authors would also like to thank Luci Stevens, 
Graduate Research Assistant at the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise, for her research 
assistance.  This case was written under the supervision of Professor Jacques S. Gansler at the 
University of Maryland and was supported by RADM James B. Green, USN (Ret) Acquisition Chair at the 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Post Graduate School.  
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 Introduction 
It was just another day in the office for Steve Carberry, the Executive Director for 
Contracts at the Naval Air Systems Command (known as NAVAIR), when Carberry’s 
boss, NAVAIR’s Commander, Vice Admiral John Lockard, asked to see him.  Lockard 
was known for tackling tough issues, and this time he wanted to enlist Carberry’s 
support for his latest challenge.  Lockard asked Carberry to head a NAVAIR team 
tasked with exploring the feasibility of privatizing the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft 
Division, Indianapolis (NAWC-ADI).  As Carberry researched his new assignment, he 
began to appreciate that NAWC-ADI had a complicated but fascinating history. 
The NAWC-ADI Facility 
The 163-acre World War II-era facility had a rich history.  Originally opened as a 
bomb-making facility in America’s heartland far enough in-land to be insulated from the 
German threat, NAWC-ADI had developed as a center of excellence, designing, 
producing, and sustaining advanced electronics for defense applications, including such 
systems as the guidance technology for Patriot missiles.  The 62-building, 984,000 
square foot facility employed almost 2,500 people – over 1,900 were highly-skilled 
engineers, logisticians, and manufacturing personnel.  NAWC-ADI – whose basic 
products included aviation and aerospace electronic systems; weapons guidance, 
control, and launch systems; ground-based electronic systems; and shipboard 
electronic systems – was the only Department of Defense (DoD) resource that had the 
capacity to take projects from concept through design and to production, all under one 
roof. 
In the early 1990s, NAWC-ADI underwent an internal reorganization geared 
around acquisitions reform that was so successful that it became the model for other 
such reorganizations – including NAVAIR, its parent organization.  The workload grew 
to include a broad array of technical support across the full spectrum of Naval 
Electronics Systems – and its mission was to: 
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 “. . . conduct research, development, engineering, material acquisition, pilot and 
limited manufacturing, technical evaluation, depot maintenance and integrated logistics 
support on assigned airborne electronics (avionics), missile, spaceborne, undersea, and 
surface weapon systems, and related equipment.” 
The customer base – much of it outside the Navy – was very satisfied with 
NAWC-ADI.  Most important in the eyes of DoD, NAWC-ADI “saved the military more 
than $200 million in the 1990s” by, for example, reducing indirect costs by nearly 30 
percent between 1991 and 1995.44
But despite these accomplishments, NAWC-ADI was in trouble. 
Problems at NAVAIR 
A number of insiders believed that NAVAIR as a whole was in peril.  According to 
insiders, NAVAIR’s customers were deeply disappointed with the fleet.  Products did not 
meet their requirements, and they were always overpriced.  On top of that, it took “years 
and years to get stuff out to the fleet.”45  NAVAIR was perceived as eating up the 
infrastructures of the Navy’s Systems Command without adding any value to the 
operations, and there was a large duplication of industrial and engineering capabilities. 
Paranoia had set in.  In 1993, NAVAIR Headquarters was slated to be moved 
from Crystal City, Virginia to Patuxent River, Maryland to increase that facility’s 
business base and to keep it away from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, which 
had plenty of room available.  NAVAIR decided to launch a preemptive strike to save 
itself.  Through a variety of efforts, it aimed to reduce its staffing by nearly 50 percent, 
from 59,000 to 31,000 employees. 
Put simply, “NAWC-Indy didn’t have anything that couldn’t be moved.”46
                                            
44 Jim Wheeler and Susan Walcott.  “Anatomy of a Successful Privatization.” Indianapolis: Hudson, 1999.  
p. 10. 
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 The Base Reuse and Closure (BRAC) Process 
With the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense (DoD) significantly 
reduced the size of the military forces.  Budgetary pressures were driving DoD to look 
for ways to shed infrastructure while freeing funding for force modernization initiatives.  
But when it came to closing facilities, political realities always caused resistance.  In an 
effort to depoliticize this process, Congress passed the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Act of 1990.47  The Act established three rounds of review – one in each of 
1991, 1993, and 1995. 
The BRAC process requires the Secretary of Defense to make recommendations 
to an open and independent blue-ribbon Base Closure and Realignment Commission 
(BCRC) comprised of eight members nominated by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate.  The BCRC then reviews these recommendations and compiles its own 
recommendations, which are forwarded to the President.  The President reviews the 
Commission’s recommendations and either sends them back to the BCRC for additional 
work or forwards them in whole to Congress.  Absent a joint resolution of Congress 
expressing disapproval, the Commission’s recommendations are implemented. 
For the BRAC-1995 round, DoD emphasized cross-service use of common 
support assets, including depot maintenance, laboratories, test and evaluation facilities, 
undergraduate pilot training, and medical treatment facilities.48  The Secretary’s 
recommendations are based on a 6-year force structure plan, and the eight criteria for 
selecting bases to close or realign are spread across four categories for review (see 
Table 1). 
 
                                            
47 See P.L. 101-510. 
48 David R. Warren.  “Military Bases:  Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure 
and Realignment.”  GAO/NSIAD-95-133, April 1995. 
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 Table 1.  Criteria for Selecting Bases to Close or Realign 
Category Criteria 
Military Value 1. Current and future mission requirements and the impact on 
operational readiness of DoD’s entire force. 
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and 
associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving 
locations. 
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and 
future total force requirements at both the existing and potential 
receiving locations. 
4. Cost and manpower implications. 
Return on 
Investment 
5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, 
including the number of years, beginning with the date of 
completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to 
exceed the costs. 
Impact 6. The economic impact on communities. 
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving 
communities’ infrastructures to support forces, missions, and 
personnel. 
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 The 1995 Base Reuse and Closure Round 
The BRAC process had been used to select bases for closure in two previous 
years – 1991 and 1993 – prior to the 1995 round.  Because the easy cuts were made in 
the early rounds, 1995 proved to be “both technically and politically the most difficult 
BRAC round.”49  The Navy was faced with some difficult decisions.  Although NAWC-
ADI was an excellent facility, in the end, it could not compete with the other NAVAIR 
facilities that could do engineering work and also support flight operations.  Moreover, 
NAWC-ADI’s geographical location did not correspond with the Navy’s plans to shift 
major operations to the East and West Coasts.  Therefore, the Navy forwarded NAWC-
ADI to DoD as a candidate for closure.  In 1995, DoD issued the following 
recommendation to the BRAC: 
“Close the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC), Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, 
Indiana.  Relocate necessary functions along with associated personnel, equipment and 
support to other naval technical activities. . . .”50
NAWC-ADI was placed on the dreaded base realignment and closure list, slated 
to meet the same fate some 402 military facilities met in the two previous rounds.51
Enter Mayor Stephen Goldsmith 
Typically, base closures resulted in the relocation of personnel and equipment to 
other bases – in this case, NAWC-ADI assets would be moved to the China Lake, 
California and Patuxent River, Maryland facilities.  NAVAIR was performing triage – 
                                            
49 Wheeler and Walcott, op. cit., p. 11. 
50 Federal Register.  1 March 1995.  Volume 60, Number 40.  p. 11485. 
51 250 military bases were listed for closure, and 152 more facilities were scheduled for realignment. 
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 sacrificing Indianapolis would shore-up the China Lake and Patuxent River operations, 
then considered the jewels of NAVAIR.52  But was there a smarter way to proceed? 
The entrepreneurial mayor of Indianapolis, Stephen Goldsmith, proposed 
transferring the NAWC-ADI personnel and equipment to the private sector.  Goldsmith 
had been inaugurated as the Mayor of Indianapolis in January 1992, and he 
immediately began transforming the city into a “marketplace for municipal services.”53  
He changed more than 60 city functions “from government monopolies into services that 
compete[d] in an open market.”54  These changes usually resulted in improved 
performance at reduced costs.  For example, privatizing wastewater treatment in the 
City of Indianapolis reduced operating costs by 44 percent, increased employee wages, 
and reduced employee grievances by 99 percent.55  A contract with Corrections 
Corporation of America (CCA) reduced jail overcrowding, while also saving $20 million 
in new construction costs and $1.4 million in annual operating expenses.56  But 
competition did not always result in privatization.  When Goldsmith competed the City’s 
trash collection business – a large part of which already was being serviced by private, 
though non-competitive, companies – City crews actually won back some of the 
contracts, saving $15 million, or 25 percent.57
By the time NAWC-ADI was placed on the BRAC list, Goldsmith was well known 
for his innovative leadership – he even was known locally as “Mr. Privatization.”58  A 
more appropriate moniker, however, might have been “Mr. Competition.” 
                                            
52 Stephen Goldsmith and Larry Gigerich interview by William Lucyshyn and Luci Stevens.  18 December 
2003. 
53 William D. Eggers and John O’Leary.  “Revolution at the Roots.”  New York: The Free Press, 1995.  p. 
106. 
54 Ibid, pp. 105-15. 
55 Stephen Goldsmith.  “Making Government Cheaper and Better – Indianapolis mayor Stephen 
Goldsmith’s economic policy.”  USA Today (Magazine), January 2000.  Vol. 128, Issue 2656, p. 11-12. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Eggers and O’Leary, op. cit., pp. 107-108. 
58 “From boots to electronics: shutting military bases.”  The Economist.  21 June 1997. 
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 Forewarned . . . and Forearmed 
In late 1992, before the BRAC-93 process officially even began, Goldsmith 
began learning more about NAWC-ADI’s business by meeting with the leadership, 
touring the facility, and speaking with employees.  In early 1993, with a good 
understanding of the business, Goldsmith and Larry Gigerich – a senior advisor to the 
Mayor, a member of the Indianapolis Economic Development Commission (IEDC), and 
one of Indiana’s top powerbrokers, began lobbying key Navy officials involved in the 
BRAC closures in Washington, D.C.  Lew Lundberg, then-Technical Director of NAWC 
Headquarters, and Vice Admiral William Bowes, then-Commander of NAVAIR, told 
Goldsmith and Gigerich that if not 1993, then 1995 was the year to expect a possible 
base closure.  Echoing these sentiments were Robin Pirie, head of the Base Structure 
Evaluation Committee (BSEC) and Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and 
Environment (ASNI&E), and Charles Nemfakos, Executive Director of the Base 
Structure Analysis Team (BSAT) and former Assistant Comptroller of the Navy.  Thus, 
even though NAWC-ADI was spared from earlier BRAC rounds, the facility’s 
vulnerability was made known by the Navy, especially because it did not fly or float, or 
have ports or runways.  It became clear that the City would have to fight to make 
NAWC-ADI more competitive and keep it open. 
Even though Navy officials were undecided whether it would be better to wait for 
a closure decision to float an alternative, to have counterproposal options at the ready in 
case of a closure decision, or to fight closure altogether, the City and NAWC-ADI, led by 
Mayor Goldsmith, pursued a strategy of keeping the facility open by presenting 
alternative plans that both raised the value while reducing the overall costs of the 
Indianapolis operation to the Navy.  Throughout 1994, Goldsmith continued to meet with 
federal and state political representatives to coordinate strategies and discuss 
alternatives with the Navy.  With the help of the Hudson Institute, the City of 
Indianapolis continued to refine its alternatives, while also identifying which alternatives 
might be politically feasible. 
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 Initial Alternatives, and Privatization as a Potential Backstop 
In the face of these dire predictions, Goldsmith began preparing for the worst 
outcome by forming alternatives to closure before the BRAC-1995 process even began.  
The City started with four broad options that focused on increasing the military value of 
NAWC-ADI while reducing costs to the Navy, in order to make it more competitive with 
other bases.  Each option came with its own set of advantages and disadvantages.  
First, the Navy could build on NAWC-ADI’s “Smart Buyer” function.  Second, the Navy 
could use the Indianapolis transportation hub to its advantage to turn NAWC-ADI into an 
“Emergency Supply Center.” Third, the City could work with the Navy to find a private 
buyer – though this option repeatedly was dismissed as premature because no closure 
decision had been reached.  Fourth, the City could promote a functional consolidation 
with the Crane Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center and/or its Louisville operation. 
Privatization was considered as the City’s fallback position rather than as a first 
line of defense.  Goldsmith and the Indianapolis already were benefiting from successful 
privatization and public-private partnership activities.  Goldsmith gave his aides two 
pieces of guidance in formulating the fall-back plan.  First, in order to be attractive to 
commercial companies, NAWC-ADI had to retain its employee assets and be marketed 
as an ongoing operation.  Second, the market had to produce the best proposal, which 
necessitated a competitive bidding process.  Analysts from two Indianapolis companies 
heavily involved in DoD-related work – Allison Engine and Allison Transmission – 
embraced privatization as both worthwhile and plausible. 
Modest Proposals:  Refining and Narrowing the Options and Alternatives 
Goldsmith and the City continued to refine their initial options based on new 
information and analysis, and their discussions with both the NAWC-ADI leadership and 
rank-and-file employees.  They developed four broad options based on the initial set.  
The first option was to build on Indianapolis’ role as a national air freight and distribution 
hub.  This option would mimic the radical logistics restructuring taking place in private 
industry.  However, there was no internal champion, and it did not have a discernable 
effect on key Navy decision-makers. 
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 A second option sought to privatize certain on-site business units.  Because the 
funds for NAWC-ADI’s “competency aligned” and highly efficient operations came from 
customers’ orders, it was close to a market-sensitive business already.  Moreover, 
NAWC-ADI was becoming increasingly involved with government, academia, and 
private industry in an electronics technology transfer consortium.  This allowed it to keep 
pace with the complex and fast-changing electronics environment without losing 
responsiveness, which, in turn, allowed the Navy to function as a “smart buyer.”  
Despite these big positives, this option did not mesh well with DoD’s downsizing criteria, 
and it, too, was discouraged.  A third option either would transform NAWC-ADI into a 
government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) facility or keep NAWC-ADI around as 
a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC).  The former was 
discouraged because of the Navy’s concern with cutting assets.  The latter was 
discouraged because of potential political perceptions – the Navy worried that it would 
be perceived as funding a non-profit entity that ultimately would compete with the 
private sector instead of actually cutting costs. 
A number of realignment scenarios were considered, mostly teaming NAWC-ADI 
with Crane.  NAVAIR had a greater desire to reduce infrastructure than NAVSEA, who 
controlled Crane.  It was generally accepted, though, that if significant savings could be 
realized, NAWC-ADI could be changed from NAVAIR to NAVSEA, and the Indianapolis 
operation might be able to remain open.  A study by the Hudson Institute estimated a 
possible annual savings of $50 million – without closing any of the Louisville, Crane, or 
Indianapolis facilities.  However, the Navy brass pointed to the formidable claimancy 
issue – that is, who had the right to claim or assert primary command and control over 
which entity.  Transferring NAWC-ADI from NAVAIR to NAVSEA would blur the 
boundaries of who had control of – and took responsibility and claimed credit for – the 
facility, also posing recordkeeping challenges related to shifting employees and 
workloads.  Ultimately the claimancy issue doomed this proposal. 
In sum, even these refined options were largely ignored – they either were 
torpedoed by a major decision-maker, or the Navy felt that it could not review options 
that did not fall within the narrow BRAC structure. 
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 In the meantime, however, NAWC-ADI received the designation of “Reinvention 
Laboratory” in support of its restructuring initiatives, which gave it greater flexibility and 
allowed it to seek waivers from certain constraining regulations.59  Goldsmith continued 
to meet with top Navy and DoD officials and a Congressional delegation of supporters, 
led by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana).  Goldsmith’s already aggressive schedule 
intensified as the Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BCRC) decision 
approached.  As it became obvious that the merger with Crane would not work, 
Goldsmith and the City of Indianapolis began to push the privatization option to the fore, 
emphasizing the successes the City had already had with public-private ventures. 
A Decent Proposal:  Lobbying for Logic 
In Spring 1995, after the initial BCRC decision to close NAWC-ADI and as 
Carberry was constructing the protocols for proceeding with the closure, Goldsmith 
began lobbying to ensure that the closure was done “in a logical way.”60  Goldsmith was 
scheduled to appear before the BCRC, whose mission was to guarantee that “a fair 
process [would] result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations. . . 
.”61  Unlike other mayors of cities containing targeted bases, Goldsmith did not try to 
appeal the closure decision.  Instead, he tried to convince the BCRC that privatizing the 
facility was advantageous to the Navy, meeting the twin goals of downsizing and 
retaining NAWC-ADI’s core military capabilities.  Goldsmith argued that what NAWC-
ADI was doing was: 
                                            
59 A Reinvention Laboratory, created as part of the National Performance Review, was defined as “a 
place that cuts through ‘red tape,’ exceeds customer expectations, and unleashes innovations for 
improvements from its employees” at the first Reinvention Lab Conference at Hunt Valley, Maryland in 
October 1993.  The National Partnership for Reinventing Government Task Force redefined Reinvention 
Laboratories as “innovative organizations or activities that are established to test or prototype new 
‘reinventing government’ initiatives.  The reinvention laboratories are empowered to begin experimenting 
with radical new ways of doing business, and share their ideas, successes and lessons across 
government.” 
60 Wheeler and Walcott, op. cit., p. 17. 
61 Quoted. in Gregory A Hogan. “Evaluation of Military Base Closure Alternatives.” Virginia: February 
1997. p. 1. 
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 “Not inherently government work.  We said, ‘We can help you fulfill your mission 
better.’  Our thesis was that the Navy would become a procurer.  We based our 
argument on the business case – that [NAWC-ADI] had the lowest costs and lowest 
rates in the Navy, and [the products] are high-quality.  We’re the best value.”62
According to Goldsmith, the BCRC staff called the proposal the most creative 
base closure response in the country, and they requested a white paper detailing the 
proposal.63  But what he really was doing was “looking for a congruence of goals” 
between the City and DoD.64
Specifically, the Mayor proposed that the City or the State would assume 
ownership of the resources and would take on the operating and maintenance costs.  
The plan also focused on the savings that the government could realize by leaving the 
NAWC-ADI employees in Indianapolis as opposed to spending millions of dollars 
transferring them.  Furthermore, a privatized facility could take on other commercial or 
governmental work in addition to the Navy work.  Such arrangements would help 
provide a smooth transition for DoD clients.65  Goldsmith framed the issues as economic 
and human resources considerations, and, in doing so, he escaped much of the messy 
politics that stymied the efforts of other mayors and governors who fought similar base 
closures while capturing the imagination of the BCRC members. 
The BCRC’s Revised Recommendation 
On July 14, 1995, the BCRC recommended that the President either “transfer 
workload, equipment and facilities to the private sector . . . or relocate necessary 
functions along with necessary personnel, equipment and support to other naval 
                                            
62 Goldsmith and Gigerich interview, supra.  Interviewee’s emphasis. 
63 Wheeler and Walcott, op. cit., p. 16. 
64 Goldsmith and Gigerich interview, supra. 
65 Wheeler and Walcott, op. cit., p. 17. 
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 116- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 technical activities. . . .”66  Ultimately, the Commission left the decision to relocate or 
privatize up to the Navy.   Subsequently, the Navy drafted a long list of issues (see 
Appendix A) that would need to be addressed before privatization could be pursued.  
The ownership structure, environmental contamination, and human resources issues 
were just some of the Navy’s concerns.67
In addition, Vice Admiral Lockard was particularly concerned about the legal 
issues associated with such a large scale privatization effort – most significantly, which 
contractual approaches would support privatization if it were to proceed.  In addition, 
Navy officials were concerned with political perceptions, and they wanted to ensure that 
privatization was not perceived as a way of skirting outright closure.  Internal Navy 
politics also were problematic, as other Navy sites were vying for NAWC-ADI’s 
personnel and workload. 
But from many angles, the fate of the employees was the biggest issue.  
Everyone recognized that “without the employees, there was nothing to privatize” – and, 
about 200 people from NAWC-ADI left to seek other employment locally while the 
privatization option was being investigated, including some people from the NAWC-ADI 
privatization team.68  Vice Admiral Lockard proposed that 80 percent of the issues would 
need to be resolved before the Navy could consider moving forward with the 
privatization of NAWC-ADI. 
At the same time, the BCRC recommended the closure of two Air Force Air 
Logistics Centers – Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas, and McClellan Air 
Force Base in Sacramento, California.  In light of rising unemployment and the large 
number of electoral votes at stake just before the 1996 election in the already 
economically hard-hit areas of Texas and California, President Clinton encouraged the 
                                            
66 Emphasis added.  Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.  1995 Report to the President.  
pp. 1-59. 
67 Wheeler and Walcott, op. cit., pp. 44-45. 
68 Carberry interview, supra. 
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 Navy to consider privatization as an alternative to closing the bases, breaking his 
promise not to politicize the BRAC process.  Nevertheless, “The McClellan Effect” 
played out well among the public, and the Navy began to consider privatization as a 
viable option for Indianapolis. 
Both George Stephanopoulos – then the Senior Advisor to the President for 
Policy and Strategy – and President Clinton were familiar with the details of the 
privatization efforts.  The White House exerted significant pressure on the BRAC 
decisions.  Staffers took a keen interest in seeing the NAWC-ADI privatization proceed, 
and when it came time to close the Texas and California bases, the BCRC was 
instructed to “Do it like NAWC-Indy.”69
Vice Admiral Lockard Commissions Steve Carberry’s Help 
Eventually, Goldsmith’s innovative ideas caught the attention of the Commander 
of NAVAIR, Vice Admiral Lockard.  Although Lockard supported the BCRC decision, he 
knew that the potential impact on the civilian employees would be significant.  These 
were all excellent, highly-skilled employees who had served the country well, and he 
believed the Navy should do what it could to help with their transition to the other bases.  
Vice Admiral Lockard also was attracted to the NAWC-ADI facility because it had 
developed an entrepreneurial attitude.  And, as Table 2 shows, even with the declining 
DoD budget, their revenues were expanding, with much of the work coming from 
agencies outside of NAVAIR. 
Vice Admiral Lockard therefore decided to investigate Goldsmith’s ideas as a 
means to “minimize disruption to employees’ lives,” acknowledging that privatization 
could be a way to ensure that the displaced NAWC-ADI workers stayed at the Navy’s 
beck-and-call, while also seizing “an opportunity to show more connection between 
industry and government – [the relationship] is not either or.”70 He knew that the 
                                            
69 Ibid. 
70 Lockard personal interview with William Lucyshyn and Luci Stevens.  14 Nov. 2003. 
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 operational capability of Navy would not be jeopardized with any of the options 
considered.  Therefore, his “personal concern was not so much to preserve the 
capabilities of the Navy, as it was [to] preserve the lives of the people who had worked 
there.”71  Although at this late phase in the BRAC process the successful privatization 
was a long-shot, Lockard “knew that [the Navy] always had the closure option if 
privatization didn’t work.”72
Table 2.  NAWC-ADI Revenues Sources 
Source of Revenues Year Revenues (in millions) NAVAIR Other 
1991 $274  42% 58% 
1992 $295  66% 34% 
1993 $327  50% 50% 
1994 $303  67% 33% 
1995 $332  40% 60% 
 
Despite Lockard’s support for privatization, NAVAIR was, according to Admiral 
Steve Loftus, head of logistics for the Chief of Naval Operations, committed to 
employing a “coastal hub concentration strategy” to meet the demands of BRAC 
downsizing.73  This strategy called for relocating smaller Midwest facilities to large 
coastal facilities that also supported flight operations.  As such, NAVAIR planned to 
move the NAWC-ADI and Midwest-region assets to its China Lake, California and 
Patuxent River, Maryland facilities. 
Vice Admiral Lockard had a taste for making changes in the bureaucracy – 
although it was challenging, he “was always out on the edge, probing” for something 
new.74  So, notwithstanding the coastal concentration strategy, Lockard wanted to 
examine the privatization option in greater depth, and he was enlisting Carberry’s help.  
                                            
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
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 Carberry knew that he now would be called on to make decisions that would have a 
significant impact on the operational capability of the Navy as well as alter the lives of 
thousands of its faithful employees.  Furthermore, Carberry realized that in order to 
succeed in his role, he would have to pressure all of the stakeholders to work through 
obstacles quickly.  “Time is the enemy,” became his mantra.75
“Time is the enemy” was not just an observation or a way of life – rather, 
Carberry used it as a teambuilding tool.  As a common enemy, it shifted the focus away 
from the natural conflicts between the stakeholders and emphasized the need to work 
together.  Beyond that, portraying time as the enemy also functioned as a morale 
booster.  Recognizing that problems were lurking around every corner, it was important 
to continually reassure the stakeholders that they were not “dead in the water.”  Instead, 
they had to postpone minor problems and disputes and take on serious issues as they 
arose.76
In this pressure-filled climate, Steve Carberry was tasked with finding the best 
way to close or realign NAWC-ADI while still maintaining its military capabilities and 
looking out for the employees.  Developing an overarching strategy and framework 
would require thinking about processes and timelines that would make the change as 
painless as possible.  Carberry recalls the uncertainty at the time of his appointment:  
“Where do you begin?  It would be fair to say ‘begin at the beginning,’ but we struggled 
[during] probably the first four or five meetings to figure out where the beginning was – 
outside of figuring out where we were going.”77
                                            
75 Carberry interview, supra. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid.  Interviewee’s emphasis. 
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 The Case for Privatization 
“The push from the very beginning was privatization.  In fact, we didn’t refer to it as the 
close-and-move or the close-and-privatization – this was privatization.” 
— Steve Carberry 
Mayor Stephen Goldsmith and the City of Indianapolis had won a major battle in 
getting the BCRC to consider privatization as an alternative to outright closure.  But how 
did they win the battle, given that there was no precedent for such a large privatization 
effort?  And, even though Goldsmith and the City carried the day, could they win the war 
against close-and-move? 
In order to win the battle, they had to assert that privatization made more 
economic and military sense than shutting down the facility; in order to win the war, they 
had to demonstrate it.  The City hired Arthur Andersen to analyze NAWC-ADI and to 
generate a business plan.  They also hired the Hudson Institute to critique the Navy’s 
analysis of the military value of the NAWC-ADI facility and the projected return on 
investment resulting from the facility’s closure.  The Arthur Andersen business plan 
consisted of three basic elements: 
1. Economic and financial considerations: 1,600 of the 2,800 employees 
were scheduled to be moved, but many of the soon-to-be-separated 
employees had workload contracts that would pay for 700-800 work years, in 
addition to the already contracted-out 500 work years to be finished after 
closure. 
2. Government savings:  It would cost tens of millions to transfer 1,600 
employees. 
3. Workload diversification:  The new company would take on commercial and 
other government work to supplement the ongoing Navy and DoD work. 
It was now up to Carberry to determine whether the arguments made sense and 
to assess the feasibility of the proposed privatization venture.  His evaluation of the 
situation would directly affect the lives of the 2,800 people who worked at the NAWC-
ADI facility, as well as the local economy of the already ailing Indianapolis – not to 
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 mention the other Navy facilities that were counting on picking up the NAWC-ADI 
employees and workload. 
Wins for the City 
Stephen Goldsmith, the enterprising mayor of Indianapolis, knew that the closure 
would seriously affect the city’s economy – NAWC-ADI’s contribution to the economy of 
central Indiana was estimated at $1 billion.  At stake were some 2,500 well-paid high 
technology jobs – already down from the high mark of 3,200 in 1992.  The scientists and 
engineers, whose average salaries exceeded $45,000, also provided a well-trained 
talent pool that benefited local facilities – including Eli Lilly and Company and Allison 
Gas Turbine (now Rolls Royce), among scores of smaller medical device and auto 
manufacturing firms.  In fact, NAWC-ADI employees had the highest per capita income 
of any comparably-sized entity in Indiana.78  The mayor realized that he would have to 
do something to minimize the impact of the DoD’s decision. 
The city had been through a similar ordeal in 1991 when Fort Benjamin Harrison 
– a pre-WWI-era, 2,501-acre Army Soldier Support Center and Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service facility located in Lawrence, Indiana – was placed on the BRAC 
closure list and its units subsequently directed to move to Fort Jackson, South Carolina 
and Fort Benning, Georgia.79  The estimated cost to close Fort Harrison was $206 
million, and the savings, between 1992 and 1997, were estimated at a total of $123.8 
million.80  After Mayor Goldsmith was elected in 1992, he vowed that NAWC-ADI would 
not suffer the same fate.  Although the facility was not placed on the 1993 closure list, 
the mayor was advised by key Navy personnel that NAWC-ADI would not escape 
closure in 1995. 
                                            
78 Carberry interview, supra. 
79 Stephen E. Bower.  “The American Army In The Heartland:  A History of Fort Benjamin Harrison, 1903-
1995.”  Indianapolis:  Indiana Creative Arts, 1995.  The unit directed to Fort Jackson ultimately was 
redirected to Fort Meade, Maryland. 
80 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.  1991 Report to the President.  p. 5-4. 
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 Mayor Goldsmith decided to launch a preemptive strike.  He tried to sell the Navy 
on a myriad of creative privatization and realignment proposals.  Despite his best 
efforts, NAWC-ADI still appeared on the 1995 BRAC closure list.  The employees were 
“devastated . . . discouraged and broken-hearted.”81  At a meeting of the Base Closure 
and Realignment Commission (BCRC), instead of protesting the BRAC decision, Mayor 
Goldsmith said, “go ahead and close us, just do it in a logical way.”82  He then set forth 
the case for the privatization of NAWC-ADI. 
Much to the mayor’s disappointment, the BCRC left the final decision as to what 
to do with NAWC-ADI up to the Navy.  Mayor Goldsmith feared that the Navy would 
close the base without seriously considering his privatization plan.  However, much to 
his surprise, the Navy brass decided to contemplate privatization despite their many 
concerns, in part, because privatization was being pushed by President Clinton and 
seriously considered by Vice Admiral Lockard. 
Under the privatization plan now being seriously considered by Carberry, who 
was acting as the principal agent of the Navy, the City or the City and State would 
assume ownership of the site, facilities, and equipment, and would become responsible 
for operating and maintenance costs.  Apart from the employees being relocated, as 
many of the released employees as possible would be absorbed into one or more 
private companies to be established on site, performing work under contract to DoD.  
Complementary companies would be invited to locate on-site, thereby creating further 
employment opportunities for displaced workers, providing support for the new company 
or companies taking over the NAWC-ADI facilities, and sharing the facility’s operation 
and maintenance costs.  Thus, an estimated 800 to 1,000 new private sector jobs would 
be supported locally through these various linkages. 
                                            
81 Quoted in Wheeler and Walcott, op. cit., p. 16. 
82 Ibid, p. 17. 
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 Downsizing the Navy: 
Privatization of the Naval Air Warfare Center 
Aircraft Division, Indianapolis 
 
Part II 
Wins for the Navy 
For both the Navy and the private company that was going to take over the 
NAWC-ADI operation, the business case for privatization had to make sense.  
Privatization options would be assessed in terms of such factors as size, lines of 
business, markets, ownership, capitalization, and organizational structure.  The 
privatization plan was consistent with Navy goals insofar as NAWC-ADI would be 
closed as a DoD site, and the Navy and DoD would see a reduction in employment 
equivalent to its closure proposal.  A side benefit was rather than moving 1,600 DoD 
employees, they would remain in Indianapolis, thus avoiding both relocation costs and 
extended disruption to vital Navy programs. 
Initially, the new firm or firms taking over NAWC-ADI would provide products and 
services under the auspices of a sole-source umbrella contract, providing a seamless 
transition for DoD customers.  In five years, the firm(s) would have to compete for DoD 
contracts.  DoD still would retain over half of the workers, while the other half would 
work for the new company or companies to supply electronic products at lower costs.  
This public-private partnership would produce an estimated onetime savings for the 
Navy of $180 million and recurring annual savings estimated at $12 million.  As a 
hedge, before NAWC-ADI closed, the firm or firms taking over would begin marketing to 
the private sector, so as to reduce dependence on DoD business.  Table 3 below 
compares the costs of each alternative for the 5-year period before the contract would 
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 Table 3.  Alternative Cost Comparison (TY $M)83
 Status Quo Relocation Privatization 
Total Program Cost 1,428.0 1,585.3 1,384.2 
    
Recurring Costs (5 
years) 
1,428.0 1,342.6 1,254.1 
Non-recurring Cost - 242.7 130.1 
Labor 1,022.4 849.0 881.0 
Material 381.5 457.9 357.7 
Facilities - 57.8 0.4 
Environment - 52.8 52.0 
Personnel 24.1 122.3 82.3 
Other - 35.5 10.6 
 
In light of the revised BCRC decision to consider privatization as an alternative to 
closure, Vice Admiral Lockard asked Steve Carberry to evaluate the issues to be 
addressed before privatizing, as well as the cost estimates.  Most importantly, Vice 
Admiral Lockard placed Carberry at the conn when he asked him to recommend a 
strategy for the Navy. 
                                            
83 Gregory A. Hogan.  “Evaluation of Military Base Closure Alternatives.”  Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University Thesis:  Blacksburg, VA, February 1997, p. 20. 
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 Engineering a Successful Plan for Privatization-in-
Place 
The City and the Navy agreed that Indianapolis would solicit bids from private 
companies that were interested in taking over NAWC-ADI.  The City would then select a 
winner, and the Navy would negotiate a contract.  Although Goldsmith was on the verge 
of rescuing NAWC-ADI, he also was navigating uncharted waters.  There was concern 
among the City of Indianapolis and the Navy about whether private companies would 
even be interested in participating in this unorthodox process.  Further, there was no 
precedent for such a competition, so procedures had to be carefully crafted to ensure 
that the process was both legal and ethical. 
The main legal sticking point was the employees – leaving Navy personnel on-
site was a key to the public-private partnership, but the Navy still had reservations about 
leaving a detachment on a closed base.  The legalities were resolved in 1995, however, 
when Congress, under the Defense Authorization Act of 1996, authorized DoD to leave 
employees in leased space on closed bases.84  Still, managing employee and workload 
flight after privatization would be key challenges. 
Ethics concerns included procurement integrity, conflicts of interest, and 
switching sides, as enumerated in the United States Code (USC).  According to 18 USC 
423, procurement officials cannot seek employment with a competing contractor, or 
disclosure proprietary or source selection material.  For NAWC-ADI, “procurement 
procedures” did not commence until after the new company was selected, and merely 
participating in privatization discussions with the City did not automatically make any 
employee a “procurement official.”  To protect against Conflicts of Interest (18 USC 
208), NAWC-ADI employees were not allowed to be involved in the selection process 
itself, although they could provide information to the City to assist in establishing a 
selection process.  Although under 18 USC 207, former government officials and 
                                            
84 P.L. 104-106. 
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 employees can neither represent a person before the U.S. government concerning a 
project on which they once worked nor engage in work involving government contracts 
for two years, the provision does not prohibit conversations.  Throughout the process, 
employees were informed of potential risks, and it was possible to obtain written waivers 
to enable employees to participate.  All in all, ethics concerns did not appear to present 
insurmountable barriers to privatization. 
Identifying the Issues 
Vice Admiral Lockard and Lew Lundberg – who spent 20 years at NAWC-ADI 
and had become the NAVAIR privatization czar before Carberry’s appointment – were 
serious about resolving 80 percent of the implementation issues.  From mid-summer to 
mid-November 1995, teams from the City and the Navy worked together to identify and 
resolve the issues.  The teams did not shy away from tough issues, and the cooperative 
approach allowed the parties to address misunderstandings and conflicts under a set of 
common ground-rules and goals.  The City, along with NAVAIR and NAWC-ADI teams, 
came to comprise the Joint Privatization Steering Group (JPSG), which took the lead in 
defining and working through key issues, coordinating the efforts for cross-group teams, 
and resolving conflicts. 
Revising the List of Issues 
In early October, Steve Carberry, then the head of NAVAIR contracting, took 
over for Lundberg; and the pressure to reach agreements quickly intensified.  By mid-
October, the critical issues list was distilled to ten: 
1. Continued support of government customers and workload; 
2. Establishing a viable private entity by supplementing its Navy/DoD business 
with commercial workload; 
3. Operating rules and concepts for the public-private partnership (concept of 
operations); 
4. Determining the necessary number of on-site Navy employees; 
5. Identifying the type of contract and terms and conditions required for success; 
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 6. The type(s) of private entity appropriate to the partnership; 
7. The ownership of buildings, facilities, and equipment; 
8. Sharing, hiring, or purchasing of staff equipment between partners; 
9. Employee benefits; and, 
10. Partnership budget requirements. 
According to Goldsmith, who continued to meet with top officials to rally support, 
“Admiral Lockard asked all the right questions” to keep the process moving forward.  
Their burgeoning trust and mutual respect became very important as the City and Navy 
continued to crystallize the case for privatization and as big challenges loomed on the 
horizon.85
A survey found that 75 percent of NAWC-ADI employees had little confidence in 
being employed through privatization.  Yet despite the lack of confidence in the City’s 
plan, only 26 percent of the employees were willing to accept a Navy relocation, 
implying that a move alternative would cause high program disruptions and losses in 
capacity related to losses of key competencies.  Actual, real-world data showed that the 
Navy already had lost an enormous amount of capacity because of the move 
requirements in other base closures and realignments. 
Components of the “80 Percent Solution” 
 The 80 Percent Solution focused on four key elements.  Although at the 
macro level, the elements involved issues that largely were resolved through peaceful 
negotiations among the JPSG players, many of the detailed steps to implementation 
actually were outstanding at the time the “solution” was reached.  Vice Admiral Lockard 
and Mayor Goldsmith agreed to a policy of not putting anything in writing until a solution 
was agreed upon.  This approach encouraged cooperative teaming, and, perhaps more 
significantly, it decreased the probability that any particular decision would be 
challenged.  Avoiding preemptive strikes became increasingly important as the deadline 
                                            
85 Goldsmith and Gigerich interview, supra. 
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 loomed.  It also allowed more innovative solutions to emerge when they might not have 
done so if the arrangements were formalized.  Often, the inventive solutions placed the 
decisions within the already existing legal interpretations, heading-off potential legal 
challenges.  Establishing trust, avoiding unnecessary conflict, and innovating were 
crucial steps for succeeding within such a limited timeframe.  Even so, many people 
taking part in the process found the lack of structure and precedent troubling at the time. 
1. What stays, what moves? 
This issue addressed the number and types of projects that would stay at 
NAWC-ADI.  In principle, all projects would stay in order to boost the business case 
upon which the private company could build and prosper.  But this decision prevented 
other Navy sites from acquiring some key projects and thus reducing their overhead 
rates. 
2. What functions must be retained by the Indianapolis 
government? 
In addition to considering different privatization scenarios and the associated 
employment implications, also of great importance were the size, function, and duration 
of the Navy contingent that would stay at NAWC-ADI.  These decisions would alter 
customer perceptions and workload retention.  Ultimately, an interim compromise was 
reached whereby a government continent of 100 to 150 would remain in FY1997. 
3. Contractual approach. 
The City wanted – and Navy ultimately agreed to – a single workload contract to 
reflect cross-functional, team-based operations, similar to those that came to 
characterize NAWC-ADI and differentiate it from other facilities.  Not-for-profit ownership 
was considered and rejected because of potential negative political perceptions.  
Moreover, in the eyes of the JPSG, it would have bypassed competition, which would 
hurt the commercial viability of NAWC-ADI.  An option for an employee-owned company 
enjoyed bipartisan political support.  However, as a hedge against risk, NAWC-ADI 
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 would have to bring in a larger, more experienced company to help provide 
management skills and to prepare NAWC for competition.  Even with an outside 
company, there still were major employee incentives for success and a virtually 
seamless transition for customers. 
The players had always envisioned a large, long-term umbrella contract.  
Ultimately, the JPSG decided on a one-year Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity 
(IDIQ) contract with four additional one-year options.  The details and duration of the 
IDIQ contract went unresolved until much later in the process.  Unlike the near 
consensus on the IDIQ contract, the alternatives for a competitive approach were hotly 
debated.  All sides recognized that long-term success depended on NAWC-ADI’s ability 
to respond to market forces.  As such, any transitional process had to prepare NAWC-
ADI to compete in full and open competition.  At this stage, though, it was deemed 
sufficient to focus on assessing the benefits and costs of various alternatives rather than 
adopting any one particular option. 
4. Supporting business analysis. 
The responsibility for generating a supporting business analysis belonged to the 
City, though the Navy later had to do its own analysis to determine the impact on 
NAVAIR business.  Goldsmith argued that it was impossible to do such an analysis 
without committing to a plan, and he was unwilling to invest in an analysis that took into 
account the myriad options available to the JPSG.  At last, a compromise was reached 
whereby Arthur Andersen and the Hudson Institute would conduct another feasibility 
study that flowed from several basic, agreed-upon assumptions.  Ultimately, the case 
study translated the NAWC-ADI books into a financial analysis that had meaning to the 
private sector, analyzed NAWC-ADI’s potential as a private business, and presented a 
business model with enough detail that the Navy and outside analysts could manipulate 
the basic assumptions and determine NAWC-ADI’s long-term business viability.  The 
assumptions inherent in the business analysis were crucial.  While major savings could 
be realized from keeping the facilities, equipment, and people in-place, slightly altering 
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 the labor rates and/or retaining additional personnel could tilt the analysis away from the 
privatize-in-place option back to the default close-and-move option. 
“Time is the Enemy” 
Vice Admiral Lockard and Mayor Goldsmith met on November 17, 1995 after 
many issues had been resolved.  However, other issues were outstanding because 
either the parties were deadlocked or decisions had been blocked in some way.  Rather 
than tackling all of the remaining issues, the goal of the meeting was to lay the 
groundwork for proceeding with privatization.  Lockard and Goldsmith agreed that 
privatization would be the primary option, but that BRAC closure had to be considered 
as a backup plan in case privatization could not be achieved. 
Although it was taken as given that the City would run a competition to determine 
which private company or companies would take over NAWC-ADI and that the Navy 
would then negotiate a workload contract, the respective roles of the City and the Navy 
in the selection process was the focus of much concern and debate.  Setting new 
precedent, Navy counsel determined that the City should steer the privatization because 
the privatization process was initiated as part of a base closure and BCRC legislation 
established the City’s reuse planning as a major decision-maker, and this particular 
BCRC recommendation put particular emphasis on Mayor Goldsmith’s initiative. 
Also coming out of this meeting was Vice Admiral Lockard’s desire to speed up 
the privatization process.  Specifically, he wanted the privatization to begin in 1997, 
agreeing that if Goldsmith met his goals in a suitable timeframe, a workload contract 
could be finalized by October 1, 1996.  Lockard also explained that it was necessary to 
determine the “character and workload” of the new company before determining the 
size of the Navy employee detachment to remain in Indianapolis.  In December 1995, 
Lockard sent a message to NAWC-ADI customers supporting the privatization plan and 
directing them to continue their business with the facility.  He also asked that NAWC-
ADI’s customers who considered taking their business elsewhere contact him first.  
John Douglass, who had just become Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
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 Development, and Acquisitions, sent a similar letter to the Navy Program Executive 
Offices (PEOs). 
Soliciting Proposals 
At this point, there just was not enough time to meet all of the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation/Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR/DFAR) standards.  Carberry 
realized an awful paradox.86  Deviating from the FAR/DFAR acquisition process was 
sure to elicit protests from the losing bidders.  But even if Carberry could get waivers, 
the award still was subject to protest to the General Accounting Office (GAO), with a 
federal court likely to place a temporary hold on the process. 
City and Navy officials eventually agreed that they would have to disengage from 
direct consultations on selection to insulate against conflicts of interest and potential 
ethics violations.  Source selection was going to be the sole and exclusive responsibility 
of the City, and all of the major players were about to sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) to this effect.  But, even so, given the way that the Navy usually 
did business, it was very unusual that it was not going to be involved in the solicitation, 
and the Navy’s initial insistence that it be detached from the selection jolted everyone – 
particularly NAWC-ADI.87  The City was worried because the Navy pledged to be their 
partner in a venture they knew almost nothing about.  But their greatest fear was that 
the Navy would disregard the source selection decision – in particular, the Mayor’s 
Office was worried that this was “subterfuge,” setting the City up for failure and 
providing the Navy with a convenient way out.88  This was a matter of trust – one which 
threatened the entire privatization plan. 
Vice Admiral Lockard recalls his meetings with Goldsmith:  “We had to go 
eyeball-to-eyeball” and read each others’ body-language to establish – and continually 
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 reaffirm – trust.89  In the end, he successfully assured Mayor Goldsmith that Carberry’s 
idea simply was a way of avoiding conflict both with the Navy and with the bidders.  
Finally, the City of Indianapolis released the “Sources Sought Solicitation” on December 
22, 1995, which contained the solicitation, a detailed overview of NAWC-ADI, the Arthur 
Andersen feasibility study, and sample draft language for a possible workload contract 
from NAVAIR. 
The evaluation criteria were expressed in a set of thirty-four questions broken 
down into six categories.  The overarching goal was to develop a plan to balance the 
desired outcomes of each of the stakeholders to have them all come out ahead.  
Specifically, employees wanted new job opportunities and employment growth; the 
Navy wanted cost, quality, and performance enhancements; the new business entity 
would need long-term profitable growth potential; and the City wanted economic 
development, technology growth, a new tax base, and a long-term commitment from the 
new business entity.  Ultimately, according to both Goldsmith and Gigerich, the “fierce 
and open competition” really provided the City and the Navy with a number of creative 
ideas for making the privatization work better.90
Evaluating Responses 
In mid-January, 110 representatives from 36 companies attended a “Responders 
Conference,” where attendees received a tour of the facility, detailed briefings, and the 
chance to ask questions – a good response, considering the City was trying to sell a 
closed business.  Employee morale picked up noticeably as the prospective bidders 
streamed through the NAWC-ADI facility.  As of the February 28 deadline, the city had 
received full bids from the American Competitiveness Institute, Battelle, Hughes 
                                            
89 Lockard interview, supra. 
90 Goldsmith and Gigerich interview, supra. 
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 Technical Services, SEMCOR, Lockheed Martin, VITRO, and Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC).91
The City was now tasked with evaluating the offers to find the best value and 
making a source selection recommendation.  An expert Review Group analyzed the 
proposals, and invited each of the seven companies back to Indianapolis to make 
clarifications and answer a common set of questions based on the review of all of the 
proposals.  At the end of these meetings, the Review Group determined that Battelle, 
Lockheed Martin, Hughes, and SAIC were ready to proceed to the next round of the 
selection process.92
Resolving Open Issues 
Because the entire privatization schedule was so compressed, the City and the 
Navy continued to tackle issues, even during the competition phase.  To save even 
more time, rather than reaching agreement on one issue and seeking final approval 
before moving to the next issue, multiple negotiations proceeded in parallel.  The issues 
that the City and the Navy had to work through addressed three areas – namely, policy, 
operations, and statutory compliance. 
1. Policy Issues 
The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) made it difficult to award the contract 
to a single entity.  However, in early January 1996, NAVAIR proposed using the “public 
interest” justification for a one-time exemption from CICA, and ASN Douglass was 
highly supportive.  The exemption was subject to approval by the Secretary of the Navy, 
and Congress required a thirty-day notification.  A draft Determination and Finding 
(D&F) for the public interest exemption was set to NAVAIR for review, and within the 
month, it was on its way to Secretary of the Navy Dalton for his signature.  The 
exemption proved to be extremely important, as the team that eventually won the 
                                            
91 Wheeler and Walcott, op. cit., p. 32.  Four partial responses also were received. 
92 Lockheed Martin later withdrew from the competition during the final stage of the selection process. 
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 competition was reluctant even to place a bid without a five-year guarantee.  Although 
the final character of the agreement did not specifically guarantee a five-year windfall, 
the one-year IDIQ contract with four one-year options was enough enticement.93
There were concerns about protecting retirement benefits for workers choosing 
to join the new private entity.  Some 600 employees who joined the federal government 
before 1984 and did not transfer from the old Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) 
to the new Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS) lost their pension benefits if 
they separated from the federal system before they were eligible to do so.  At risk were 
the most experienced workers who had the most to contribute.  However, Senator 
Daniel Coats (R-Indiana) introduced legislation as part of the Defense Authorization Act 
of 1997 to help retain core technical staff, prevent disruption to key integrated project 
teams, and do it at fairly low cost to the government.  The legislation, which applied only 
to CSRS employees who accepted work with the private contractor and were otherwise 
ineligible for federal retirement benefits, offered a voluntary option to index a deferred 
annuity, as a two-year pilot program.  DoD would pay the annual salary increases into 
CSRS for the indexed annuity, though employees would have to forego their federal 
severance pay, receive a federal deferred annuity at the retirement age, and allow 
indexing of the average pay on which the annuity is computed.  The employees’ union, 
which became involved in some of the political proceedings, agreed to continue 
representing the employees even after the privatization was complete.94
Navy officials approved an Acquisition Strategy Plan for the Privatization of 
NAWC-ADI. The document formally laid out the process to which the City and the Navy 
had agreed. 
2. Operations Issues 
On January 24 and 25, 1996, the JPSG conducted a special meeting with Navy 
financial and contracts representatives, NAWC-ADI customers, as well as City, NAWC-
                                            
93 Carberry interview, supra. 
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 ADI, and NAVAIR personnel.  The JPSG assigned various breakout groups to address 
as many outstanding issues as possible, bringing them to closure, establishing a plan 
for their resolution, or finding viable alternatives.  In addition to establishing processes 
and timelines for resolving critical issues, the Navy also initiated a cost-benefit analysis 
of two closure options, which became part of the final decision-making process on 
whether to close or to privatize. 
3. Statutory Compliance 
NAWC-ADI still had to meet normal base closure requirements.  Before the 
government could transfer ownership of the facility to Indianapolis, they were required to 
cleanup contaminated areas.  The BRAC Environmental Planning process started 
almost immediately after the closure decision was announced.  Pollution almost 
certainly existed in one storage shed and a number of underground tanks.  The BRAC 
Cleanup Team (BCT) also was concerned about the plating shop and the printed wiring 
board shop.  The BCT, along with a group of local and community organizations 
comprising the Restoration Advisory Board (RAB), and the Reuse Planning Authority 
(RPA) took an integrated, cooperative approach to avoid conflict and minimize the 
chance for rejection by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Potential 
environmental liability issues – issues that the private company taking over did not 
create that could cause them operational disruption costs – ultimately would have to be 
addressed in the interim lease agreement. 
The City ultimately would lease the facilities and equipment from the Navy, and, 
in turn, would sub-lease them to the winner of the competition.  After ten years – 
comprised of two five-year options – the title would belong to the City, who would pass it 
to the private company.  The City initiated a process for negotiating an economic 
development conveyance with the Navy, and Arthur Andersen won the role of the City’s 
support contractor.  Their primary responsibility was to prepare a financial valuation and 
offset cost analysis for the City and the Navy. 
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 And the Award Goes to . . . Hughes Technical Services Company 
Although any of the three finalists’ bids would have been preferable to the Navy’s 
original closure decision, Steve Carberry, who officially had become the leader of the 
NAVAIR Privatization Team, was excited when Hughes Technical Services Company 
was awarded the NAWC-ADI contract on May 14, 1996.  Hughes offered the best 
employment opportunities and prospects for job growth.  They also promised to keep 
the technical teams together, reduce costs to perform existing and new work, and 
minimize disruption costs to the Navy.  Hughes, who already had demonstrated success 
with other Indiana sites, offered Indianapolis a strong, positive, long-term growth 
outlook.  Moreover, the acquisition of NAWC-ADI clearly fit within both the firm’s and the 
City’s respective strategic visions. 
But Hughes only won the right to begin negotiations with the Navy – the close-
and-move alternative was still looming in the background.  As such, Carberry had to 
develop an implementation plan that accommodated the needs of Indianapolis, the 
Navy, and Hughes.  In just over three months, the Navy expected to sign a workload 
agreement with Hughes; and in less than eight months, Hughes would take over 
NAWC-ADI.  Even though the City and the Navy had done much to resolve many of the 
outstanding issues, a good number still had to be resolved within this compressed 
timeframe. 
The Alpha Acquisition Process 
A Tool for Compressed Negotiations 
Carberry had to address the selection of a contract negotiation model.  The 
normal acquisition process was extremely time-consuming, often requiring 12 or more 
months.  Another option, “Alpha Acquisition,” involved all of the members of the 
approval chain in the negotiations simultaneously.  Thus, once an agreement was 
negotiated, rapid authorization could be obtained from all of the parties involved.  The 
Alpha process removes a significant amount of duplication from the process, for 
example, eliminating countless iterations of internal documents. 
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The Alpha Acquisition requires that the contractor and the government: 
• Get a commitment from all of the Integrated Product Team members; 
• Dedicate resources; 
• Take ownership of the process; 
• Be willing to change existing processes and procedures; and, 
• Share a common purpose, vision, and desired results with honest and trust. 
 
Taken from Michael White.  "Contracting Overview."  Acquisition Reform Week. 
Although Alpha Acquisition promised to speed up negotiations, it was a new 
model still under development at NAVAIR.  Still, with so little time and so much to do, 
the City, the Navy, and Hughes had to risk trying the Alpha approach.  Even Naval 
Facilities Command felt the time crunch and agreed to a compressed interim lease 
negotiating process, similar to the Alpha Acquisition approach. 
Negotiating the Contract 
Hughes had difficulty coming up with an accounting system, which was a 
prerequisite for determining the contract type – the accounting system in place at 
NAWC-ADI simply was not suitable for a private company.95  Carberry suggested that 
the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) develop an accounting system for Hughes.  
This was an interesting approach, as the contractor usually develops a system and 
submits it for DCAA approval, but Carberry sold his novel approach and overcame this 
potential show-stopper. 
Additionally, a refined copy of the business case data came in for review, and the 
results were surprising – the cost of privatization-in-place and close-and-move were 
incredibly close.  Although privatization was the still the best value, a small increase in 
the labor rates could easily shift the balance in favor of the close-and-move option.96
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 Carberry had to do something to make the privatization plan more appealing, or 
his supporters easily could jump ship.  To remove the ambiguity and turn the tide fully in 
favor of privatization, he decided that he would have to change the structure of the 
contract from cost-plus to a firm fixed-price – effectively fixing the labor rates and 
requiring Hughes to commit to the as-yet unverified rate structure for the next five 
years.97  It seemed like Hughes was being set-up:  a government agency was taking 
away a “cost-plus” contract and replacing it with a fixed-cost contract.  How could they 
possibly agree to such a deal? 
The answer:  Carberry and his Hughes counterparts had built their relationship 
on trust.  On Carberry’s direction, Hughes officials peeked at some of the business case 
numbers, and they realized that he was right.  Thus, after successfully navigating the 
cost-benefit issue that could have sunk the whole privatization effort, the type of 
contract negotiation was concluded within only three or four days.98
Carberry was close to ensuring for the City, NAWC-ADI, and the Navy a 
win/win/win outcome. 
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 Downsizing the Navy: 
Privatization of the Naval Air Warfare Center 




The Win/Win/Win Outcome 
Within one week of Hughes’ selection, the Navy announced its intention to 
privatize the NAWC-ADI facility.  The Navy and Hughes signed a one-year IDIQ 
contract with an additional four one-year options on September 25, 1996.  At the same 
time, the Navy and the City signed an interim lease agreement, and the City and 
Hughes signed a sublease.  The workload contract provided NAWC-ADI’s customers 
with a seamless transition, enabled the new facility to gear-up for competition for Navy 
business in five years, and allowed the entire government – not just the Navy – to place 
orders with the new NAWC-ADI.  Although difficult project-by-project negotiations were 
required to convert Navy Air Tasks into IDIQ task orders – as required by Federal 
Acquisition Regulation/Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR/DFAR) standards 
– Hughes took over operations on January 5, 1997, with most on-site Navy employees 
becoming Hughes employees.  NAWC-ADI became Hughes Air Warfare Center 
(HAWC).99
The City essentially swapped former NAWC-ADI land, equipment, and 
employees for employment guarantees and a local investment in human capital.  
Indeed, Hughes pledged to bring in over 700 new technical jobs from elsewhere in the 
                                            
99 James P. Valley.  “A Comparison of the Contracts Involving the Privatization of Newark AFB and the 
Naval Air Warfare Center-Indianapolis (AFIT/GCM/LAL/97S-14).”  Air Force Institute of Technology:  
Thesis, 1997, p. 29. 
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 140- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 company and to provide training for existing NAWC-ADI employees.100  Further, Hughes 
claimed it would increase the number of people employed at the former NAWC-ADI to 
3,000 by 2002,101 and pay the City $3 million a year in property taxes.102  The actual 
Navy workload guarantee was set at one-half of the projected workload for the facility.  
In exchange, Hughes pledged to reduce man-year rates by 15 percent over the five-
year contract period.103
Raytheon Takes Over for Hughes 
In December 1997, Raytheon Corporation merged with Hughes Aircraft 
Company and took control of the Indianapolis operation.  The federal government has 
not been able to measure the effects of the Indianapolis privatization-in-place under 
either Hughes or Raytheon because of a lack of baseline data from the original NAWC-
ADI operation, and the changing and mixing of workloads.  However, both Hughes and 
Raytheon did institute a number of business improvements that appear to be increasing 
efficiencies and reducing costs to the government; and, military customers have been 
satisfied with the quality and timeliness of the products.104
The Indianapolis operation really began to feel declining workloads by 1999.  
Raytheon attempted to counter by bringing in new Defense-related work from other 
sites and reengineering processes to mitigate the negative effects.  Although Raytheon 
had difficulty attracting new customers and were uncertain about future workloads, the 
company remained optimistic about its efforts.  Despite these efforts, though, the 
Indianapolis workload dropped by 30 percent only three years after the privatization.105  
                                            
100 Carla E. Tighe, et. al.  “A Privatization Primer:  Issues and Evidence (CRM 96-123).”  Alexandria, VA:  
Center for Naval Analysis, 1997, pp. 37-38. 
101 Ibid. 
102 “From boots to electronics: shutting military bases,” op. cit. 
103 Tighe, op. cit., pp. 37-38. 
104 David R. Warren.  “Military Base Closures:  Lack of Data Inhibits Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of 
Privatization-in-Place Initiatives.”  GAO/NSIAD-00/23, December 1999, p. 7. 
105 Ibid, pp. 8-9. 
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 And, although Hughes promised over 700 new jobs, in mid-1998, Raytheon cut the 
workforce by 17 percent for a loss of 330 employees.  Carberry recalls in retrospect that 
“Hughes was the only one that understood that this was not a procurement, it was an 
acquisition and a merger . . ., and when Raytheon took over, they didn’t understand 
that.”106
It was not all bad news, though – at least not for Indianapolis.  Raytheon 
transferred its entire Long Beach, California depot-level repairs and spares 
manufacturing to Indianapolis.  The consolidation equated to moving 120,000 square 
feet from Long Beach to Indianapolis.  Raytheon also brought additional work to 
Indianapolis through foreign government sales, such as armored tank modifications for 
Portugal, for a total of $31 million in sales.107
Even though the overall cost-effectiveness of the privatization-in-place operation 
for NAWC-ADI could not be determined, there are signs that indicate that the Navy 
realized some savings – at least in the short-term.  A City-imposed covenant required 
that Raytheon charge the Navy at labor hour rates that were 15 percent lower than 
Navy rates at the time.  However, these rates were subject to renegotiation in 2002, 
coinciding with the end of the five-year contract. 
Even though the Navy promised only 50 percent of the total workload, the Navy 
business that existed before the privatization accounts for about 65 percent of the total 
business done in Indianapolis. 
Does the BRAC Process Save the Government Money? 
As noted above, the 1993 closure of Fort Harrison cost the government $206 
million, and the estimated savings between 1992 and 1997 were only $123.8 million – a 
non-trivial shortfall of $82.2 million over five years.  But a March 2004 DoD report 
claimed that through FY2001, DoD had achieved an aggregate net savings of $17 
                                            
106 Carberry interview, supra. 
107 Warren, op. cit., p. 9. 
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 billion, with recurring annual savings of $7 billion – implementation costs, especially 
environmental cleanup costs, are quite high.108
Apart from these “observable” savings, what was the impact on employment?  
DoD estimated that the 1993 closings would increase unemployment by an average of 
5.6 percentage points in the 34 affected communities.109  However, the DoD estimate did 
not take into account the reuse of valuable resources left behind by the base closures – 
DoD’s Office of Economic Adjustment estimated that between 1961 and 1997, in some 
cases, for every one DoD job lost, almost two civilian jobs were created,110 as former 
facilities have been used for transportation needs, education centers, commercial and 
industrial centers, new neighborhood complexes, community support services, and 
recreation and conservation sites.111  Although there is a lag between government 
closure and private sector takeover, the time needed to complete the transfers has 
fallen from 57 months in 1988 to 21 months in 1995.112
On the whole, the BRAC process, as a tool for excising excess infrastructure 
while retaining savings for DoD, still has fat to trim.  The current DoD estimated excess 
capacity is 24 percent above the 1989 baseline.  Table 4 shows the excess capacity by 
service branch and for the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).113  Another BRAC round is 
scheduled for 2005.  Difficulties arise, in part, because the BRAC process relies on a 
static picture, or, as Mayor Goldsmith put it, “a snapshot of what is going on today.”114  It 
likewise is difficult to forecast activities that are five years away, especially as the 
                                            
108 Department of Defense.  “Report Required by Section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2003.”  March 2004, p. 55. 
109 “From boots to electronics: shutting military bases,” op. cit. 
110 Ibid. 
111 March 2004 DoD report, op. cit., pp. 58-61. 
112 “From boots to electronics: shutting military bases,” op. cit. 
113 March 2004 DoD report, op. cit., p. 54. 
114 Goldsmith and Gigerich interview, supra. 
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 threats to the national security continue to evolve and as government continues its 
transformation. 
Table 4.  Estimated Percentage of Excess Capacity in DoD 
Department Estimated Excess Capacity 
(above 1989 baseline) 
Army 29% 
Navy 21% 
Air Force 24% 
DLA 17% 
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 Appendix A 
List of Navy Issues to be Addressed Prior to Privatization, 
Summer 1995 
NAWCADI Privatization/Critical Issues 
• Contracting/Programmatic 
• Budget and Finance 
• Environmental 
• Human Resources 
• Private Side Construct 
• Other 
Ownership Structure 
• Employee owned 
• Publicly traded SEC company 
• Joint venture between ESOP and large defense/other government contractor 
• Employee owned and management contract with large defense/other 
government contractor 
Contracting Approach 
• Sole source through 3 to 5 years, then free and open competition 
• Initial free and open competition 
• Long-term sole source beyond 5 years 
Smart-Buyer Considerations 
• Retention of Navy employees critical to continuance of NAVAIR workload 
• Customer support additionally affected by retention of Navy employees 
• e 
• Navy need to retain smart buyers 
 Need to consider who will remain key engineering Navy employees and balanc
Navy employees with private side engineering force 
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 Contracting/Programmatic Issues 
• Specific business plan for implementation of privatization concepts 
• Identify cost and benefits of privatized divisions, personnel and facilities 
• Identify costs and risks of privatization to customers 
• Understand GFE/GFM process 
• Private entity rights vs. Government rights to assets and facilities 
• Reversion clauses for special government facilities and equipment 
• Transition of workload 
• Prepare timeline for transition of workload, equipment, facilities, how the 
transitions will occur and what functions will be transferred 
• Determine vehicles for interim use and early turnover of the facilities 
• Determine approach to privatization 
• Full privatization vs. division of private and public company workload 
• Identify those functions, processes, products that are Navy-inherent and cannot 
be transferred 
• Develop models of privatization to determine organizational structure and how 
• Consider FAR/DFARs and how they affect privatization 
Budgeting and Fiscal Issues 
gin prior to privatization? 
• Need to consider interim-use agreement for commercial work 
• Commercial work revenues may offset costs of transition to private company 
•
veyance to privatized 
•  NAVCOMP 
ons and transition to private company? 
tion? 
 
products get delivered 
• Can commercial work be
 What is the fair market value of assets and facilities? 
• Government should grant economic development con
company 
Budget for
• How does it affect operati
• What is the budget for a new contracting requirement for privatiza
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 Environmental 
• Perform an environmental assessment or environmental impact study 
• What is cost? 
• What is timing? 
• How does either affect privatization or ability to perform commercial work 
• Determine if NAVFAC needs to be involved City of Indianapolis can indemnify 
Navy upon transfer of facilities or equipment 
• What are Pryor amendments for environmental requirements and how do they 
apply to this privatization? 
• Need to prepare official reuse plan 
Human Resources 
• NAVSEA issues 
• Pension mobility 
• Retention of skill base – smart buyers for Navy vs. core engineering force for 
private company 
• Stable and strong workload continuance affects retention of skill-base 
• Contracting vehicle critical to retention of skill base 
• Identify legal precedent and authority to retain government personnel in closed 
facility (Navy presence, detachment, and other) 
Other 
• Navy guidance on major labs 
• EP-3, V-22 labs to stay or move? 
• Short-term success of privatization plan will rely on private company to retain 
• Can there be a privatization of these labs and workload continuance for 1 to 2 
• 
these labs 
years on these projects? 
What is fall back position – give up V-22 and retain EP-3 or vice versa 
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 • What are the roles and responsibilities of the various individuals in the private 
company vs. Navy? 
• Decision authorities 
• Integrated project team structures 
• Development of evaluation criteria for options/models 
• Develop list of transition issue 
• Is there initial funding for the private company and where does it come from? 
• Determine effect of Reinvention Lab status (NAVAIR and NAWC-Indy) on 
privatization 
• Reinvention Lab status offers selective waiver opportunities to achieve specific 
goals 
• All privatization models cost less than close and move 
• Goal of Privatization is to save Navy money and improve efficiency of contract 
process. 
• Consider local, regional, and national political implications 
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 148- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 Appendix B 
Detailed Cost Estimate of Relocation and Privatization Options 
Table 5.  Relocation Plan Cost Estimate (TY $M)115
 TY97 TY98 TY99 TY00 TY01 Total 
Total Cost 329.6 320.1 327.3 330.5 277.8 1,585.3 
       
Labor 211.3 196.1 167.8 142.8 141.1 859.0 
Material 84.9 86.3 81.6 99.0 106.1 457.9 
Facilities 12.0 15.4 18.7 11.7 - 57.8 
Environment 6.1 5.2 11.4 15.0 15.1 52.8 
Personnel 13.6 14.8 36.9 42.9 14.0 122.3 
Other 1.7 2.3 10.9 19.1 1.6 35.5 
 
Table 6.  Privatization Plan Cost Estimate (TY $M)116
 TY97 TY98 TY99 TY00 TY01 Total 
Total Cost 339.3 282.7 241.6 254.1 266.6 1,384.2 
       
Labor 191.2 180.7 161.9 170.7 176.4 881.0  
Material 79.5 71.0 65.7 69.4 72.1 357.7  
Facilities 0.4 -       -       -       -  0.4  
Environment 9.5 5.3 11.1 11.1 15.1 52.0  
Personnel 55.9 23.3 1.0 1.0 1.1 82.3  
Other 2.8 2.3 1.8 1.9 1.9 10.6  
 
                                            
115 Gregory A Hogan. “Evaluation of Military Base Closure Alternatives.” Virginia: February 1997. p. 46. 
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 The Army Seeks a World Class Logistics 
Modernization Program 
William Lucyshyn — Visiting Senior Research Scholar, Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise, 
University of Maryland 
Keith F. Snider — Associate Professor, Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Robert Maly — Graduate Research Assistant, Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise, University 
of Maryland117 
On a hot summer day in early August 1999, Paul Capelli walked from the 
Longworth House of Representatives office building after briefing the staffers of 
Representative Richard Gephardt on the Army program for which he was responsible.  
He was on his way to brief another House member and his staffers in the Rayburn office 
building.  This trip felt like his 100th, and he wondered if they would ever stop.  Capelli 
had been tasked by the Army Materiel Command (AMC) to lead a project team to 
modernize the Army’s logistics management and information systems in the Logistics 
Modernization Program (LMP).118
In the beginning, Paul Capelli was concerned mainly with assembling the right 
team and developing innovative alternatives for modernization.  However, he had soon 
realized his major resistance would come due to the unprecedented nature of the 
modernization, and the political resistance that resulted. 
                                            
117 This case was a joint effort of the University of Maryland’s Center for Public Policy and Private 
Enterprise (at the School of Public Policy) and the Naval Post Graduate School’s Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy.  William Lucyshyn is Visiting Senior Research Scholar at the Center for 
Public Policy and Private Enterprise, Keith F. Snider is an Associate Professor at the Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy (Naval Post Graduate School), and Robert Maly is Graduate Research 
Assistant at the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise.  This case was written under the 
supervision of Professor Jacques S. Gansler at the University of Maryland and was supported by RADM 
James B. Greene, USN (Ret) Acquisition Chair at the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
(Naval Post Graduate School) 
118 Originally, LMP, or LogMod, was termed “WLMP,” which referred to Wholesale LMP. Later, LMP was 
expanded to include retail logistics and the “W” was dropped from LMP, although the wholesale and retail 
operations have yet to be integrated fully as of April 2004. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Capelli’s work with LMP started two years prior in August of 1997 at the 
Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM), Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. 
CECOM’s Deputy to the Commanding General Mr. Victor Ferlise called Capelli to ask 
him if he’d be interested in leading an important new program that would help 
modernize the Army’s outdated logistics management systems.  Capelli had served at 
every level within CECOM’s Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) prior to being named the 
Program Director of LMP.  And, since a core aspect of LMP was the modernization of 
the logistics business processes, Capelli’s experience made him a logical choice.   
CECOM was responding to an Army Materiel Command’s (AMC’s) August 5, 
1997 memorandum (see Appendix A), in which AMC’s Deputy Commanding General 
Dennis Benchoff tasked the Commander, CECOM “to explore alternatives to modernize 
the wholesale logistics processes and associated information technology to support 
these processes.”119   Specifically, the letter asked CECOM to:120
1) Determine feasible alternatives for logistics modernization strategies,  
2) consider the implications and devise methods to soften the impact on the 
existing workforce, 
3) develop a performance-based statement of requirements, and 
4) to recommend an acquisition approach.  
As the first step toward this aim, General Benchoff had asked the CECOM 
Commander to designate a Special Project Team in order to gather information and 
conduct market research to develop alternatives for a modernization strategy.  The 
team, to be led by Capelli, would ultimately consist of top hand-picked individuals from 
across AMC, all of AMC’s Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs), one of which is 
CECOM; numerous affiliated MSC depots; and other activities and centers supporting 
                                            




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 152- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 the Army’s logistics enterprise. Specifically, Benchoff wanted the team to develop a plan 
to modernize the Army’s wholesale logistics systems leveraging recent acquisition 
reform initiatives and best commercial business processes and products.  He 
encouraged outside-the-box thinking and gave the team the authority to challenge all 
regulatory and process constraints. Benchoff envisioned a “partnering with industry” that 
“privatized development and sustainment of the wholesale logistics automation 
systems.”121
PAUL CAPELLI 
Before he became the Program Director for LMP, Capelli served in the federal 
government for over 20 years.  He began his career in logistics at CECOM and steadily 
developed into one of CECOM’s most talented leaders.  Throughout his tenure there, 
Capelli had been a user of the logistics systems as well as a supervisor for divisions of 
other users.  In fact, he had experience with virtually every aspect of CECOM’s logistics 
processes during his career—as an intern, a materiel manager, a branch chief and a 
division chief. 
Prior to his appointment with LMP, Capelli was the Deputy Director in CECOM’s 
Directorate of Materiel Management, where he began seeing the changes in strategic 
direction the Army was making.  Increasingly, the Army’s strategy was integrating best 
practices from the commercial sector.  In this capacity, Capelli began to believe that the 
Army’s supply chain processes could benefit greatly from those in the private sector 
where firms were continually making their world class systems more effective and more 
efficient. 
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 SETTING THE STAGE 
The US Army is supported by a vast and complex logistics network, which 
contains about $9 billion of Army general issue inventory and about $4 billion in spare 
parts; the average annual inventory turnover is about $2.5 billion.122  It is this system that 
is responsible for moving supplies from manufacturers and warehouses to the soldiers 
on the battleground.  
The first Gulf War revealed flaws in the existing Army logistics system.  These 
weaknesses were generally not characterized by a lack of supplies, but by a lack of 
supplies in a timely manner, and the inability to efficiently get supplies, replacement 
parts and equipment to the units that needed them.123  In fact, the Gulf War logistics 
operation has often been described as a classic “push” system in which the Army would 
literally send everything it might need into the theater first, and then issue the specific 
equipment as needed.  This method can be effective, but it is rarely efficient.  Generals 
coming off helicopters after the war referred to the pallets of unused equipment in the 
desert as “iron mountains.”  Recognizing a need for improvement, Department of 
Defense (DoD) and Army leaders began to look to the advances made in how the  
private sector was transforming supply chain management and began to consider ways 
to incorporate those into their logistics reform efforts.  
In fact, the 1990’s saw a large push throughout the entire federal government for 
best business practices.  In Congress, the Government Performance and Results Act of 
1993 set off a series of mandates for government performance measurements, 
infrastructure reductions and increased government efficiency within the federal 
government known as the Revolution in Business Affairs.  In parallel, DoD introduced its 
Revolution in Military Affairs based on the idea that the US military must revolutionize 
                                            
122 Paul Taibl, “Army Logistics Modernization Program: A Case Study,” Business Executives for National 
Security Tail-to-Tooth, April 9, 1999. [Accessed on February 2004]  Viewed at http://www.bens.org. 
123 Larry Asch, LMP Chief, LMP Business Office, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert 
Maly and Keith Snider.  College Park, Maryland, January 29, 2004. 
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 itself in order to adapt to future needs of speed and flexibility in combat.  In 1994, 
President Clinton signed the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, and in 1996, he 
signed the Federal Acquisition Reform Act.  These laws made it easier for the 
government to buy goods and services from the private sector through reduced 
government oversight, simplified contracting procedures, and generally eliminated 
barriers between the public and private sectors.124
In July 1996, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Joint Vision 2010, which proposed a 
vision for the US military to channel human resources and leverage technological 
advances to achieve higher levels of effectiveness and efficiency.  It identified four main 
operational cornerstones—among them, focused logistics that were responsive, flexible 
and precise.  The report stated: “Service and Defense agencies will work jointly and 
integrate with the civilian sector, where required, to take advantage of advanced 
business practices, commercial economies, and global networks.”125
Two of the most influential legislative actions in the 1990s regarding acquisition 
reform, the Governmental Performance and Results Act (1993) and the Clinger Cohen 
Act (1996), stressed the importance of government performing duties that were 
inherently governmental.  These Acts recommended that non-core competencies, those 
duties such as software maintenance that could be performed in the private sector, 
should be competitively sourced. 
In May 1997, Defense Secretary William Cohen released the Quadrennial 
Defense Review which mandated the adoption of innovative business practices used in 
the private sector and put forward goals to reengineer DoD support structures.  
Secretary Cohen said, “Our purchasing system is still too cumbersome, slow and 
                                            
124 Michael Lippitz, Sean O'Keefe and John White with John Brown, “Advancing the Revolution in 
Business Affairs,” Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future, Cambridge, MA: Preventive 
Defense Project, September 2000, p. 170-171. [Accessed on April 2004]  Viewed at 
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/KTE_ch7.pdf.. 
125 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, 1996, p. 24. 
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 expensive.  We still do too many things in-house that we can do better and cheaper 
through outsourcing.”126
And yet, as of August of 1997, the Army still relied on its 30-year-old logistics and 
depot maintenance systems, the Commodity Command Standard System (CCSS) and 
the Standard Depot System (SDS), to support the Army’s annual procurement of 
supplies and equipment worth billions of dollars.  These wholesale systems, which were 
written in Common Business Oriented Language (COBOL) software dated from the 
early 1970’s, were neither flexible nor adaptable to change, and were very expensive to 
sustain and upgrade.127  In addition, when the Army questioned whether developing and 
maintaining these computer systems was a core competency, the answer came back a 
resounding no. 
According to Paul Capelli, “While commercial logistics business processes have 
evolved towards replacing inventory mass with velocity management, the Army logistics 
system remains based upon an inventory mass concept…For the soldier, the current 
system is inflexible and generally unresponsive.  For the Army, it is obsolete and costly 
to sustain. Modernization of our thirty-year-old system is an imperative.”128
                                            
126 William Cohen, DoD News Release, May 5, 1997. [Accessed on April 2004]  Viewed at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May1997/b051997_bt250-97.html. 
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 SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY TO MODERNIZE 
In 1996, as a result of a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
recommendation, CECOM assumed responsibility for the two Army central design 
activity (CDA) logistics centers in St. Louis, Missouri, and Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.  
Previously under the authority of the Industrial Operations Command, the mission of 
these centers had been to “design, develop and maintain computer software systems 
and provide services that manage commodities, such as ammunition, avionics, 
communications and electronics, tanks, and missiles.”129
One of CECOM’s first actions at these centers was to assess the state of the 
logistics systems run at each location.  At the time, many COBOL software experts were 
retiring—in fact, most would be eligible for retirement in less than two years.130  As a 
result, CECOM managers were finding it difficult to train new employees in COBOL—
both because there were fewer and fewer people to be the trainers and because the 
technology was so old, with little application in the private sector, so recruiting new 
employees was difficult.  From their evaluation of the current systems, CCSS and SDS, 
both based on outmoded business processes and outdated technology, CECOM 
determined that addressing the outdated systems was a top priority.  Larry Asch, Chief 
of the Business and Operations Office at LMP, said, “The systems were being held 
together with spaghetti links.”131
According to CECOM, there were major weaknesses in the old AMC legacy 
systems:132  
                                            
129 General Accounting Office, “DoD Competitive Sourcing: Plan Needed to Mitigate Risks in Army 
Logistics Modernization Program,” October 1999, p. 5. 
130 LMP Special Project Team, “The Business Case: Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” 
CECOM, US Army, February 12, 2004, p. 13. 
131 Larry Asch, LMP Chief, LMP Business Office, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert 
Maly and Keith Snider.  College Park, Maryland, January 29, 2004. 
132 LMP Special Project Team, “The Business Case: Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” 
CECOM, US Army, February 12, 2004, p. 7. 
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 • Lack of flexibility: Process changes, regulatory changes, and reorganizations within 
and between user commands require expensive and extensive data conversions 
and programming changes. 
• Slow, unfocused reports: Reporting and summarization capabilities are geared to 
workers. Managers and executives, with their need for easily specified, flexible, 
tailored, and rapid generation of reports and summaries are usually frustrated with 
output capabilities. 
• Difficult to use: The system is not user friendly.  The system relies on extensive use 
of codes to provide compact storage (a holdover from the time when computer 
storage was inordinately expensive).  Users are required to learn codes and have 
extensive system knowledge. The system lacks adequate data edits and validations, 
as well as support functions. 
• Expensive to maintain: The system’s size and complexities make it difficult to 
manage and change code.  Large portions are based on relatively old third-
generation programming languages and flat data structures that are inflexible to 
change and inefficient to operate. 
• Unresponsive: The use of batch processing precludes timely updates to data 
architecture, flexible data retrieval capabilities, and informed decision-making. 
• Outmoded database: The use of outmoded database systems and architecture 
result in rampant data inconsistencies, data duplication, and the lack of data 
standardization. 
• Expensive to operate: The system requires extensive manual intervention because 
of outmoded data and system architectures. 
• Lack of cost-sharing: The Army is the only “bill payer,” precluding the ability to 
leverage existing industry investments in modern logistics processes and IT. 
Said one Army logistics consultant: “The trust in the system is not there.  
Because supply lines are slow and unreliable, the smart supply clerk orders twice as 
much as he needs, or he orders it again 30 days later, just to be sure it comes in.”133  
According to Larry Asch, the existing system was characterized by the mantra: “gotta’ 
                                            
133 Nancy Ferris, “Logistics Logjam,” Government Executive, May 1, 1999. [Accessed on February 2004]  
Viewed at http://www.govexec.com. 
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 hunch, buy a bunch.”134  Yet another observer said of the CCSS and SDS systems: 
“These old systems are literally running on patches and prayers and could collapse at 
any time.”135  The resultant excess inventory from these systems costs the Army millions 
of dollars. 
Now that CECOM was able to examine the situation with a new and independent 
perspective, the necessity for modernization was painfully obvious.  Yet, due to 
institutional resistance and inertia, the status quo had been sustained for years.  The 
transition of the CDA centers from AMC’s Industrial Operations Command to CECOM 
provided an opportunity for change and innovation. From the first days of this transition, 
CECOM proceeded with a proactive approach. 
In the CECOM tasking letter, General Benchoff made clear that the 
modernization goal was an imperative, but the direction for modernization was left wide 
open because the solution was yet unknown.  The tasking included four broad 
parameters.  First, the letter emphasized that maximizing the logistics performance to 
supply the troops was AMC’s core competency—software coding was not.   Second, 
Benchoff determined that the team must seek a solution that operated within the current 
operating budget, that is, the existing system had to maintained as the new one was 
developed—all within the current operating budget, estimated at $426M for the next 10 
years.  He did not want to go to Congress and ask for more money to fund the 
modernization because he was not confident in the result, and he knew, at minimum, 
doing so would greatly slow down the process.  Third, Benchoff believed it was 
important to use best commercial business processes and technology because the 
private sector was so far ahead of the public sector in supply chain management 
practices.  Finally, Benchoff instructed Capelli to take care of the employees at the CDA 
centers who had given many years of committed work, had done their jobs well, and 
who would be ultimately most affected by the modernization changes. 
                                            
134 Larry Asch, LMP Chief, LMP Business Office, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert 
Maly and Keith Snider.  College Park, Maryland, January 29, 2004. 
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 With these broad parameters, AMC gave Capelli’s team the modernization task 
and essentially said, “Now go figure out how to do this.” 
Within a week of assuming the responsibility to direct the new logistics 
modernization program, Paul knew that the staffing of the special project team was his 
first important responsibility as the team leader.  Finding themselves in uncharted 
territory, Paul and one of his key attorneys, Thomas Carroll, decided they needed 
expertise in key areas of contracting, logistics and IT.  Fortunately, Paul’s supervisor, 
Victor Ferlise, was an avid supporter of the program.  Ferlise essentially told Capelli: 
“Get the best and the brightest people—give me specific names you need, and we’ll get 
them.”136  Paul and Thomas made a list of their nominees, emphasizing highly 
knowledgeable people who were innovators and risk-takers. 
Said Paul Capelli: “My initial concerns were focused around getting the right 
people together.  Fortunately, this consideration was a core element for my 
management as well. We got the best and the brightest that CECOM had to offer, and 
then when the contract was eventually awarded, we got the best and the brightest of 
what the AMC community had to offer.”137  
Thomas Carroll said: “Vic Ferlise went to the Commander and said, ‘We want 
this guy and this guy.’  And of course we were asking for the best of the best, so 
everyone objected.  But our task was such a priority that our leaders mandated the 
personnel choices.  That’s how we got the team we needed.”138
                                                                                                                                             
135 Paul Taibl, “Army Logistics Modernization Program: A Case Study,” Business Executives for National 
Security Tail-to-Tooth, April 9, 1999. [Accessed on February 2004]  Viewed at http://www.bens.org.  
136 Larry Asch, LMP Chief, LMP Business Office, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert 
Maly and Keith Snider.  College Park, Maryland, January 29, 2004. 
137 Paul Capelli, email response to questions, May 14, 2004 
 
138 Thomas Carroll, LMP Attorney, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly and Keith 
Snider.  Moorestown, New Jersey, March 11, 2004. 
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 By the Spring of 1998, Capelli had 7 new people on his team that represented 
some of the most experienced CECOM staff.  Many team members had over 20 years 
experience with major contracts and complicated programs.  In all, the team had over 
100 years of acquisition experience.139 With such a talented roster, AMC leadership 
empowered the team to freely seek modernization solutions without unnecessary 
oversight and restrictions.  The team was required to directly coordinate with only one of 
their superiors, Victor Ferlise, the Deputy to the Commander of CECOM. 
Once they took a closer look at the challenges facing them, for Capelli and his 
team, the path ahead was clear: 
“It is time, once again, for the Army’s wholesale logistics business systems to lay 
claim to the title of state of the art by adopting commercially available business 
processes and enabling technologies.  A refinement of our systems is not enough.  We 
can only achieve a revolution in military logistics if we first revolutionize our business 
affairs.  The destination is known.  It is a place where American industry resides; 
successfully forged out of competition in a global marketplace during the 80s and 
90s.”140
In order to accomplish their first task, developing feasible alternatives for logistics 
modernization, the team began work on a business case. 
                                            
139 Ibid. 
140 Paul Capelli and John Keogh, “Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” LMP, US Army, p. 1. 
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 ALTERNATIVES: HOW TO MODERNIZE? 
First, the team began to conduct market research to see where the best private 
sector firms were regarding supply chain processes.  The team decided early in the 
process that free and open communication with the private sector was critical to their 
success.  While they had their top-level goal of modernization, they did not have a 
template of how to achieve that goal.  Said Carroll, “At every step, we were more open 
with industry about what we were doing, and why we were doing it than anyone has 
ever been in a government procurement, in my experience.”141  So, the team conducted 
meetings for 6-8 months with industry leaders to find out what lessons learned and best 
practices companies had discovered from their own modernization efforts.  The team 
also developed a website that enabled companies and prospective service vendors to 
ask questions about the LMP project and enter into a dialogue with the project team. 
As a result of their research and communication with industry, the team realized 
their modernization goal was essentially dual in nature: (1) to reengineer their business 
processes, and (2) to support those new processes with modern information 
technology.142  With this goal and the original parameters in mind, the LMP team used 
the following as screening criteria for potential alternatives:143
• Wholesale logistics must change to meet the needs of the modern Army. 
• The potential performing organization must have the expertise to perform Business 
Process Reengineering (BPR) and the experience to implement logistics 
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software. 
• The alternatives must have an acceptable level of risk and risk mitigation strategy. 
• Alternatives must have the potential to meet the schedule for developing and fielding 
the Army Global Combat Support System (GCSS-Army is a strategy to modernize 
                                            
141 Thomas Carroll, LMP Attorney, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly and Keith 
Snider.  Moorestown, New Jersey, March 11, 2004. 
142 Ibid. 
143 LMP Special Project Team, “The Business Case: Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” 
CECOM, US Army, February 12, 2004, p. 11. 
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 and implement an integrated logistics system that meets the requirements of the 21st 
century).  
Alternatives must have the potential to be executable within the existing operating 
budget. 
• 
d on the screening criteria, the status quo was rejected as a viable option, 
which reconfirmed the commitment to bring about the needed changes.  In the Business 
Case s
The CDAs perform legacy sustainment while minimizing changes to existing 
rnment also performs wholesale logistics modernization.  This in-
house t 
tion 
The Government performs legacy sustainment; the contractor performs 
odernization and sustainment of the modernized system.  
Alterna ues to 
The Contractor performs legacy sustainment services and wholesale logistics 
s.  The contractor will employ displaced Central Design Activities 
center
                                           
Base
tudy, the LMP team identified three alternatives to the status quo.144
Alternative 1: 
systems.  The Gove
effort employs the current workforce to implement a modern enterprise projec
with COTS software.  This alternative assumes that the CDAs will be reorganized, 
provided the skills and trained to perform industry-quality BPR.  Additionally, they will 
acquire the skills to design and implement a system that will achieve the moderniza
and sustainment goals of the LMP and GCSS-Army. 
Alternative 2:  
wholesale logistics m
tive 2 relies on the private sector for modernization while the Army contin
maintain its legacy system. 
Alternative 3:   
modernization service
 workers.   
 
144 Ibid, 11-12. 
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 Under Alternative 1, federal IT employees would be responsible for the 
modernization, yet the majority of these employees had neither the expertise nor the 
basic skills necessary for such a transformation.  A 1997 General Accounting Office 
(GAO) report said that when federal employees attempt to undertake a software 
modernization such as the LMP, the result often “is characterized by a software process 
that is ad hoc, and occasionally even chaotic.”145  In addition to lacking the basic 
software and programming skills, existing federal employees lacked critical BPR 
knowledge and experience that was needed for the logistics modernization.  On top of 
the performance risk that these deficiencies posed, re-training the federal employees 
would pose time and financial risks.  The Business Case estimated the cost of 
Alternative 1 at $581.7M for the next 10 years, which would exceed the current 
operating budget by at least 30 percent; and even if the federal employees were able to 
reengineer the logistic process and modernize the system, the LMP team estimated a 
delay of at least four years (see Figure 1 for Investment/Implementation Comparison of 
the three Alternatives). 
Under Alternative 2, perhaps the biggest risk to the LMP was the conversion from 
the legacy system to the modernized system.  Using this alternative, there would likely 
be an adversarial relationship between the government employees and the contractor 
because as the modernization was implemented, the contractor would be increasingly 
displacing government employees.  In fact, there was an inverse incentive for 
government employees to work inefficiently toward the program goals so that their 
employment could be extended.  Furthermore, the actual conversion of data from the 
legacy system to the new system would be at risk. The Business Case noted:  
When the legacy system and a modernized system are separated, and their 
respective responsibilities for each system is separated between the government 
                                            
145 General Accounting Office, “Defense Computers: LSSC Needs to Confront Significant Year 2000 
Issues,” September 1997, p. 9-10. 
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 and the contractor, the risk inherent in the data migration is magnified since each 
organization has little expertise in the other’s systems and processes.146
Although the estimated cost of Alternative 2 was $425.2M for a ten year period, 
which was below the current operating budget, the risks were such that Army officials 
feared the estimate could quickly balloon. 
Also, under Alternative 2, there would be no provision for a “soft-landing” for the 
then 478 government employees at the two Central Design Activities centers in St. 
Louis and Chambersburg.147  Under alternative 3, the soft-landing was an arrangement 
in which the winning contractor would agree to employ the government employees 
affected by the transition for a pre-specified period of time, offering competitive pay and 
benefits.  Consideration of the employees at the CDA centers had been one of the 
original mandates for the project team.  Moreover, without a soft-landing provision, 
Army officials feared the federal employees, who had the most expertise in sustaining 
the legacy system until modernization was fully implemented, would leave before the 
transition took place.  One solution to this specific concern would be to migrate the 
systems in a “turn key” fashion—turning on the modernized system all at once while 
turning off the legacy system.  However, the Joint Logistics Systems Center had tried 
this approach in a similar effort in 1998 with little success.  The LMP team determined a 
phased approach, with incremental transitions between the systems, was preferred. 
The project team strongly recommended Alternative 3 with a ten year program 
cost of $420.9.  The project team determined that the biggest risk posed by Alternative 
3 was the interruption of logistics services during the transition from the government to 
the contractor.  However, since the status quo had already been rejected, this 
alternative appeared the least risky of the three.  Essentially, the team determined the 
greatest risk was doing nothing.  Private industry, with companies such as Federal 
Express, Chrysler and Proctor and Gamble, had proven its ability to continuously 
                                            
146 LMP Special Project Team, “The Business Case: Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” 
CECOM, US Army, February 12, 2004, p. 24. 
147 General Accounting Office, “DoD Competitive Sourcing: Plan Needed to Mitigate Risks in Army 
Logistics Modernization Program,” October 1999, p. 7. 
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 integrate new technology and reengineer business processes to enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness.  This alternative would allow the modernization to occur under current 
Army funding levels, as directed, because the winning contractor would be required to 
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Source: LMP Business Case, 1999 
In the end, the project team determined Alternative 3 would best satisfy LMP 
goals and objectives.  This alternative, utilizing commercial best practices and proven 
experience, had the lowest estimated cost for the government (see Table 1), the lowest 
level of risk, and the best prospect for a timely transition.  In addition, it was the only 
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  Baseline Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 
Current 
Dollars 
$426.0M $581.7M $425.2M $420.9M 
Table 1.  Cost summary of Alternatives (10 Year program)   
Source: LMP Business Case, 1999 
Said Capelli: “If you look at any of the other alternatives, the people impacts are 
much more severe…I personally believe that many of [the employees] will be better off 
[under LMP].”148
Under this alternative, the Army would neither own nor operate the new system.  
According to Victor Ferlise, “We made a fundamental switch from the procurement of 
systems to the acquisition of services.”149  The contractor that the Army selects would be 
responsible for re-engineering and modernizing the service’s logistics processes using 
commercial best practices on a continual basis—thereby satisfying the team’s two-fold 
goal.  “We didn’t want to worry about obsolescence every couple years,” said Asch.150
                                            
148 Nancy Ferris, “Logistics Logjam,” Government Executive, May 1, 1999. [Accessed on February 2004]  
Viewed at http://www.govexec.com. 
149 Victor Ferlise, “Innovations in Logistics Modernization,” Program Manager, May/June 2000, p. 64. 
150 Dan Caterinicchia, “Army Logistics Marches Ahead,” Federal Computer Weekly, November 18, 2002. 
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 COMPARING APPLES TO ORANGES:  
OUTSOURCING OR PRIVATIZATION 
Once it settled on Alternative 3, the project team considered how their 
modernization effort would need to use the relevant government processes for acquiring 
private sector services.  The team believed they would need to conduct either an 
outsourcing or privatization effort. 
All outsourcing proposals were required to comply with the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 requirements; that is, to use “competitive sourcing” 
(i.e. competition between the public and private sector to do the work).  A-76 requires all 
federal agencies pursuing competitive sourcing options to allow the federal employees 
to form a “most efficient organization” (MEO) in order to compete on equal footing with 
the private companies for a contract.  While outsourcing is the sourcing model in which 
organizational activities are contracted out to vendors or suppliers who specialize in 
these activities in a competitive fashion.151  However, the LMP project team believed its 
objectives required privatization, not outsourcing.  In contrast to outsourcing, 
privatization is the sourcing model in which current government equipment and 
personnel are moved into the private sector.152  First, the team maintained that it did not 
make sense to conduct a cost comparison competition under A-76 because the current 
CDA employees were not comparable to the BPR and IT experts in the private sector 
with which they would be competing.  “It was like comparing apples to oranges,” said 
Carroll.153  Secondly, in an A-76 competition, when the government MEO loses, the 
employees lose their jobs completely.  From their market research and the business 
case, the team knew the CDA employees had no chance to compete through the A-76 
                                            
151 Jacques Gansler, Moving Toward Market-Based Government: The Changing Role of Government as 
the Provider, Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise and the IBM Endowment for the Business of 
Government, June 2003, p. 10. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Thomas Carroll, LMP Attorney, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly and Keith 
Snider.  Moorestown, New Jersey, March 11, 2004. 
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 process with the private sector because they simply did not possess the necessary 
expertise.  Privatization was consistent with their desire for a soft-landing provision with 
the winning contractor.  Consequently, privatization was deemed the way to go. 
The team decided to work towards a strategic partnership with one contractor for 
a 10-year period.  However, the team’s research led them to decide that their first 
priority would be to find the best company, not necessarily the best software solution 
initially. They determined: 
…no ‘silver bullet’ solution [was] available that satisf[ied] all the Army’s 
anticipated needs. Rather several commercial software products provide the 
functionality to accomplish the wholesale logistics requirements.  This 
research indicates clearly that the effort to develop and gain approval of the 
reengineered business practices as a baseline for determining an IT and 
organizational solution must be a priority effort.154  
By April 1998, the team’s plans to modernize through privatization were 
approved through top-level management in CECOM, AMC, and the Army.  However, 
when their proposal reached the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level and 
OMB, OMB told OSD and the project team that in fact LMP was an outsourcing 
initiative, not a privatization effort, and that they did need to conduct a competition with 
the government employees.  OSD did not appear willing to take on that political battle, 
so the team was stuck with the A-76 process despite their reasoning to the contrary.  
According to Carroll, “At that point, we thought our efforts were finished because we 
knew an A-76 cost comparison was a waste of time in this circumstance.” 
Nonetheless, the team still had one remaining option.  OMB representatives had 
mentioned that the Circular allowed for the application of a waiver in special 
circumstances.  Vince Buonocore, the team’s main attorney and Assistant to the Chief 
Council at CECOM, found that their case for a waiver fit OMB’s requirements.  He also 
                                            
154 LMP Special Project Team, “The Business Case: Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” 
CECOM, US Army, February 12, 2004, p. 34. 
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 found that although waivers were permitted under A-76 guidelines, there was in fact no 
precedent for a waiver request.155  Still the team pushed forward—they had nothing to 
lose by trying.  The team officially assembled their case for a waiver, and AMC 
Commander General Johnnie Wilson sent an A-76 waiver package to the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics and Environment in October of 1998.  
Wilson signed the waiver request saying, “An elongated A-76 process can take between 
14 months and 24 months to complete…. If we cannot get the waiver approved, then it’s 
really going to set us back.”156  The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, 
Logistics and Environment—ultimately responsible for granting the initial waiver 
according to OMB regulations—approved LMP’s waiver request.  Although OMB had 
published the A-76 Circular, OMB did not have a direct role in the waiver process once 
the team submitted its request.  Thus, it was essential for LMP to have the support from 
top-level management throughout the DoD chain of command. 
In anticipation of future resistance, the original waiver package was revised in 
March of 1999 to include a revised business case, an economic analysis, an acquisition 
strategy, a logistics integration agency study, background on private sector supply chain 
achievements, and a risk analysis of the alternatives.157  The memorandum in support of 
the request listed three main reasons for a waiver: (1) the conversion will result in 
significant service quality improvements, (2) the conversion will not serve to reduce 
significantly the level or quality of competition in the future award or performance of 
work, and (3) the functions to be converted are not inherently governmental.158  
However, a waiver request had in fact never been attempted because such a move was 
                                            
155 As of March 2004, the members of the LMP project team believe that the LMP waiver request was the 
first and only request of its kind for any executive agency. 
156 Gregory Slabodkin, “Army Seeks A-76 Waiver for Logistics Project,” Government Computer News, 
November 23, 1998. [Accessed on February 2004]  Viewed at 
http://www.gcn.com/archives/gcn/1998/november23/3a.htm. 
157 General Accounting Office, “DoD Competitive Sourcing: Plan Needed to Mitigate Risks in Army 
Logistics Modernization Program,” October 1999, p. 20. 
158 LMP Special Project Team, Memorandum in Support of the Request for Cost Comparison Waiver in 
Connection with the Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program, US Army, p. 1. 
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 170- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 expected to bring stiff resistance from unions and Congress.  Indeed, the expectations 
for resistance were realized. 
THE BIGGEST HURDLE:  
CONGRESS, UNIONS AND A SOFT-LANDING 
On April 27, 1999, the Army notified Congress and the CDA employees that it 
had approved an A-76 waiver for the LMP project.  In early May, the local union in St. 
Louis that represented many of the St. Louis CDA employees, the National Federation 
of Federal Employees (NFFE), officially filed an appeal with the Army (the 
Chambersburg center employees were not represented by a union).  NFFE claimed the 
government employees should be able to compete for the contract through the 
traditional A-76 process.  Immediately, Congressional representatives from the two 
areas became involved. 
Representative Dick Gephardt, the House Minority Leader, was heavily 
connected with labor unions in Missouri and represented some of the employees at the 
St. Louis CDA. With Gephardt, Representatives Jim Talent and Jerry Costello, 
members whose districts also held the St. Louis CDA employees, demanded to know 
what was happening to their constituents’ jobs. 
Due to the number of government jobs involved, the program was highly charged 
politically, but it was also covering new ground.  As a result, Capelli and Buonocore 
were required to make innumerable trips around Washington to brief and explain to 
many congressional committees, representatives, military departments and even other 
executive agencies what LMP was doing and why.  According to Buonocore, whose 
primary role on the team was to serve as an advocate for the program, helping put 
together the request for the waiver and responding to interested parties in Washington: 
The attitude in the Pentagon often was: ‘Get as many fingerprints on it 
as possible so there is enough blame to be spread around when the political 
heat comes in.’  A lot of the resistance was due to the unprecedented nature 
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 of our program.  There really weren’t many substantive program issues to 
deal with.  This just wasn’t the way competitive sourcing was done…and 
people were put off by it because it had never been tried at that time.  We 
had to explain, explain, and explain again.159
Meanwhile, in March of 1999, the project team had continued to prepare its 
solicitation and evaluation strategy for potential contractors.  Their strategy was not to 
ask competing companies for a business process and software solution, but to ask for 
an approach to find the solution.  To facilitate this process, the team used a commercial 
business practice called “due diligence,” a risk management tool often used prior to 
corporate acquisitions.160  In their case, the LMP team defined “due diligence” as “a 
period of time wherein offerors shall be allowed to examine the organizations and 
operations associated with the WLMP. This period will allow offerors to asses the 
program’s needs in order to mitigate proposal risks.”161 This included site visits and 
access to an Internet-based virtual library. 
The team then focused on each company’s risk assessment of the contractors’ 
proposed approaches to finding a business process and software solution.  With their 
responsibility to take care of CDA employees in mind, the team wanted to make the 
contract a win-win for both the government and the private vendor.  Their Request for 
Proposal (RFP) required all offerors to put a minimum soft-landing requirement in the 
contract, stating that the contract must offer at least a one-year job guarantee to all CDA 
employees, at the current geographical location, with comparable pay and benefits.    
Additionally, one of their evaluation criteria was “What are you going to do to get a hold 
of the expertise you need to sustain our legacy systems—which we are going to transfer 
                                            
159 Vince Buonocore, LMP Attorney, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly and Keith 
Snider.  Moorestown, New Jersey, March 11, 2004. 
160 For more information about LMP’s use of the Due Diligence process, see: Lea Duerinck, “Use of Due 
Diligence in the Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” Program Manager, July/August 2000. 
161 Lea Duerinck, “Use of Due Diligence in the Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” Program 
Manager, July/August 2000, p. 61. 
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 to you at the time of award—until modernization is complete?”162  The team asked how 
each company was going to mitigate the risk of losing legacy expertise until the 
transition was completed knowing well that the only logical solution for the contractors to 
mitigate the risk was to hire the current CDA employees.   
Said Carroll: “The only place the offerors could get the expertise to run the legacy 
systems was from the CDA employees, so the employees became valuable assets to 
win the contract and to achieve future performance bonuses…We were able to take this 
to Congress, leaders in DoD and the employees and say, ‘yes, taking care of our people 
is a top priority.’” 
In addition to the due diligence process, the team employed other methods of 
commercial acquisition practice that were allowed by the recent revisions to the Federal 
Acquisition Reform Act.163  Most notably, the team conducted communications with the 
offerors prior to establishing the competitive range.  The team provided each offeror 
Initial, Interim and Final Evaluation Reports that listed their strengths, weaknesses and 
deficiencies.164  These periodic reports let the offerors know exactly where they stood 
throughout the evaluation process.  As a result, the contractors knew what specific 
points in their offer to improve, and the proposals continually got better.  For instance, in 
the end, the winning contractor offered a three-year soft-landing—two years beyond the 
team’s minimum requirement. 
As the process went along, LMP received a lot of high level interest from within 
DoD due to the innovative methods that were being introduced.  In fact, in terms of the 
soft-landing, it was the first ever in DoD history.165  LMP enjoyed the support of many 
key leaders such as the Secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of Staff, and 
                                            
162 Thomas Carroll, LMP Attorney, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly and Keith 
Snider.  Moorestown, New Jersey, March 11, 2004. 
163 The most recent section of Federal Acquisition Reform Act to be rewritten is Section 15, “Contracting 
by Negotiation,” which was used specifically by the LMP team. 
164 Paul Capelli and John Keogh, “Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” LMP, US Army, p. 4. 
165 Nancy Ferris, “Logistics Logjam,” Government Executive, May 1, 1999. [Accessed on February 2004]  
Viewed at http://www.govexec.com. 
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 Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology Dr. Jacques 
Gansler. 
 
”I really supported the Army’s Logistics Modernization Program.  In the end 
it demonstrated that with good planning you can arrive at a win-win 
situation…the Army acquired a state of the art, COTS based logistics 
management system, while the soft landing program protected the 
displaced employees.” Dr. Jacques S. Gansler 
 
In addition to their trips to the Pentagon, Capelli and Buonocore estimate that 
they delivered about 20 briefings on the Hill.  Of those trips, only two were to House 
member Bud Shuster who represented the Chambersburg employees.  Once they 
explained the substantive reasoning for LMP, and explained the soft-landing provision 
they were requiring of the winning contractor, Rep. Shuster and his staff understood 
what the LMP program was trying to accomplish.  
The experience was different with the St. Louis representatives because the 
union involvement was providing a source of greater resistance.  Capelli and Buonocore 
made many trips to brief these representatives with the same presentation.  
Interestingly, after Capelli and Buonocore had explained the soft landing provision that 
they were requiring  to the staffers of Rep. Gephardt, one of the most prominent union 
supporters in Congress, most of the staffers reacted positively to the plans, and 
repeatedly asked: “Gee, it all sounds good—so tell us again why the union doesn’t like 
it?”  Says Buonocore, “Was the local union stoking the fires in St. Louis?  Yes, no 
question, because there weren’t really many objections with the substance and 
reasoning for the program.”166
                                            
166 Vince Buonocore, LMP Attorney, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly and Keith 
Snider.  Moorestown, New Jersey, March 11, 2004. 
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 LMP did have lobbyists in their corner as well—among them, the Information 
Technology Association of America and the Professional Services Council.  Ultimately, 
Capelli said the scales in Congress tipped in their favor because “of the sanity of what 
we were tasked to do. We had to modernize. It made sense to outsource. The money 
was right and just as importantly we had devised a plan to take care of the Government 
employees that were being outsourced.”167  
Capelli and Buonocore tried other mollifying measures with NFFE when things 
continued to stagnate. They had visited the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis 
where, in the face of a nationwide wave of base closures, the Navy had conducted a 
privatization effort to place the operation of the center under private control.168  In this 
case, the Navy and the winning contractor conciliated the union representing the public 
employees by allowing the employees to remain unionized even after the public-to-
private transition took place.  They had specifically asked the local NFFE president, 
John Morris, whether a similar approach could work in St. Louis, but Morris ultimately 
responded that such a move went against NFFE’s national charter, and was therefore 
not a possibility. 
When NFFE maintained that the Army wouldn’t negotiate or communicate, 
Capelli and the LMP team “took great pains” to keep the union informed and extended 
opportunities to NFFE to share any input they may have had on implementation and 
impact proposals.169  Buonocore says the team never received a response from the 
union in this regard because the union was caught in a catch-22 situation.  On one 
hand, the union wanted to preserve their stance that the agency wasn’t negotiating.  On 
                                            
167 Paul Capelli, email response to questions, May 14, 2004 
 
168 Jacques Gansler, Moving Toward Market-Based Government: The Changing Role of Government as 
the Provider, Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise and the IBM Endowment for the Business of 
Government, June 2003, p. 29. 
169 Vince Buonocore, LMP Attorney, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly and Keith 
Snider.  Moorestown, New Jersey, March 11, 2004. 
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 the other hand, if the union gave any advice or proposals, they were facilitating the 
same process that they were trying to stop. 
Army Secretary Louis Caldera, responsible for the final appeal decision, rejected 
the union appeal and sustained the initial decision in a September 30, 1999 
memorandum, stating: “The OMB Circular A-76 process is intended to apply to recurring 
commercial activities.  The Circular is not intended to constrain federal agencies in the 
adoption of better business management practices or the termination of obsolete 
services…Accordingly, I deny all of the appeals on the wholly independent ground that 
the A-76 process is not applicable.”170
                                            
170 Brian Friel, “Army Outsourcing Plan Leads to Employee Exodus,” Government Executive, October 18, 
1999. [Accessed on March 2004]Viewed at http://www.govexec.com. 
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 CONCLUSION 
When all else had failed, in early December NFFE went to the U.S. District Court 
of the Eastern District of Missouri looking for a restraining order and an injunction. The 
correspondence from the team to the union, which clearly requested and welcomed the 
union’s help served to repudiate the union’s claim that the Army and the LMP Program 
were not negotiating.  Also, the business case and the myriad of appeal analyses 
stating why the cost comparison did not make sense in LMP’s case were enough to 
rebut the union’s charge that the process for decision-making was arbitrary and unfair. 
The final legal appeal was unsuccessful, and on December 30, 1999, AMC awarded the 
Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) with a 10-year contract—the ten year contract 
was required so that CSC could recoup the loss during the development phase while 
they were also maintaining the legacy system and operating at a loss.  
Ultimately, AMC chose CSC because: (1) their performance bonus plan was 
more aggressive—they were willing to put a greater percentage of their revenues 
contingent on their performance, and the team believed this minimized the Army’s risk; 
and (2) their soft landing plan was better for employees. CSC guaranteed every 
employee a three-year job guarantee in the same geographic location, comparable pay 
and benefits, and a $15,000 bonus with the first CSC paycheck. 
Addressing the final soft-landing package extended to the CDA employees by 
CSC, Capelli said: 
Throughout the entire process leading up to award, never once was 
the ‘soft-landing’ taken off the table. Everyone, from each member of my 
team, to Commanding Generals at all levels, to Congressmen and Senators, 
took this aspect of the program very seriously. All were adamant that our 
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 displaced employees get a fair shake for ensuring the readiness of our 
soldiers. We think the package extended by CSC is an excellent one.171
In the end, job offers were extended to all remaining 207 employees, with 205 
accepting.172  Originally, there were almost 500 total employees at both centers.  Most 
CDA employees, however, were participants in the legacy Civil Service Retirement 
System, and 83% were eligible for regular or early retirement within five years of 1999. 
173 Consequently, many employees chose to transfer to other federal positions or accept 
buyouts and early retirement packages offered by the Army.174   
Capelli and his team were satisfied that they had successfully completed their 
difficult task with an innovative solution.  For Capelli, the LMP would “provide a single 
wholesale logistics system175 that will be capable of providing timely, flexible and cost-
effective world wide distribution of assets that can sustain integrated, joint and 
multinational military and peacetime operations…From a logistics standpoint, the LMP 
is on the cutting edge of everything the Army wants to become…LMP will forward the 
march in the revolution in business affairs and resultant revolution in military logistics.”176
                                            
171 Paul Capelli, email response to questions, May 14, 2004 
172 Computer Sciences Corporation, “Logistics Modernization Program Transition.” [Accessed on April 
2004]  Viewed at http://www.csc.com/industries/government/casestudies/1346.shtml. 
173 General Accounting Office, “DoD Competitive Sourcing: Plan Needed to Mitigate Risks in Army 
Logistics Modernization Program,” October 1999, p. 17. 
174 Larry Asch, LMP Chief, LMP Business Office, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert 
Maly and Keith Snider.  College Park, Maryland, January 29, 2004. 
175 NOTE: the retail portion is under the Global Combat Support System-Army 
176 Paul Capelli and John Keogh, “Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” LMP, US Army, p. 5. 
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 APPENDIX B 
Terms and Abbreviations 
AMC  Army Materiel Command 
BPR  Business Process Reengineering 
BRAC  Base Realignment and Closure 
CCSS  Commodity Command Standard System 
CECOM Communications-Electronics Command 
CDA  Central Design Activity 
CIO  Chief Information Officer 
COTS  Commercial off-the-shelf 
CSC  Computer Sciences Corporation 
COBOL Common Business Oriented Language 
DoD  Department of Defense 
GAO  General Accounting Office 
GCSS  Global Combat Support System 
IT  Information Technology 
LMP  Logistics Modernization Program (or WLMP, or LOGMOD) 
LOGMOD Logistics Modernization Program (or WLMP, or LMP) 
MEO  Most Efficient Organization 
NFFE  National Federation of Federal Employees 
OMB  Office of Management and Budget 
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense 
SDS  Standard Depot System 
WLMP Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program (or LMP, or LOGMOD)  
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 Web links to Presentations and Appendices 
The enclosed CD has the presentations from the Acquisition Research Program, which 
are outlined below: 
Panel I: Issues in Acquisition Policies 
Centralized Control of Defense Acquisition Programs 
What’s T&E’s Role? 
Panel II: Total Ownership Costs: The Future 
Total Ownership Cost: An Exercise in Discipline 
Impact of Software 
Panel III: Performance Based Logistics: Contractor Performance Measurements 
Characteristics of Good Metrics 
Using Metrics 
Panel VI: Government in the Market Place 
Navy - Privatization Case Study 




Presentations are available within the attached CD or online at 
 http://www.nps.navy.mil/gsbpp/ACQN/forums/symposium 
Copies of the Acquisition Sponsored Research Reports may be printed from our 
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 FY 2004 Sponsored Acquisition Research Products 
Sponsored Report Series 
NPS-CM-04-006 Measurement Issues in Performance Based Logistics 
June 2004 
NPS-CM-04-004 Update of the Navy Contract Writing, Phase II  
June 2004 
NPS-CM-04-001 Update of the Navy Contract Writing, Phase I 
December 2003 
NPS-CM-04-002 Marine Corps Contingency Contracting MCI  
December 2003 
Working Paper Series 
NPS-CM-04-012 Air Force Commodity Councils: 
   Leveraging the Power of Procurement 
September 2004 
NPS-LM-04-009 Improving the Management of Reliability 
August 2004 
NPS-AM-04-007 The Impact of Software Support on 
System Total Ownership Cost 
July 2004 
NPS-LM-04-003 Enablers to Ensure a Successful Force Centric Logistics Enterprise 
April 2004 
Acquisition Case Series 
NPS-CM-04-008 Privatization of the Naval Air Warfare Center 
Aircraft Division, Indianapolis 
July 2004 
NPS-PM-04-010 The Army Seeks a World Class Logistics Modernization Program 
June 2004 
Acquisition Symposium Proceedings 
NPS-AM-04-005 Charting a Course for Change: Acquisition Theory and Practice for 
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 FY 2003 Sponsored Acquisition Research Products 
Sponsored Report Series 
NPS-AM-03-003  Centralized Control of Defense Acquisition Programs:  
A Comparative Review of the Framework from 1987 – 2003 
September 2003 
NPS-AM-03-004 Reduction of Total Ownership Cost 
September 2003 
NPS-CM-03-006 Auto-Redact Toolset for Department of Defense Contracts 
September 2003 
Working Paper Series 
NPS-CM-03-002 Transformation in DOD Contract Closeout 
June 2003 
Acquisition Case Series 
NPS-CM-03-005 Contract Closeout (A) 
   September 2003 
Other Sponsored Research 
NPS-CM-03-001 Transformation in DOD Contract Closeout 





Copies of the Acquisition Sponsored Research Reports may be printed from our 
website www.nps.navy.mil/gsbpp/acqn/publications   
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